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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation explores the intellectual development of two leading members of 
the Young Turk organisation during its early phase – that is, the period before the 
organisation turned into the militarist nationalist group that carried out the 1908 
Revolution and ruled Turkey until the end of WW1. The thesis argues that the two 
intellectual activists, Ahmet Rıza and Mehmet Sabahettin, have been central figures 
in the theoretical emergence of an Ottoman synthesis, which responded to the 
geopolitics of the empire and aspired to provide an intellectual bridge between the 
Empire and Europe. My main object of analysis are Young Turk journals published 
mainly in France between 1890s and 1907, of which Rıza and Sabahettin were 
editors or contributors, as well as the thematic volumes they authored. I contend that 
an understanding of the arguments put forward by these activists is crucial in 
constructing a more accurate picture of the historical continuum between nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century Ottoman/Turkish politics. This new picture enriches the 
narrative of a Kemalist debate on modernity as rupture with the Empire‘s past and 
confronts nationalist frames of looking at the Ottoman past that have been very 
prevalent in modern Turkish historiography. Throughout this research, I present a 
fresh reading of an intensely-studied period. I claim that the periodisation of Young 
Turk history is, besides few exceptions, misrepresented and that the early phase of 
the organisation has not been given the attention and analytical depth it deserves. I 
suggest that a comparative interrogation of the varied visions of Ottoman opposition 
groups, which has not been done before, sheds light on the much-debated transition 
from Empire to Republic and acknowledges an ideological bridge between the 
political and social ideas of pre- and post- Republican period. 
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based on that of the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES), 
unless taken from a source that uses a different method (Encyclopaedia of Islam). 
Names in languages that use a non-Latin script have been rendered in Latin script.  
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
The object of enquiry 
On the 23
rd
 September 1912, while fighting against the Italians in North Africa, 
Enver,
1
 a young Ottoman officer en route to become one of the most influential 
statesmen of the Ottoman Empire, wrote to a friend in Europe: 
C‘est un poison votre civilisation, mais c‘est un poison qui éveille et 
on ne veut, on ne peut plus dormir. On sent que si on refermait les 
yeux, ce serait pour mourir. Et la grande différence c‘est que vous 
autres avec tout votre ‗Erkenntnis‘ [knowledge] vous prenez la vie 
légèrement tandisque [sic] nous, quand nous avons la ‗Erkenntnis‘ 
nous nous rendons la vie plus difficile qu‘elle ne l‘est en vérité, 
surtout si nous changeons les principes que nous sommes habitués.2
 
 
 
How did Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals in the late nineteenth century translate 
their visions of the future into practical strategies for reform? This is what the next 
few hundred pages will attempt to unravel. The dilemma articulated by Enver Pasha 
represents what Ottoman reformers had been asking themselves for a very long 
period, at least since the reign of Sultan Süleyman in the mid sixteenth century.
3
 
Since then, the pressing question ‗How can the state be saved?‘ had been tackled in 
                                                          
1
 Enver (1881-1922) was a Young Turk soldier who went on to become one of the most important 
statesmen of the Unionist period. He was sent to Berlin as military attaché and became very close to 
the German government. In 1911, he took command of the Ottoman forces fighting the Italians in 
Lybia but returned to Istanbul the following year, when the Italians took control of area. He was 
nonetheless promoted in rank for his efforts in North Africa. At the 1912 Congress of the Committee 
of Union and Progress he ensured the appointment of his friend Talat. Following the defeat of the 
Ottoman military during the Balkan Wars in 1912 and the subsequent weakened Ottoman 
government, in 1913 he took the position of War Minister. During the Second Balkan Wars, he 
achieved important victories, and, once back in Istanbul, managed to acquire enough power to 
establish a triumvirate with his two closest associates, Talat (as Minister of Inetrior Affairs) and 
Cemal (as Minister of the Navy). By 1914, he had become commander-in-chief and was the 
mastermind, together with his two associates, behind the Ottoman entry into World War One on the 
side of Germany. However, his choice and military skills proved insufficient and the Ottoman army 
in Northeastern Anatolia suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Russians, leading Justin 
McCarthy to state the following: ―Enver was convinced he was a strategic genius, but really he was a 
cowboy.‖ Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: an introductory history to 1923 (London: Longman, 
1997), 359. With the defeat in sight and following clashes with Armenians, on 2
nd
 November 1918, 
Enver, Talat and Cemal boarded a German vessel and fled the Empire. Enver was killed in battle in 
August 1922, while Talat was killed in Gemrany in 1921 by an Armenian activist. Cemal was killed 
in Tbilisi, in the same year, by another Armenian activist. 
2
 Kendi Mektuplarında Enver Paşa, edited by Şükrü Hanioğlu (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1989), 188. 
3
 Bernard Lewis, ―Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline,‖ Islamic Studies 1, no. 1 (1962): 71-87. 
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different ways, but never so drastically as during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. 
 
When Enver wrote these lines, it was ten years since the first Congress of Ottoman 
Liberals held in Paris in 1902 and four years after the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908 that had reinstated the constitution. However, the way to close one‘s eyes and 
absorb the influence of Western European civilisation, as Enver framed it, without 
dying in the process – death here takes the form of cultural annihilation, loss of 
traditional aspects of society or the collapse of the Empire as political entity – had 
not yet been decisively defined. 
 
Reform in the Ottoman Empire had started with the first attempts to modernise the 
military in the late eighteenth century – under Selim III – yet these attempts were 
neither unitary nor consistent. Much of the difficulty of the endeavour resided in the 
nature of the Empire itself, which was ethnically, religiously, and culturally so 
diverse that it proved extremely difficult to formulate coherent ideas and plans for its 
organisation. In the nineteenth century, the ethos of reform picked up more 
momentum, as the threat of collapse became more realistic and Western intervention 
increased. Moreover, some minorities were starting to see the appeal of a 
nationalistic discourse, as put forth in the West, giving weight to linguistic, ethnic or 
religious definitions of the self as opposed to what had been the multilayered and 
pluralistic Ottoman Empire. Additionally, a side-effect of reform had emerged: as 
the military, the statesmen, and the broader elite started to study scientific subjects, 
so far marginalised due to their alleged incompatibility with Islam, as well as 
European languages, a liberal philosophical tradition began to emerge. This tradition 
9 
 
included currents such as positivism, materialism, and social science, and was 
influenced by events of enormous ideological weight such as the French Revolution. 
Such ideological influence encouraged the elite to request more representativeness 
from the government and rights that went well beyond the bare protection of the 
citizens, who, until recently, were identified as re`aya, the flock.  
 
These developments pushed these Ottomans who still believed in the possibility and 
feasibility of living in an imperial framework to look for their own version of 
nationalism. This translated into the formulation of a discourse of proto-nationalism, 
known as Ottomanism, Osmanlılık. The first ideologues of this kind of Ottoman 
nationalism were part of the bureaucracy during the period known as Tanzimat or 
reorganisation (1839-1876). After them, came the very short-lived First 
Constitutional Period, when Ottomanism was a central element of an agenda that 
envisaged more popular involvement in state affairs. In 1878, after the suspension of 
the Constitution, began the period of absolute rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II. With the 
advent of the latter to power, attempts to establish a feasible plan of reform and 
modernisation reached their peak and they came from many sides.4 While formerly 
the impetus to reform had generally come from the state, with the sole exception of 
the Young Ottomans in the 1860s,
5
 Abdülhamit‘s rule witnessed a sort of 
popularisation of the voices of reform – even if this was limited to the members of 
the elite – resulting in the emergence of competing ideas. These competing voices 
                                                          
4
 Contrary to what many historians claim, the Hamidian period was not a setback in the reform of the 
Empire but the moment in which some of these changes reached maturity and fullness. This issue will 
be analysed in length in the next section of this chapter, the literature review. 
5
 The Young Ottomans, formed in 1865, were a group of civil servants (mostly of the Translation 
Office) with a religious background. They criticised what they regarded as too broad an adoption of 
Western systems during the Tanzimat period. The group was significant since it promoted its view 
that constitutionalism was fully compatible with Islam. The group was composed, among others, by 
Namık Kemal, Ziya Bey and Ali Suavi. 
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were opposed to the path that the state, personified in Sultan Abdülhamit, had 
chosen. While they shared with the Sultan the goals of modernisation and reform, 
they did not approve of the method and structure of the Sultan‘s process, which 
entailed strict obedience to his rule. For example, reformers fundamentally disagreed 
with Abdülhamit‘s philosophy that ethnic and religious differences should be 
demarcated rather than erased, and with putting religion at the service of political 
expediency. 
 
Because of the multitude and coherence of these voices, the nineteenth century can 
arguably be seen as the most formative period for the late Ottoman Empire. I argue 
that the discussions that took place during this period laid the ideological 
foundations of the Turkish Republic, proclaimed in 1923, which recycled many of 
the ideas formulated during the previous century. Formative as it had been, the 
nineteenth century did not produce a unidirectional and tangible path to reform in 
terms of policy. It produced, nevertheless, the intellectual ferment that laid the 
political, social and cultural foundations of the near- and long-term future. During 
this period, approaches to reform were so numerous and dynamic that the usual 
characterisation of Ottoman society of the time as divided along the lines of 
Islamists, Modernists and Westernists is, I claim, ultimately unhelpful; such division 
does not allow historians to understand the syncretic and complex character of the 
processes that were taking place at the time. 
 
This thesis is concerned with the early history of the movement that began to 
envisage a different future from the one planned by the reigning Sultan. This 
movement is widely known as the Young Turk organisation, formed in Istanbul in 
11 
 
1889. The Young Turk organisation acted as an umbrella under which a number of 
smaller groups operated, and its life span went from 1889 up until 1923. It has 
traditionally been maintained that the organisation had a unilinear history and 
development with specific cultural, ideological and social traits that marked it from 
its inception until its demise. Instead, as I will illustrate, this organisation went 
through different phases in its trajectory, and, even within the same period, was 
characterised by a number of different, and sometimes conflicting, voices within. 
This thesis covers a key period of the history of the Young Turk, from 1895 to 1902. 
As I will argue, these seven years mark an important and distinctive phase in the 
broader history of the movement. 
 
My specific object of enquiry is the intellectual development of two of the most 
formative exponents of this group during the last decade of the nineteenth and the 
first years of the twentieth century. These two figures are Ahmet Rıza and Mehmet 
Sabahettin, members of the Ottoman elite and leaders of two groups within the 
opposition who held different conceptions of reform and modernisation of the 
Empire. They were among the most charismatic figures of the Young Turk 
organisation, and ended up heading the two most important factions within the 
organisation in the period in question. Rıza and Sabahettin were also extremely 
prolific in their writings and, as I contend throughout this thesis, their respective 
ideologies exemplified the attempt of a section of the Ottoman intelligentsia to 
synthesise Western technological and cultural achievements with an Ottoman 
intellectual and political reality. 
 
12 
 
Ahmet Rıza left the Empire in 1889, on the pretext of attending the Exposition 
Universelle to be held in Paris in the same year, but with the real intention of 
organising an opposition to Sultan Abdülhamit II.
6
 Once there, enjoying the freedom 
granted by self-imposed exile, he started the publication of a journal, Mechveret, in 
Ottoman Turkish and its supplement Mechveret Supplément Français, in French, co-
edited with an Ottoman Lebanese, Halil Ganem. Once in Paris, Rıza joined the 
positivist circle, became acquainted with many positivists from around Europe, and 
started publishing other projects such as his own monograph, La Faillite morale de 
la politique occidentale en orient,
7
 as well as reviews, such as the Positivist Review 
and La Revue Occidentale. Rıza‘s main ideological approach to reform was based on 
the idea of Ottomanism as the engine for co-operation and consensus between the 
various ethnic and religious components; consequently, any plan based on the 
reform of only a given area or ethnic group would have to be rejected. Of equal 
importance was Rıza‘s total dismissal of any help, in any form, from European 
governments. 
 
Prince Mehmet Sabahettin joined the diasporic community of intellectual Young 
Turk members of Paris in 1899, following his overnight escape from the Empire, 
together with his father, Damat,
8
 Mahmut and his brother Lutfullah. In Paris, 
Sabahettin joined the school of social science of Edmond Demolins, whom he 
befriended, and became an admirer of Anglo-Saxon societies; he appreciated 
especially the latter‘s emphasis on private initiative and the laissez-faire approach of 
the state. Drawing on the French social scientist and the Anglo-Saxon system, he 
                                                          
6
 Ahmet Rıza, Ahmed Rıza Bey’in Anıları (Istanbul: Arba, 1988). 
7
 Ahmet Rıza, La Faillite morale de la politique occidentale en orient (Paris: Librairie Picart, 1922). 
8
 ―Damat, a Persian word meaning son-in-law, used as a title by sons-in-law of the Ottoman Sultans.‖ 
Encyclopedia of Islam, J.H. Mordtmann, s.v. ―Dāmād.‖ 
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produced his own work Türkiye nasıl kurtarılabilir,9 (How can Turkey be saved?), 
inspired by Demolins‘s book Anglo-Saxon superiority, to what is it due? 10 
Sabahettin‘s main conception of reform in the Empire entailed the creation of a 
federal entity, emphasising the Empire‘s diversity (in contrast to Rıza‘s approach), 
and relying on the practical and ideological help of European countries, especially of 
Britain. The two ideologues became the leaders of the two most representative 
factions within the broader movement of the Young Turk and organised the first 
Congress of Ottoman Liberals in Paris, in 1902. As I will discuss later, the Congress, 
which was convened with the explicit aim to create a united front against the rule of 
Abdülhamit II, resulted instead in the clear demarcation of different players within 
the movement and in the end of a particularly ambitious intellectual and activist 
phase in the history of the Young Turks.  
 
In this thesis, I argue that Rıza‘s and Sabahettin‘s endeavour within the C.U.P. and 
the composition of the Young Turk movement was instrumental in laying the 
foundations for the future emergence of civil society in the late Ottoman and 
Republican periods. A comparative study of the two gives a more nuanced picture of 
a period (from 1889 to 1923) that is too often analysed as an uninterrupted whole. 
This thesis suggests that it is crucial to consider the history of the opposition to 
Sultan Abdülhamit II as a gradual and multi-faceted endeavour. It is also essential to 
bear in mind that this opposition passed from an intellectually driven phase, more 
liberal and pluralistic, to a more pragmatist and militarist one. The latter phase did 
not match the intellectual rigor of the former, but ensured more than its predecessor 
                                                          
9
 Mehmet Sabahettin, Türkiye nasıl kurtarılabilir (Istanbul: Elif Yayınları, 1962). From here on, it 
will be referred to in the English translation. 
10
 Edmond Demolins, Anglo-Saxon superiority, to what is it due? translated by Lois Bertram Lavigne 
(London: Leadenhall Press, 1920). 
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in terms of political gains – such as the re-instatement of the Constitution in 1908 
and the shift in despotic rule from the Sultan to the authoritarian Unionist cadres. In 
brief, I maintain that the Young Turk movement shifted from a more intellectual and 
open position to a more militarist and rigid stance. This approach is innovative 
because it is examined through the comparative analysis of Rıza and Sabahettin, 
whose impact was more important than many other leaders of the Young Turk 
movement of the time and more instructive for an appreciation of the events of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
 
Overview of primary sources 
My line of enquiry begins with the premise that exile was essential in providing 
intellectual development and practical opportunities to the opposition. Without being 
in exile, in fact, much of the intellectual and activist practices of both Rıza and 
Sabahettin would not have been feasible. Exile was self-imposed for both figures 
and emerged as a decisive feature of the Young Turk organisation of the time for a 
number of interrelated reasons. For one, it gave them the chance to express their 
ideas through the publication of journals when, back in the Empire, the Hamidian 
regime worked vigorously to censor critics and to prevent discussions that emerged 
from reading, contributing to, and circulating reformist publications. Paris stood out 
as by far the most attractive European destination for Young Turk members in exile: 
public opinion was predominantly supportive of their reformist activities and 
sensitive to infringements upon their freedom of expression. Therefore, when the 
Ottoman government attempted to restrict their actions, Young Turk members found 
a large number of French intellectuals, politicians, and writers ready to rally behind 
them. The press itself constituted a central instrument for the development of the 
15 
 
intellectual endeavour of Sabahettin and Rıza; such output is related to the 
intellectualism and elitism that became pillars of the Young Turk movement in exile. 
Paris became a sine qua non condition for political activism, offering the Young 
Turk members in question the chance to partake in a global intellectual elite,
11
 and 
gave them a sense of belonging and participation to intellectual developments well 
beyond their own political borders.  
 
As it will be argued further on, the most shared characteristic of Young Turk 
émigrés during the intellectual phase was the idea that they constituted the 
enlightened section of Ottoman society, entrusted with the tutelary role of 
emancipating both Ottoman reformists and the wider population. The proximity to 
individuals that Rıza and Sabahettin had found instrumental for their own 
intellectual development and their subsequent exposure to new ideas helped them 
synthesise what were seen as ‗modern‘ with ‗traditional‘ aspects of their society. 
Such proximity advertised the movement abroad and made it appealing to the wider 
liberal civil society of Europe at the time. Lastly, because of their cooperation with 
non-Ottoman intellectuals, and because of the multi-ethic and multi confessional 
nature of the organisation – coupled with the relative freedom that Europe granted – 
these journals became essential forums where editors, journalists, intellectuals, 
Young Turk militants as well as sympathisers exchanged views, discussed issues, 
and planned activist meetings. The culmination of these activities, which coincided 
with the end of the intellectual phase, was the 1902 Congress of Ottoman Liberals. 
The Congress gathered, for the first and last time, a large and relatively 
                                                          
11
 As explained further on, Rıza became an admirer of Comte‘s positivism, via the writings of 
Gustave Le Bon. Sabahettin, instead, was convinced, almost mesmerised, by the ideas of Edmond 
Demolins‘ social science. 
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representative number of Ottoman ethnic and religious groups and was organised 
through rigorous advertisement in the press coordinated by Rıza and Sabahettin.  
 
A study of the intellectual phase of Young Turk history requires an examination of 
this intellectual project‘s contradictions. For example, what will emerge from the 
discussion ahead is a number of tensions that inhered in the intellectual and 
ideological formulations of members of the Young Turk organisation and are 
exemplified here in the writings of Ahmet Rıza and Mehmet Sabahettin. These 
tensions, which will be discussed at length in the following chapters, relate to the 
formulation of a coherent policy of transition, a concept of ethnic and religious 
pluralism that can keep the Empire together and, relatedly, the role of religion in 
governance and in the public sphere in the future Ottoman Empire. I will contend 
that Rıza‘s and Sabahettin‘s intellectualism provided the ideological foundations for 
future discussions but stopped short of the concreteness required to translate ideas 
into policies. 
 
My analysis of the figures of Rıza and Sabahettin is driven by the conviction that the 
periodisation of the Young Turk movement has been reductive. I maintain that the 
period from 1895 to 1902 is separate from the rest of the Young Turk trajectory and 
that this period is characterised by a very high degree of intellectualism. After the 
relative failure of the 1902 Paris Congress of Ottoman Liberals, this period gave 
way to a phase of transition and ethnic and religious crystallisation (1902-1907), 
followed by the militarism of the Unionist era. The latter period was inaugurated 
17 
 
with the Revolution of 1908 and ended with the beginning of World War One and 
foreign occupation.
12
 
 
I have consulted a number of primary sources in order to trace and interpret the 
features of this complex and formative period. The first primary material I examined 
are the two books that Rıza and Sabahettin published: Ahmet Rıza, La Faillite 
morale de la politique occidentale en orient
13
 and Mehmet Sabahettin, How can 
Turkey be saved?
14
 Other central material included Rıza‘s own memoirs, Ahmed 
Rıza Bey’in Anıları,15 İbrahim Temo‘s İttihad ve Terakki Anıları,16  and William 
Morton Fullerton, The memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey.
17
 In the Harvey S. Firestone 
Library of Princeton University, I concentrated on Mechveret and Mechveret 
Supplément Français, which are held in full collection, together with memoirs of the 
time and precious eyewitnesses‘ accounts in other newspapers and journals. In the 
British Library in London I encountered another key journal, Osmanlı, as well as the 
important and informative books by two Frenchmen very close to Sabahettin, Joseph 
Denais,
18
 La Turquie nouvelle et l’ancien regime,19 and Paul Fesch, Constantinople 
aux derniers jours d’Abdul-Hamid.20 I analysed the book that changed Sabahettin‘s 
                                                          
12
 Şükrü Hanioğlu, in both his books, The Young Turks in Opposition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995) and Preparation for a Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) puts forth 
this approach to the period in question. However, no specific figure is analysed at length so as to 
provide a deeper understanding of the Young Turk ethos of the intellectual phase. Apart from 
Hanioğlu, the period is grossly overlooked by most of the historians of the period, as I discuss further 
on in this chapter. 
13
 Rıza, La Faillite morale de la politique occidentale. 
14
 Sabahettin, Türkiye nasıl kurtarılabilir. 
15
 Rıza, Ahmed Rıza Bey’in Anıları. 
16
 İbrahim Temo, İbrahim Temo’nun İttihad ve Terakki Anıları (Istanbul: Arba, 1987). 
17
 William Morton Fullerton, The memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey (London: Constable, 1920). 
18
 French journalist, friend and colleague of Paul Fesch, born in 1851, died in 1916. He is co-author, 
with Fesch, of Bibliographie de la franc-maçonnerie et des sociétés secrètes, imprimés et manuscrits 
langue française et langue latine. 
19
 Joseph Denais, La Turquie nouvelle et l’ancien régime (Paris: Rivière, 1909). 
20
 Paul Fesch, Constantinople aux derniers jours d’Abdul-Hamid, 2nd ed. (New York: Burt Franklin, 
1971). 
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life: Edmond Demolins, Anglo-Saxon superiority, to what is it due?
21
 In the 
Préfecture de Police de Paris, I found precious information not only about Rıza and 
Sabahettin, but also on the whole Ottoman community living in France. These police 
archives provide detailed accounts of movements, meetings, and activities of the 
members of the Young Turk organisation, and of the French government‘s relations 
with the opposition and with the Ottoman embassy. Police reports give us clues 
about how the French state and public opinion, not always in agreement, viewed the 
struggle of the Young Turk movement. The archives of the IREMAM – Institut de 
Recherches et d‘Études sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman – in Aix-en-Provence 
proved valuable for both primary and secondary sources on Sufi orders and 
Freemason organisations that collaborated with the exponents of the Young Turk 
movement, providing them with safe-houses and with inspiration. Other primary 
sources from a number of private collections are listed in the bibliography. 
 
Literature Review 
In analysing intellectual history, I adopt the approach of Şerif Mardin in his study of 
the group that came to be known as the Young Ottomans.
22
 Mardin‘s work focuses 
on the background, sources of inspiration, analysis and the dilemmas of the 
intellectual venture of the Young Ottomans, providing evidence of an intimate link 
between the ideas and discussions of this group and those taking place in Republican 
Turkey. Up to this date, there has been no similar work on the ideologues of the 
early Young Turk movement. 
 
                                                          
21
 Demolins, Anglo-Saxon Superiority. 
22
 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: a study in the modernisation of Turkish 
political ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). 
19 
 
Before dwelling on the subject of Young Turk history proper, it is important to 
highlight that the group lived and acted during a period of drastic and important 
changes for the Ottoman Empire, which have been recorded in history in conflicting 
ways. Since the beginning of the rule of Sultan Selim III, the Empire had entered a 
period of reform, attempting to revert what most refer to as ‗decline‘, the beginnings 
of which were traced back to the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent. Therefore, the 
history of the Young Turk coincides with a larger conversation on what decline 
entailed, its causes, and speculations on how the Sublime State was supposed to 
emerge out of this impasse. Broadly speaking, the two opposing historiographical 
views are the following: on the one side, there are a number of older studies, such as 
Bernard Lewis‘s The Emergence of Modern Turkey23 and, to a lesser extent, Ernest 
E. Ramsaur‘s The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908,24 which view the 
relative success of the period of reform as intimately related to the level of 
Westernisation that Ottoman modernisation was imbued with: the more aspects of 
Western culture were borrowed, the more successful the plan looked. To put it in 
another way, as Benjamin C. Fortna has argued, the above works emphasised the 
―adoption of Western European institutions and attitudes … [rather] than the process 
of adaptation.‖25 This stance was not only discarded by later historians, but was 
countered by some Ottoman contemporaries themselves who criticised the choice of 
outright adoption of Western institutions, that resulted in dandyism and mimicking. 
This is the case, for example, of Dr. Zifos‘ critique of men‘s attire in Nora Şeni‘s 
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Fashion and Women’s clothing26  or the one analysed by François Georgeon of 
conscious public exposure of one‘s drinking habits in nineteenth-century Istanbul to 
show ―adherence to the values of the modern world.‖27 On the other side stands a 
narrative of a declining entity that was able to stave off collapse because of a 
number of internal and external forces and influences which, working together, 
produced a series of able statesmen such as Reşid Pasha and Abdülmecid, or 
Abdülhamit and the Young Turks as a group. This stance, exemplified by Şükrü 
Hanioğlu‘s two books, The Young Turks in Opposition28  and Preparation for a 
Revolution,
29
 adopts a wider lens of analysis, considering a number of internal 
dynamics to be as formative as the external ones. To add to this perspective, I should 
mention Butrus Abu Manneh and Frederick Anscombe, who have presented the 
Hatt-ı Sherif of Gülhane – which became the symbol of Ottoman reform and which 
has been, for years, seen as a move orchestrated by the West – under a new light. In 
his ―The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript,‖30 Abu Manneh challenges the view 
that almost every incentive for modernisation in the Empire had its roots in the West 
by looking at the cultural and religious background of the Sultan. Abu Manneh 
underlines the fact that some of the ideas introduced by the edict, and which gave 
way to the period of the Tanzimat, should be seen drawing from both Western 
liberal thought as well as Islamic ideas of social justice. Similarly, Anscombe has 
written that ―Islam pervades the Gülhane text from beginning to end …‖31 and that 
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one of the aims of the edict was to pacify the Muslims of provinces such as Albania 
and Bosnia, who had rebelled, under the previous Sultan, against a state that they 
regarded as un-Islamic and void of justice. 
 
The academic field of Ottoman history has seen the publication of studies based on 
quantitative data. These studies do not usually dwell on the historical background of 
the forces of change, but are more interested in tracking changes within the state 
apparatus. The most comprehensive of these studies that contribute to an 
understanding of changes at the state level are the two volumes by Carter V. Findley, 
Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: the Sublime Porte, 1789-1922;
32
 and 
Ottoman Civil Officialdom: a social history.
33
 These works provide a great number 
of statistical data regarding the growth, expansion, and systematisation of the civil 
apparatus during a period in which the state encouraged increasing representation 
and institutional connections, through the ministries, with the outside world. 
 
Closer to the focus of the present study, there is a tendency to view the organisation 
of the Young Turks as an agent of change only during the revolution of 1908, 
considering its earlier stage as very marginal. This is the case, for instance, in Erik J. 
Zürcher‘s The Unionist Factor.34 The choice of focus on a later period of Young 
Turk history is deliberate insofar as the field of late Ottoman studies has been 
traditionally concerned with finding the immediate precursors of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. Therefore, the militarist period is more readily linked with the emergence 
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of Atatürk‘s regime and seems to make his policies more intelligible, especially in 
light of the authoritarianism of the Unionist government in the post-Revolution 
environment. The historical research carried out by Feroz Ahmad in The Young 
Turks, the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish politics, 1908-1914
35
 
follows the same rationale. In Ahmad‘s work, the two figures, Rıza and Sabahettin, 
are mentioned only in terms of their involvement in the developments after 1908 
without reference to their paramount formative role in the period 1895 to 1902. 
Likewise, the monumental work of Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism 
in Turkey,
36
 does not do justice to the Young Turk organisation prior to the 
revolution; as for Rıza and Sabahettin, the author devotes a few pages surveying 
their main ideas rather than dwelling on the influential aspects of their ideologies. 
Erik J. Zürcher has neatly summed up this problem in his most recent book,
37
 
encapsulating well the argument that I develop in this thesis: 
… works on the period abound in generalisations. … Allen says they 
[the Young Turks] were ‗young officers‘, which is also Geoffrey 
Lewis‘s classification, while Bernard Lewis talks about ‗Muslim 
Turks, mostly soldiers‘ … . Richard Robinson describes them as ‗… 
western-oriented army officers‘, … . These obviously are very broad, 
and in some cases contradictory, generalisations.
38
 
 
Nevertheless, after recognising that available works have not adequately 
acknowledged the diversity within the organisation, Zürcher himself limits his 
discourse to the 1908 and post-1908 period and to the background of those who 
carried out the Revolution, devoting very few pages to the intellectual members of 
the 1890s and early 1900s. 
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Another disputed aspect of Young Turk history deals with the role of religion and 
the idea of secularism in the conceptualisation of Young Turk policies. The work of 
Şükrü Hanioğlu exemplifies a tendency to characterise the majority of Young Turk 
members as convinced atheists or unbelievers.
39
 In the case of his first book, 
Hanioğlu maintains that, when addressing the masses, the leaders of the Young Turk 
movement saw ―Islam … [as] nothing other than a device.‖40 I assert that, in order to 
assess this point, we should consider how extensive the readership of such journals 
was. In what sense could these ideas be directed to the masses? Given this doubt, we 
should consider these intellectuals as engaging with the topic of religion because 
they were seriously concerned with its adjudication in the public sphere and in 
governance. We should also focus on the ways in which they promoted a type of 
secularism that developed a relationship between modernity and religion that did not 
consider the two as incompatible. Similarly drastic statements regarding the 
religiosity of Young Turks have been addressed about the early founders of the 
Ottoman Union Society, in 1889,
41
 Abdullah Cevdet and his group, Garbcılar – the 
Westernisers. In an article dated 1898, Cevdet is reported to have written that 
―science is the religion of the elite, whereas religion is the science of the masses.‖42 
Yet, in his memoir, İbrahim Temo, who was one of the founding fathers of the 
Ottoman Union Society together with Cevdet, insisted on the religiosity of his 
contemporary. Temo said of the latter, ―Abdullah Cevdet … at the time [1889] was 
very devout.‖ 43  Evidently, the difference between their assigned atheism by the 
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wider scholarship and the emphasis placed in the writings of Young Turks on the 
role of religion in the new Empire deserves further critical exploration.  
 
In order to comprehend better the Young Turk movement, it is important to 
appreciate the world in which its members lived. One of the most widely deployed 
books on the history of the Empire from the late eighteenth century onwards is that 
of Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey, a modern history.
44
 This book provides a balanced 
overview of the period of reform, from the rule of Sultan Selim III in 1789 up to the 
Kemalist period. However, more in-depth and illuminating for the Hamidian period 
(1876-1909), which coincides time-wise with the chronological focus of my 
research, are the works of Benjamin C. Fortna and Selim Deringil. The two studies 
constitute new historical perspectives on the much studied but rather misrepresented 
period from 1878 to 1909. Fortna‘s Imperial Classroom45  offers an analysis of 
Hamidian schools and school curricula with a view to present the state in a double 
light: its agenda was to highlight the importance of tradition through the inculcation 
of Islamic morality among children, yet, the same state also pushed for reform and 
modernisation through the introduction of European teaching methods. This twofold 
approach challenges the idea that the period was characterised by two clearly 
distinct forces: tradition, embodied in the Sultan, and innovation epitomised in the 
Young Turk movement. Deringil‘s The Well-protected Domains46 offers a similarly 
complex image of the period through the argument that the Ottoman state attempted 
to construct both internal and external images for consumption. One of the most 
important aspects of this latter work, for the purposes of my thesis, is that it provides 
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evidence of a political use of religion and, parallel to this, shows the eagerness of the 
state to provide a modern image of itself. Similarly to these two studies, I attempt to 
demonstrate that, both in the case of the Young Turks and of Sultan Abdülhamit II, 
the picture is more complicated than one of a struggle between the forces of 
modernity and those of tradition.  
 
As mentioned before, another structural basis of this thesis is the role that exile 
played in the trajectory of Young Turk history and the opportunities this provided to 
the members of the movement. The literature on the exile of the Young Turk 
members is scarce, with one of the notable exceptions being the work of Hans-Lukas 
Kieser‘s A Quest for Belonging.47 His project has a much broader time focus and is 
based on the diaspora of Switzerland rather than that of France. Kieser is interested 
in the diversity of the various ethnic and religious groups rather than in the common 
idea of Ottomanism as a proto-national discourse. Exile as a dynamic situation and 
experience has been seriously tackled in James McDougall‘s48 work on Algeria. 
McDougall has argued that the space Algerian exiles occupied was instrumental in 
creating revolutionary-populist groups as well as developing a new idea of Algeria 
and of Algerian nationalism.
49
 This position is very similar to that occupied by the 
Young Turk émigrés, such as Rıza and Sabahettin, since they, through the pages of 
their publications – such as Mechveret Supplément Français for instance – were 
constructing and debating a new idea of Ottomanism as the affilitaive discourse for 
all the communities of the Empire.  
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An important, if not decisive, aspect of their exile, was that these Ottoman émigrés 
saw themselves as part of an intellectual elite bestowed with the mission of 
enlightening the masses. This specific view of the Young Turk movement is more or 
less commented upon by all the historical works I have cited at the beginning of this 
section; however, one should add the work of Carter V. Findley, who states that the 
group‘s idea regarding the future was leaning towards ―technocratic authoritarianism 
and toward transmutation of liberal political forms into those of a tutelary regime.‖50 
Also, very important is the argument that the intellectual elite served a social 
purpose, by filling a space outside the institutionalised powers and serving as a 
channel for the transmission of synthesised ideas. In the field of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century studies of the Ottoman Empire, this view has been developed by 
Fatma Müge Göcek in Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire. In her study, 
Göcek claims that ―[t]he Ottoman epistemological transition from … Western 
imitation to interpretation occurred through the agency of the newly emergent group 
of Ottoman intellectuals.‖51 Her focus, in Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire, 
lies on the broader idea of intellectualism and not specifically on Young Turk 
history. Significantly, research in other societies that attempted to reform and 
modernise in similar ways was also instructive to my project. Cyrus Schayegh 
delves into the intellectual and activist endeavours of early twentieth Century Iranian 
modernists in Who is knowledgeable is strong.
52
 There, we see how a political and 
intellectual opposition, as loosely formed as the Young Turks, went on to fill ―a 
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nascent social space.‖53 A good explanation of what this resulted in, in the case of 
Turkey, is given by Erdal Kaynar‘s ―The Almighty Power of the Written Word: 
Young Turk conception of the Press.‖54 His study highlights how the elitism and 
consequent intellectualism of the Young Turk movement found the perfect 
expression in the publication of journals. 
 
The publication of journals, a central feature of the intellectual and activist agenda 
of Rıza and Sabahettin, is central to this thesis. I am interested in the Ottoman press 
abroad both in relation to its commentary on affairs within the Empire and on those 
of Europe. Within the broader field of the history of the press in the Ottoman Empire, 
Orhan Koloğlu55 has provided a comprehensive study of Ottoman press and the 
influence of the European one upon the former‘s development. Koloğlu presents 
valuable information on circulation numbers as does Fatma Müge Göcek
56
 in Rise of 
the bourgeoisie, demise of the Empire. Filling gaps in the history of Ottoman 
modernisation and its links with the press, the work of Ahmet Emin gives us a vivid 
picture of how the press viewed the ascent of Abdülhamit II to power and his 
consequent consolidation of power, also carried out through the establishment of a 
tight censorship system.
57
 As I will develop in the following chapters, Hamidian 
censorship forced many Young Turk activists into exile and brought many of them 
to Europe, where they frequented philosophical and intellectual circles that 
influenced their own intellectual development. This is further evidence of how the 
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history of the Ottoman Empire has been intimately intertwined with that of Europe 
rather than developing in separation from – or in imitation to – it. In relation to this, 
my thesis attempts to show the close link between these two geographical 
neighbouring settings. Exile, I maintain, placed Young Turk émigrés in the midst of 
European historical developments; members of the various Young Turk groups lived 
and shaped, and were shaped by, events taking place in cities such as Paris, Geneva 
and Brussels. Another project with the comparable aim to frame Ottoman history 
within the European historical tradition is that of Huri Islamoğlu. While the present 
study analyses this interconnection through the lens of intellectual history, in A 
personal Agenda for Ottoman history,
58
 Islamoğlu shows how, already by 1815 
(after the Congress of Vienna), the Ottoman Empire became integrated in European 
dynamics both economically and politically. Islamoğlu‘s view is shared by both 
Şükrü Hanioğlu, in A brief history of the late Ottoman Empire59 and by Suraya 
Faroqhi, in her Approaching Ottoman History.
60
 
 
A domain of activity that illustrates the extent of exchange between the Empire and 
Europe is the history of Freemasonry. The study of Freemasonry serves two 
purposes: first, it shows the level of exchange between cultures that are usually 
portrayed as distant. Second, through the study of ethnic membership in its various 
organisations, research on Freemasonry clarifies the high regard for science and 
scientific advancement by a society that has been portrayed as quintessentially 
Muslim and, as this reductive reasoning goes, not prone to modernisation. Instead, 
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by looking at the history of Freemasonry, one is informed of how some Muslim 
actors within the Ottoman Empire strived to devise a path for both religion and 
scientific advancement through participation in Freemason organisations. 
Instrumental are the works of Eric Anduze, La Franc-Maçonnerie de la Turquie 
Ottomane 1908-1924,
61
 and Thierry Zarcone, Secret et sociétés secrètes en Islam.
62
 
Thierry Zarcone demonstrates that many influential members of the opposition
63
 
were also part of Freemason‘s organisations; Anduze goes as far as to argue that the 
Revolution of 1908 had its origin in a lodge of the French Grand Orient.
64
 
 
Beyond their shared passion for intellectual debate and interest in shaping a new 
political and social system, Rıza and Sabahettin came together to contemplate the 
feasibility of the idea of Ottomanism in the period up to 1908. In order to understand 
the socio-political projects that the members of the Young Turk movement were 
attempting to put forth, we have to assess, I argue, whether Ottomanism was by then 
a viable option for the Empire or whether other types of nationalistic discourses had 
by then gotten the upper hand. Niyazi Berkes states: 
[b]efore the 1908 Revolution and even for a few years thereafter, no 
Turk, Young or Old, took Akçura‘s question seriously [whether the 
interests of the three components of the Empire, the Turks, the non-
Turkish Muslims and the non-Muslims, coincided]. Turkish nationalism 
was to be enflamed only by further shocks from the West, by 
nationalisms within the Empire, and by Turkist nationalist 
developments in Russia.
65
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A similar conclusion regarding the Ottoman Arab section is reached by Hasan 
Kayalı in Arabs and Young Turks. 66  Kayalı maintains that the Young Turk 
movement was even more Ottomanist in its composition than the Young Ottomans 
themselves; he claims this by showing that a large proportion of Ottoman Arabs 
were interested in the success of the Ottomanist project.
67
 Another author who 
discusses the feasibility of an Ottomanist plan at this stage in the history of the 
Ottoman Empire is Renzo Falaschi,
68
 who, through the study of the life of Ismail 
Kemal,
69
 shows that, among the Balkan minorities, the plan was believed to be 
realistic provided that it included some kind of administrative autonomy for the 
various ethnic and religious communities. Similar conclusions are shared by Şerif 
Mardin
70
 and Cağlar Keyder 71  in their contributions to the edited volume After 
Empire.
72
 
 
This intellectual debate on Ottomanism that was launched forcefully and 
passionately by Rıza and Sabahettin constitutes, in my opinion, a significant piece in 
the puzzle of evaluating the Ottoman legacy in general, and of the Young Turk 
movement in particular, as part of the later developments of the Empire and the 
Turkish Republic. In a well-known essay, Roderic Davison has stated that, ―[t]he 
Republic owes much to the Empire; the Empire also owes much to the Republic, for 
some concepts and institutions that the Empire developed but could not make 
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workable, the Republic took over and made workable.‖73 Davison does not focus on 
the Young Turk period, but takes into consideration the larger era of reform; his 
appreciation of the germane work carried out by many intellectuals of the reform 
movement is paramount to our assessment of that period. Another more temporally 
relevant approach is taken by Erik Jan Zürcher in his book, The Young Turk Legacy 
and the National Awakening,
74
 even though the focus is on later Young Turk history. 
The roots of Kemalism‘s forced modernisation are traced back to the approach 
adopted by the Unionists in the post-1908 environment. However, the pressing 
question, for which I provide a possible answer, remains un-tackled by Zürcher: 
where do the ideological roots of the forced modernisation lie if not in the elitist 
intellectual approach of the early Young Turk movement?  
 
Researchers of modern Turkey are currently interested in some of the questions 
analysed in this thesis. In Faces of the State: secularism and public life in Turkey,
75
 
anthropologist Yael Navaro-Yashin argues that, in the public sphere of today‘s 
Turkey, people are still debating the meaning of concepts such as secularism, 
religion, and cultural belonging. I maintain that these debates echo the dilemmas 
discussed by the Young Turks of the late nineteenth century. The author contends 
that a common depiction of Turkey today as dichotomised between secular and 
religious interests does not actually represent Turkish reality; this reality is 
composed, instead, of the very discussions and reframing performed by Turkish 
political actors, intellectuals, and citizens. Before Navaro-Yashin, Şerif Mardin, in 
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his Power, Civil Society and Culture,
76
 presents us a dynamic whereby processes 
that started in the period under scrutiny here have found renewed  interest or 
resonance around the 1980s – a whole century after the action of Rıza, Sabahettin, 
and their contemporaries.  
 
Contribution to the field  
Late Ottoman history is not lacking in analyses and studies of the Young Turk era; 
however, there has not been as of yet a comparative study of the key figures of a 
distinct phase, a phase that I define as the intellectual one and that covers the period 
between 1895 and 1902. In providing this analysis, I concentrate on the contribution 
of two individuals who not only shaped the history of the movement, but also 
remained relevant through their written legacy to Ottoman and Republican history 
even if they themselves were eventually side-lined. My thesis provides an analysis 
of an unseen side of a much discussed era. It is an attempt to highlight some aspects 
of Young Turk history which shed light on the future Republic and which are, as 
Şerif Mardin described, ―latent … much more elusive [but, simultaneously] more 
interesting than the explicit political ideas… .‖77 The available literature has, until 
now, treated aspects of this period with little nuance. The first aspect is concerned 
with the paramount importance of exile in the intellectual and physical production of 
journals. The opportunities that the Young Turk members had at their disposal, 
precisely because of their exile, were of practical significance, as they were actually 
able to publish material that would have been censored in the Empire. Exile gave 
them the chance to mix with worldwide intellectuals and reach a level of synthesis 
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that was previously unparalleled. Another obscured feature that I investigate is the 
trajectory and complexity of the ideologies of Rıza and Sabahettin. While their 
ideological approaches have been usually dismissed as being too abstract, I highlight 
their coherent and dynamic nature, as well as explore the frictions and dilemmas that 
emerge from their ideological development. I claim that their dilemmas, which were 
essentially dilemmas of implementation of their ideology on the ground, should also 
be seen as indications of a vibrant intellectual exercise.  
 
Another area that has escaped the attention it deserves is the issue of periodisation of 
Young Turk history. As I discussed earlier, the history of the movement is usually 
presented as a continuum from its inception in 1889 to the Revolution of 1908 and 
even beyond, until World War One and the advent of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In my 
research, I forward the suggestion that the period in question, 1889 to 1902, forms a 
stage per se and an extremely formative one.
78
 This period will leave a much more 
lasting legacy than the post-Revolution itself, which did not bring about change on 
the nature of power – which remained as authoritarian under the Unionists as it was 
despotic under Abdülhamit II. The activities of Rıza and Sabahettin, in fact, 
inaugurated discussions on the meaning of modernity, on the cultural roots of the 
Empire, and on the role of religion in society and the state. All this is done within a 
framework where the struggle between the Young Turk organisation and the 
Sublime Porte is not taken to be one between the forces of reform and those of 
tradition, but between two forces which had a similar stand on some issues: for 
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example, the importance of the Empire as a unifying idea as opposed to its 
demarcation along ethnic and religious differences was shared by both Rıza and the 
Sultan. My dissertation underscores plurality within the Young Turk organisation 
itself, and demonstrates that this plurality enriched the intellectual discourses among 
the various Young Turk members to a level that was unparalleled in the Empire 
either before them or after. 
 
The sources I have included as core part of my research have either not been used in 
the available literature yet, or, if included in previous studies, they have not been 
employed in a comparative manner. For instance, the memoirs of Ahmet Rıza in 
Paris have not been included in any of the works I have encountered so far in 
English. In terms of foreign language publications, the monographs of Rıza, as La 
Faillite morale de la politique occidentale en Orient,
79
 and of Sabahettin, How can 
Turkey be saved?,
80
 do not feature as the focus of any other study. Lastly, this thesis 
shows that, far from being immobile, Islam as religion and culture was in on-going 
evolution in search for its compatibility with scientific modernity and political 
transformation, such as parliamentarism. Finally, the present study approaches this 
material from an angle that attempts to frame an Ottoman experience in relation to a 
wider European and, in a sense, a global context.  
 
                                                          
79
 Rıza, La Faillite morale de la politique occidentale. 
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 Sabahettin, Türkiye nasıl kurtarılabilir. 
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Chapter Organisation 
The thesis is organised into four main chapters framed by an introduction and 
conclusive remarks. Chapter 2 provides an assessment of the emergence of the 
Young Turk organisation, its connections with other contemporary organisations –
such as the religious establishment and Freemasonry – and some of its sources of 
inspiration. Further on, the chapter launches into a discussion on the role of exile 
and of the press in exile; Paris, as the specific centre of exile is looked at in 
conjunction with the idea of elitism and intellectualism. Together, space and 
experience constitute central lenses that help us understand the writings and ideas of 
the two ideologues in question. Chapters 3 and 4 explore the ideologies Rıza and 
Sabahettin through their own writings – both monographs and journals articles. The 
two chapters shed light on the sources of inspiration of the two men, positivism and 
social science respectively. The chapters examine how they envisaged reform and 
how they perceived previous attempts at reform, including those of the 
contemporary regime of Abdülhamit II. Moreover, Chapters 3 and 4 discuss Rıza‘s 
and Sabahettin‘s understanding of secularism and their suggestions on the role of 
religion in a reformed state as well as their opinion of what constituted an acceptable 
degree of external help. This last issue becomes pivotal in light of its link with the 
thinkers‘ respective stance on the fate of ethno-religious communities. Chapters 3 
and 4 discuss the ambiguities and tensions that emerge in the works of the two 
intellectuals, and which give us important clues into the level of intellectual 
enthusiasm that characterised the Young Turks in exile. What will emerge is a 
picture of two individuals who, even though shared a disdain for the despotic nature 
of Hamidian rule, adopted distinct angles through which to imagine reform. 
Influenced by two different philosophical currents, positivism and British liberalism, 
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through he study of social science, Rıza and Sabahettin shared the feeling of a 
mission as exponents of enlightened intellectual elites but ended up disagreeing on 
the future organisation of the Empire: Mehmet Sabahettin emphasised federalism, in 
which diversity was institutionalised to ensure a balanced distribution of rights. 
Ahmet Rıza, on the other hand, was convinced that ethnic or religious difference 
should not feature centrally in organisation for the sake of a supra-ethnic, supra-
religious Ottomanist project. These divergent visions resulted in a rupture between 
the members of the Young Turk movement that I investigate in detail in Chapter 5. 
This part of the thesis looks at the Congress of Ottoman Liberals that was held in 
Paris from the 4
th
 to the 9
th
 of February, 1902. I argue that this Congress represents a 
critical moment in the history of the Young Turk movement as a whole, as it is the 
moment when the two major groups, headed by Rıza and Sabahettin, were supposed 
to unite into a coherent and strong opposition faction. Instead, as the divergence 
between the two leaders became apparent, their two groups clashed and decided to 
go their own way. In fact, the failure of the Young Turk delegates at the Congress to 
agree on a united programme marks the end of the intellectual phase of the Young 
Turk movement. Lastly, as it will be argued in the Conclusion, however unfeasible 
their plan might look today, the two men and their numerous followers were fully 
invested in the feasibility of Ottomanism and actively worked towards its attainment. 
Even though it took very little time to turn their promising visions into a missed 
opportunity, their intellectual legacy lived on past their time and survives to this day 
in the heated negotiation of the identity of modern Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 2 – IDEAS, MEDIA AND NETWORKS OF THE YOUNG TURK 
MOVEMENT IN EXILE 
One of the difficulties of demarcating the trajectory of the Young Turk organisation 
is that the group was rather loosely organised, hence tracing a unilinear development 
since its onset as Ottoman Union Society in 1889 is impossible. Şükrü Hanioğlu1 has 
provided a comprehensive overview of the various sub-groups that made up the 
organisation of the Young Turks, yet, precisely because of the diversity between the 
various groups and the different focus of the two volumes Hanioğlu authored, his 
work has not highlighted the link between the movement itself and earlier, as well as 
other contemporary organisations. So far, the larger literature has not given attention 
to the importance of exile for either the external branch of the organisation or its 
internal one, or to the spread of the printed press within the Empire and the 
unanticipated outcomes of the tight Hamidian censorship on the ideological 
trajectory of the opposition groups. In this chapter, I focus on precisely these 
phenomena.  
 
I initially discuss the sources of ideological and practical inspiration for the 
movement at large, so that the ideas of the Young Turk members are contextualised 
within a broader discourse of modernisation and renewal of the Empire. Even 
though they are specific to the present discussion around late Ottoman reform, the 
ideas presented in this chapter can be compared to similar intellectual endeavours of 
the nineteenth century around the geographical area that Marshall Hodgson has 
labelled Islamdom.
2
 I argue that exile in Europe was both practical and formative for 
                                                          
1
 Hanioğlu, Young Turks in Opposition; and Preparation for a Revolution. 
2
 Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 58-
59. 
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figures such as Rıza and Sabahettin: it provided political links with either Western 
government or civil society, and, at the same time, contacts with the European 
intelligentsia, which, as we will see in the next pages, heavily influenced the 
intellectual development of the members of the organisation. This dynamic is not 
unique to Ottoman intellectuals but needs to be seen in comparison with the efforts 
of Muslim intellectuals of the Middle East and North Africa to reconcile technology, 
science and the idea modernity with religious and cultural values. In this sense, the 
efforts of Rıza and Sabahettin can be seen as part of an intellectual exercise carried 
out by many different actors. In 1826, Rifa`a Badawi Rafi al-Tahtawi went to Paris 
and came back with a fully articulated argument about the compatibility between 
science and Islam.
3
 In 1870, two simultaneous events pointed to the same direction: 
while Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani was speaking in front of the Darülfünun of the 
necessity for the Mulsim world to follow the example of ‗civilised nations‘ on 
modernisation, Namık Kemal was in London and was stunned by what he 
considered as impressive infrastructural progress in the city, hoping that the Empire 
would embark on a similar path of reconstruction. Meanwhile, Abdülhamit II had 
embarked on his own, somewhat reactionary, project of modernity.
4
 In brief, the 
development of Rıza and Sabahettin‘s ideas were an integral part of a broader 
process whereby different actors were aspiring to transform the make-up of Muslim 
societies and, specifically in their case, attempting to answer the haunting question 
‗How can the state be saved?‘  
After setting up the larger framework for the development of Rıza‘s and 
Sabahettin‘s ideology, I analyse the context of exile. I need to clarify here that the 
                                                          
3
 John Esposito and John Donohue ed., Islam in transition – Muslim perspectives (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
4
 As discussed in the previous chapter. 
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type of exile that Young Turk members faced was the result of an active choice 
rather an imposition by the regime. By being abroad, these opponents to the rule of 
Abdülhamit were free to voice their grievances against what they regarded to be a 
despotic regime. In this sense, exile needs to be seen in a different light from what it 
would mean as forced marginalisation in a remote corner of the Empire. The 
available literature has not tackled the significance of exile for political opponents in 
the late Ottoman period, although it has dwelled extensively on the use of exile for 
the inhabitants of the provinces.
5
 The history of Ottoman Syria provides some 
noteworthy examples, as some influential families were punished after the events of 
1860 by being sent into internal exile and by temporarily losing all of their powers. 
Therefore, internal exile constituted an important punishing tool of the state as it 
brought shame and serious setbacks to the political and economic aspirations of 
various activists. In relation to the Young Turk organisation, this was not the case. 
The prerequisite for internal exile to work is primarily that those who are the target 
of it have an active interest in status-quo dynamics, while the likes of Rıza and 
Sabahettin did not. Moreover, while internal exile removed the individual from his 
basis of power and marginalised him in a remote area, the self-imposed exile of the 
Young Turk group brought its members right where they needed to be politically: in 
the heart of Europe, which, they thought, would serve as a moral and intellectual 
partner to their cause as well as platform where they could advertise their activities 
and ideas.  
                                                          
5
 In 1860, a series of revolts broke out in Mount Lebanon and Damascus that led to the massacre of a 
part of the Christian population of these areas. The Ottoman authorities, under the then governorship 
of Cemal Pasha, punished those supposedly culpable of inciting the masses by public hanging and 
forced exile. For a general overview, see Albert Hourani, ―Ottoman Reform and the Politics of 
Notables,‖ in The Modern Middle East: a reader edited by Albert Hourani, Philp S. Khouri and Mary 
C. Wilson, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993), 83-110.  
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This chapter also discusses how the tight censorship set by the Hamidian regime, 
instead of proving a successful tool in quelling the opposition, gave more substance 
to self-imposed exile and more space for the free discussion of issues that would 
have been banned inside the Empire. Censorship, thus, enabled a conversation with 
a wider intellectual spectrum than the Ottoman one. I intend to demonstrate that 
exile in France, and specifically in Paris, was formative and decisive for the 
organisation‘s survival. 
 
Intellectual predecessors and contemporary allies 
The Young Turk opposition was a conglomerate of small groups tied together 
through some general ideals: an orientation to rationality and an endorsement of the 
rule of law, a wish for the reintroduction of a constitutional system, and the 
extension of rights to all citizens of the Empire. Finally, a driving force for the 
movement was the modernisation of political institutions and religion: 
―[s]imultaneously, … [the group] include[d] a tendency toward technocratic 
authoritarianism and toward transmutation of liberal political forms into those of a 
tutelary regime.‖6 In fact, even though differing greatly in the manner through which 
the Sultan would be deposed, and while they disagreed on the alternative socio-
political system to put in place, the groups under the Young Turk umbrella thought 
they constituted an enlightened elite entrusted with the defence and tutelage of the 
rights of the citizens. Understanding the Young Turks‘ sources of inspiration is vital 
to the creation of an intellectual and historical link between earlier attempts at 
modernisation and reform and the period I analyse. I suggest that, drawing on these 
sources of inspiration, the first ideologues of the Young Turk movement managed to 
                                                          
6
 Findley, ―The Advent of Ideology,‖ 168.  
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crystallise and synthesise ideas that had been around before the constitution of the 
group itself and which would contribute greatly to the development of the Empire 
towards the twentieth century. 
 
The Young Turk movement was shaped by the cultural exchanges that developed in 
the Translation Office – the training ground for the Ottoman Muslim diplomatic 
service – the ideas of the Young Ottoman movement, and, finally, the ideology of 
the First Constitutional Period. Moreover, all Young Turk parties were largely 
inspired by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European philosophical and political 
developments and received logistical help from a number of Ottoman and European 
organisations, one the most interesting of which is Freemasonry.
7
  
 
One of the first channels of transmission of progressive ideas to the intellectual elite 
is considered to be the Translation Office. The Bab-ı Âli Tercüme Odası was first 
established within the Foreign Ministry in 1833 under the reign of Sultan Mahmut II. 
This office, which has been referred to by some as a literary club,
8
 ―... became the 
training ground for Ottoman diplomats, and also for the new intelligentsia who 
played a major role in ideological developments during the nineteenth century.‖9 
Prior to the establishment of the Translation Office, every diplomatic transaction 
between the Ottoman state and foreign governments was carried out between the 
dragomans (translators) of the embassies and the official translator of the Imperial 
Divan (Council). The latter post had been held, until 1821, by members of minorities, 
                                                          
7
 Şükrü Hanioğlu, ―Notes on the Young Turks and the Freemasons, 1875 – 1908,‖ Middle Eastern 
Studies 25, no. 2 (Apr. 1989): 194. 
8
 Findley, Bureaucratic Reform, 204. 
9Kemal Karpat, ―The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908,‖ International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 3, n. 3 (1972): 255. 
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especially from the Phanariote Greek families.
10
 But with the onset of the Greek 
War of Independence (1821-1831), Ottoman statesmen grew wary of appointing 
Greeks to such important posts; ―[t]his left the Ottoman government with a serious 
communications problem at a time when diplomatic contacts were becoming more 
and more important to the survival of the Empire. Between 1821 and 1833 the 
business of translation was conducted through makeshift arrangements.‖11 Finally, 
in 1833, the Tercüme Odası was established and became an important locus of 
intellectual training. As Erik J. Zürcher notes, ―[s]ervice in the translation office and 
in one of the embassies are two elements which we encounter time and again when 
we scrutinize the curricula vitae of reformist Ottoman bureaucrats of the nineteenth 
century.‖ 12  This office was soon to become the training ground for all future 
reformists: from the Young Ottomans, to the men of the Tanzimat, to the Young 
Turks.
13
 Among those employed in the office, Namık Kemal represented the Young 
Ottomans, Mizancı Murat the Young Turks, and Ali and Fuad the Tanzimat men. 
The Office gradually increased in prestige and by 1871 it acquired as high an 
importance as the Chef de Protocole and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, second 
only to the actual Foreign Minister within the same Ministry. 
 
Şerif Mardin has written on: 
[on] one instance in which the Translation Bureau acted as a funnel for 
the conveying to the Young Ottomans of the ideas of the 
                                                          
10
The Phanariote Greeks were part of the Istanbul Greeks who, during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, 
acquired important positions within the civil bureaucracy and among the Christian Orthodox ruling 
group. Some of them became official translators, others were influential merchants and bankers, and 
all had links with the Patriarchate. For this reason, they were looked at with suspicion by the Greeks 
of Peloponnesus, who eventually inaugurated an organised rebellion against Istanbul. 
11
 Zürcher, Turkey, a modern history, 46. 
12
 Ibid., 47. 
13
 Mizancı Murat wrote an account of his service in the Translation Office, in the form of a parody, in 
his novel Turfanda mı yoksa Turfa mı. See Findley, Civil Officialdom, 119.  
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Enlightenment that had permeated the Balkans at an earlier date … 
One of the employees of the Translation Bureau who had acted as 
Kemal‘s tutor [Namık Kemal] in French was a certain Mehmed 
Mansur Efendi … a Macedonian Christian converted to Islam. He was 
an amateur historian [and] it is quite possible that it was Mehmed 
Efendi who first taught Kemal the virtues of national cohesion.
14
 
 
Beyond this institution, another important source of inspiration for the Young Turks 
was the group known as the Young Ottomans as well as the figure of Midhat 
Pasha,
15
 the main character behind the drafting of the Constitution of 1876. The 
affinity between groups is hard to miss given their name. Carter V. Findley wrote 
that: 
[t]he name ‗Jeune Turc‘ was also used at the time of the Young 
Ottoman movement, of which even the members applied the term to 
themselves when writing in French. The application of the term to the 
activists of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki 
Cemiyeti) and its various offshoots thus signifies, not the recognition of 
some difference between the Young Turks and the earlier movement, 
but rather the opposite.
16
 
 
The Young Ottomans were an exquisite example of synthesis, as they tried to 
harmonise the modernist traits found in Europe – which they had picked up initially 
at the Tercüme Odası – with Muslim and Ottoman realities: ―[o]verall the most 
distinctive contribution of the Young Ottomans lies in their attempt not just to 
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 Mardin, Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, 211. 
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 Born in Istanbul in November 1822, Midhat Pasha was one of the most influential figures of the 
late Ottoman Empire. Called by many ―the father of the Constitution‖ of 1876, he held many high 
offices. In 1868, Midhat was appointed head of the newly formed Council of State, with the mandate 
to discuss and draft legislation. In 1872, he was appointed Grand Vizier by Sultan Abdülaziz, yet his 
office lasted for only 80 days, after which he held the position of Minister of Justice (from 1872 to 
1875). Midhat allied himself ―with groups and individuals in Istanbul who desired change, including 
members of the ulamā. As public discontent mounted in 1876, Midhat became one of the principal 
movers of political change.‖ Roderic Davison, ―Midhat Pasha,‖ Encyclopedia of Islam. Following the 
deposition of Abdülaziz and that of Sultan Murat V, Midhat backed the appointment of Abdülhamit 
II, as the latter promised the promulgation of a constitution if enthroned. However, the 
constitutionalism of Midhat soon clashed with the despotism of Abdülhamit II and the former was 
dismissed from Grand Vizier and exiled to Brindisi in February 1877. The friction between the two 
culminated in Midhat‘s arrest and death sentence in June 1881. Pressured by Ottoman and European 
pleas for leniency, the Sultan converted the death sentence into life banishment in Taif, where Midhat 
died in mysterious circumstances in 1884. 
16
 Findley, ―The Advent of Ideology,‖ 156. 
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introduce an enlarged volume of Western ideas, particularly ones drawn from the 
liberal political philosophy, but to demonstrate the compatibility of those ideas with 
Islamic tradition.‖17 As we shall see, the Young Turks, and Ahmet Rıza and prince 
Mehmet Sabahettin among them, were heavily influenced by Western culture but 
were convinced of the necessity to maintain, even if to different extents, traits of an 
Eastern/Muslim culture, values, and philosophy. This is very reminiscent of the 
Young Ottomans. Regarding this, it is interesting to note that Mustafa Fazil Pasha is 
mentioned as ―chef du parti de la Jeune Turquie‖ in the journal Mechveret. 18 
Another reference to him can be found in another article in which also Namık Kemal 
is mentioned in the following manner: 
[Mustafa Fazil] … grand home d‘Etat qui, en Turquie, contribua 
largement à la diffusion de l‘instruction, au développement des idées 
libérales en envoyant à Paris et à Londres, soit des étudiants, soit des 
administrateurs et des poètes tells que l‘illustre Kémal, et en créant le 
parti de la Jeune-Turquie dont nous sommes aujourd‘hui si fiers de 
porter le nom.
19
  
 
Especially important for my discussion, is the last sentence, which creates an 
uninterrupted continuum between the actions of the Young Ottomans and those of 
the Young Turks. Another influential figure was that of Midhat Pasha, the drafter of 
the Ottoman Constitution of 1876. For Ahmet Rıza in particular, but for prince 
Sabahettin as well, the Constitutional experience fostered and implemented under 
the guidance of Midhat Pasha represented a pillar for the future development of 
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 For the outcome of the synthesis, consult Findley, ―The Advent of Ideology,‖ 151, or the work of 
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 Ahmet Rıza, ―Une Explication,‖ Mechveret Supplément Français 1, no. 10 (1 May 1896), 1. 
19
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political opposition to the rule of Abdülhamit II. Mechveret, the journal founded by 
Ahmet Rıza in Paris, constantly featured articles and eulogies of the life of Midhat20 
and held his exile and assassination as evidence of the Sultan‘s treachery and 
unwillingness to compromise. Likewise, the English supplement to the journal 
Osmanlı wrote that ―[t]he spirit of the noble Midhat Pasha inspires all true 
Mussulmans, ‗the Constitution‘ is not dead, it sleeps, but it will arise the stronger fro 
[sic] its sleep, to become a living fact in a regenerated empire.‖21 
 
Midhat represents a significant transition in Ottoman political thought. He suggested 
that a nation can be constructed on the basis of a territorial affiliation rather than on 
the religious creed, that checks and balances on governments are needed as 
guarantees for the well-being of the population at large, and that citizens should 
become more than mere recipients of higher decisions. These ideas constituted not 
only the basis for Young Turk thought, but also a blueprint for developments in the 
post-Ottoman period.
22
 
 
In every discussion of the late nineteenth century, the crucial and rather 
controversial issue of the West and its interference in Ottoman affairs was especially 
prominent. The role of the West was deployed as leverage for advocacy: according 
to the specific political approach of a given writer or political player, the West 
represented either the ultimate salvation or the ultimate evil, especially in the post 
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World War One literature and until the late 1980s. Even though it seems that the role 
of the West has been overstated in most books,
23
 it is equally important to 
acknowledge that a specific set of ideas, discussed throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries in Europe, made their way into the political formulations of 
Ottoman thinkers and activists who perceived them as suitable approaches to the 
social and political life of a modern Empire.
24
 I do not wish to suggest that without 
the West the Empire would have never accomplished reform, but, rather, that the 
existence of some of these concepts, their discussion across the borders, and their 
dynamic adaptation represented milestones in the development of the Young Turk 
modus pensandi. Moreover, the contact and exchange, but most significantly the 
common experiences of struggle against repression between the Young Turks and 
other activists featured on a ―world time‖ scale,25 to which Benjamin Fortna refers. 
This world time scale, essentially an awareness of contemporaneity between 
different contexts, was instrumental in shaping the ideologies, dreams and plans of 
many within the Young Turk organisation. In this light, it would be wrong to 
underestimate the importance of exile in general and of Paris as a global city in 
particular. 
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 See for example Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey. Bernard Lewis claims that Ottoman 
modernisation was attained, and decline averted only through a tight system of Westernisation.  
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 Throughout this thesis, the ideals borrowed, copied, or adapted from Western Europe will be 
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 Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 12. 
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Among Western philosophical ideas, those that most attracted the Young Turks were 
the same that inspired the French Revolution as well as the philosophical movement 
of positivism; both were liberal in their conceptualisation but could and were 
reconciled with Islamic traits. These ideas were ‗liberty, equality and nationality‘, 
which appeared centrally in the proto-nationalist ideology of Ottomanism, 
Osmanlılık. The ideal of liberty, which Bernard Lewis refers to as ―organised 
liberty‖26 in this case, envisaged a representative government and the rule of law. As 
for citizenship, the Ottomanism of the Young Turks aspired to equality among all 
the citizens of the Ottoman state, regardless of religion and ethnicity. The idea of 
equality would extend to all nations; in this respect, there should be a decrease in 
foreign encroachment in the affairs of the Empire. However, if the first meaning of 
equality seemed to be shared by all, the question of foreign intervention was to 
become one of the main reasons for discord and division within the Young Turk 
movement.
27
 Undoubtedly, all the Young Turk exponents opposed a direct takeover 
of the state by a foreign government, but the degree of foreign presence considered 
acceptable varied widely from group to group, from a total rejection of foreign 
presence to an Ottoman state under considerable foreign influence. The concept of 
nationality, intertwined with equality and citizens rights, was, beyond its idealistic 
appeal, a necessity in late nineteenth century Ottoman Empire because of the loss of 
many territories to newly emerging nations especially in the Balkans.  
 
Besides this more strictly intellectual heritage, the Young Turk movement benefited 
from the patronage, both logistical and ideological, of other contemporary 
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organisations. Various studies have highlighted a tight link between Freemasonry 
and the Young Turk movement. It has been shown that both the organisational and 
operational model of the Masonic lodges became, for the first Young Turk members, 
a blueprint for structuring their own organisations; Freemasonry was also a channel 
for the transmission of western political ideas and a locus for intellectual and 
cultural exchange. Masonic lodges became active supporters and allies of the Young 
Turk movement, at least during the first phase of its development as various 
organisations.
28
 Even though the material at my disposal only hints at this 
connection, it seems that Freemasons also helped Ottoman exiles take part in the 
intellectual circles of Europe.
29
 Moreover, it was through some Masonic channels 
that the idea of Ottomanism as a proto-nationalist ideology was maintained by some 
of the minorities, especially the Greek one. The underground work of Cleanthi 
Scalieri, an Istanbul Greek banker who, in 1865, joined the French Masonic lodge 
L’Union d’Orient, was instrumental in the preservation of the Ottomanist ideology. 
Scalieri was closely involved in anti-Abdülhamit II campaigning, in Freemasonry, 
and in supporting the Young Turk movement; he was a staunch supporter of the 
involvement of the Western powers in the affairs of the Empire. He was part of a 
group that aimed at bringing back the late Sultan Murat as a more suitable, 
enlightened head of a new Byzantine state. Murat was a liberal and had apparently 
been initiated, in Scalieri‘s presence, to the Freemason lodge of Italia Risorta. 30 
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The two Masonic lodges, the French Union d’Orient and the Greek I Proodos31 
(Progress), of which Scalieri was an influential member, played an instrumental role 
in the political life of the Empire. These two lodges emerged between 1863 and 
1874 under the leadership of a lawyer, Louis Amiable,
32
 who opened membership 
rights to the Turkish component of the Empire and translated the lodge‘s regulations 
and Masonic rites into Turkish. These gestures increased the appeal of Freemasonry 
to those who wanted to join but had been alienated by the absence of Turco-Muslim 
attendance. After this move, between 1865 and 1869 Turkish membership in 
Masonic organisations rose drastically, going from a low of three to a high of 53 
members. New Muslim members were mostly intellectuals from circles close to the 
Sultan, ―Ottoman high officials, army pashas and statesmen‖ 33  interested in the 
introduction of liberal laws inside the Empire. Around the same time, in the late 
1860s, Istanbul witnessed a boom not only in membership, but also in the number of 
lodges. According to Dumont, by that time, ―there were about 15 lodges in the 
Imperial capital, all connected to various European orders. Four were dependent on 
the Great Lodge of England, four others on the Grand Orient of France, at least five 
on the Grande Oriente of Italy, one on the German Great Lodge of Hamburg, one on 
the Great Lodge of Ireland, and one or two on the Meghali Anatoli of Greece.‖34 
As mentioned, European Freemasonry served as a model for the establishment of 
most secret societies, which, under the umbrella of the Young Turk movement, 
opposed the despotic rule of Abdülhamit and were ideologically dedicated to the 
cause of scientific advancement. For example, the Italian lodge of Italia Risorta 
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diffused to the Ottomans the ideas and organisational framework of Mazzini and 
Garibaldi. The first organisers of the internal branch of the Young Turk movement 
adopted the ideas of secrecy, hierarchical structure, and the limited knowledge of 
other members of the Carbonaro-Freemasonry organisations. Even though, with the 
advent to power of Sultan Abdülhamit II, Freemason organisations came close to 
disappearing, they still provided help to those Ottomans who had voluntarily gone 
into exile. Ahmet Rıza himself rejected the possibility of becoming a member of any 
such organisation on the basis of their ideological clash with his positivist leanings, 
but in 1892 he apparently recognised that ―… la Franc-Maçonnerie a joué un rôle 
positif dans la lutte contre le cléricalisme et pour la liberté de conscience.‖ 35 In light 
of this, Hanioğlu suggests that the real beginnings of the Young Turk movement are 
to be found in the Masonic lodge known as the Envâr-ı Şarkiye (Lights of the East). 
This lodge was established in mid-1870s by Cléanthi Scalieri, whose agenda, as 
briefly mentioned earlier, was to fund a new Byzantine state that would unite both 
Turks and Greeks under the guidance of an enlightened Sultan. Even though the 
Envâr-ı Şarkiye was short-lived, it gave way to a more active and effective 
organisation, the Osmanlı Hürriyetperverân Cemiyeti, also known as Le Comité 
Libéral Ottoman. In Hanioğlu‘s words, this committee was ―none other than the 
cover name used by Freemasons in their political endeavours in Turkey.‖36 This 
organisation started publishing journals and other works, both in English and 
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French.
37
 The aims of the Osmanlı Hürriyetperverân Cemiyeti were the application 
of drastic reforms at the political level and an increase in individual freedom for the 
Ottoman citizens in a multi-religious Empire; all this would be achieved with the 
help of foreign influential figures.
38
 This plan, as discussed, was very much in line 
with the goals set earlier on by the organisation founded by Scalieri. In sum, 
Hanioğlu suggests that the Osmanlı Hürriyetperverân Cemiyeti was still heavily 
influenced and permeated by Freemasonry. Tellingly, the actions of the members of 
the Hürriyetperverân Cemiyeti were referred to by the Western press as those of 
Young Turks, and ―the term Young Turk referred to the political wing of the 
Freemasons.‖39 
 
Freemasons also provided Young Turk members with protection (safe houses) and 
economic help to sustain their publishing endeavours and to fund trips to Europe for 
advocacy and fundraising purposes. The close relationship between the Young 
Turks and Freemasons extended well into the twentieth century; as reported by Eric 
Anduze, the Young Turk revolution was warmly welcomed by members of the 
Freemasonry, Young Turk actions were described as being highly imbued with 
Masonic signs, and Freemasons were convinced of a future convergence with the 
new regime in the Empire, the Unionist one. Speaking about the revolution of 1908, 
a David Cohen, from the lodge Veritas of Salonika and Secretary General of the 
Grand Orient de France, is reported to have said that: 
Apres l‘heureux événement qui vient de se produire en Turquie et 
auquel, je suis heureux de le dire, la propagande de nos idées, a pris une 
assez large part, il était de mon devoir de penser à la fondation d‘une 
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Loge à Constantinople sous la dépendance de notre GRAND 
ORIENT.
40
 
 
Besides the Freemasons, the Young Turks perceived religious representatives, from 
the ulema and Sufi orders, as allies in the struggle for reform. What is not too clear, 
however, is the motive behind the latters‘ involvement with the movement. It has 
not been fully researched whether these two groups got involved in opposition to the 
Sultan for political and social considerations, or for competition and supremacy 
within their own circles, once the Sultan had been ousted.
41
 What is equally 
ambiguous is the type of relationship between organised religion and the Young 
Turk movement. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight the degree of affinity 
between the Young Turks and some religious exponents, as this factor has been 
neglected by the more widespread literature. The most plausible scenario is that 
members of the religious establishment joined the Young Turk organisation 
individually and in parallel to their belonging to ulema and Sufi circles. 
The ulema had already been active with the Young Ottomans group and involved in 
the proclamation of the First Ottoman Constitution in 1876. Ali Haydar Midhat, the 
son of Midhat Pasha, claims that the ulema were convinced upholders of the 
Constitution and, later on, supporters of the Young Turks:  
Chakir Effendi, one of its [the Constitution] warmest partisans, was 
one of the most learned, distinguished and highly esteemed Ulema at 
Constantinople; it was he who headed a deputation of Ulemas and 
doctors of the law, to congratulate Midhat immediately after the 
ceremony of promulgation was over. The most enthusiastic champions 
of both Midhat and the Constitution were the Softas, or body of 
students, numbering several thousands, of all the medreses … in 
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Constantinople, the future generation of the educated mind of the 
nation.
42
 
 
The above citation may contain a degree of exaggeration on the part of the writer, 
who was probably concerned primarily with promoting his father‘s legacy. At the 
very least, however, we can assume that the students of the madaress were actively 
involved in the liberal organisation of Midhat Pasha. The ulema involvement with 
the Young Ottomans was made smoother by the fact that the latters‘ ideology was 
heavily imbued with religious undertones. Evidence of this can be found in the 
writings of Murat Bey. In a booklet he published in 1895, he wrote: 
Les Softas … faisaient function de boucs emissaries du parti libéral au 
temps de Midhat-Pacha. Aujuord‘hui ils se sont enrôlés dans les cadres 
mêmes du parti liberal. Ils ont leurs place entre l‘élite de la nation et les 
convertis aux idées nouvelles. Ils peuvent être très utilement employés, 
car ils trouvent auprès des masses plus de crédit que personne.
43
 
 
As to the relationship between the ulema and the Young Turks, it is suggested that 
the former organised their own opposition to the Sultan because of the total rejection 
on the part of Young Turks of religion, seen ―…as an obstacle to progress.‖44 This 
assumption at first seems to be fairly plausible. However, from the writings of some 
of the more influential Young Turks,
45
 it is possible to understand that opposition to 
the ulema was upheld on the principle that the Young Turks saw the ulema as 
perpetrators of a corrupted version of Islam, which had sidelined the true Islamic 
values of progress and had consolidated a corrupted structure of power with the 
complicity of Sultan Abdülhamit II. However, some exponents of the ulema did 
organise opposition parties, ―… even before the overt activities of the CUP had 
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begun.‖46  The most prominent of these ulema were: Ubeydullah Efendi, 47  Hoca 
Muhiddin, and Hoca Kadri.
48
 The last figure is of special interest, since, he was ―a 
member of the ulema with even more direct relations with the CUP, [and who] had a 
profound impact on the absorption of the organised ulema into the CUP.‖ 49 
Interestingly, he was also the only member of the ulema who was present at the 
1902 Paris Congress of Ottoman Liberals. It is equally worth noticing that the 
attacks that these ulema launched against the Sultan were echoed in the Young Turk 
discourse.
50
 Their accusations, appearing in leaflets ―undoubtedly authored and 
circulated by the organisation of the ulema‖51  in Istanbul in 1896, claimed that 
―Abdülhamid is a usurper of the Caliphate‖ 52  and that ―to call him caliph is 
tantamount to infidelity.‖53 In sums, it appears that the Young Turk movement had 
close ties with those ulema that had stayed out of the Palace circle because they had 
not been corrupted by the Sultan‘s regime. On their part, the ulema who decided to 
co-operate with the opposition had done so because they also believed that religion 
had been co-opted by the status-quo and because they viewed the regime as un-
Islamic and obscurantist. In fact, considering the options that the ulema had – 
between a body of corrupted religious exponents which could have alienated the 
masses and the ‗privatisation‘ of religion as advocated by most Young Turks54 – the 
second one must have looked more appealing, especially if the Young Turk 
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movement would have succeeded in changing the nature of the regime with the help 
of those ulema who were close to the population and could have served as vehicles 
of transmission of the Young Turk ideology. 
 
As far as the Sufi orders are concerned, in the political spectrum of the late 19
th
 
century they can be seen as two categories: the heterodox,
55
 who sided with the 
Young Turk movement, and the more orthodox, which supported the Sultan. 
Exceptions to this dichotomy were two Naqshbandī sheikhs, Erbilli Sheikh Mehmet 
Es‘ad and Şevki Celâleddin; the latter was the only representative of Sufi orders to 
attend the 1902 Paris Congress of Ottoman Liberals. The presence of Sufis at the 
Congress of Paris raises the question of their impact on the Young Turk movement.  
While this is beyond the focus of this thesis, it seems probable that the Sufi orders 
found themselves in the middle of a struggle for power and that the two political 
forces vying for supremacy, the Young Turks and the Sultan, played them against 
each other in order to diminish their authority and influence among the population, 
similarly to what has been discussed earlier in the case of the ulema. Ernest Ramsaur 
claims that the Bektashi order and the Young Turk movement shared similar aims 
and that the order itself had to some extent tried to use the opposition to the Sultan 
for its own benefit. Ramsaur suggests that some of the doctrines followed by the 
Bektashi order were nearing ―… a definitely materialistic atheism,‖56 while some of 
its most influential exponents were heavily influenced by the writings of Voltaire. 
Such leanings would have undoubtedly facilitated conversations with the Young 
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Turks that I am investigating here. Moreover, the Bektashis and Young Turks had 
mutual contacts due to their respective affiliation with Freemasonry, which appears 
to have been very active in co-ordinating and mediating between all segments of the 
opposition to Sultan Abdülhamit II. As for the manipulation of the Young Turks by 
the Sufi orders, Frederick Hansluk appears convinced that the Bektashis were 
hoping to become the most influential Sufi order by supporting the winning side of 
the Young Turk organisation:
57
 ―The Bektashi undoubtedly aimed at an ultimate 
religious supremacy in the countries touched by their propaganda. At the time of the 
Turkish revolution they had still hopes of a Bektashi state in Albania. Such a 
religious supremacy could hope to hold its own if supported by a sympathetic civil 
power.‖58 Finally, another possible reason for the Bektashi Sufis‘ affinity with the 
Young Turk organisation could be their fear of Abdülhamit‘s treatment of Sufism in 
general after the elimination of the Young Turk component. Sufis feared that the 
Sultan‘s adoption of Pan-Islamism could lead to the abolition of their orders,59 while 
this would not have been the case in the event of a Young Turkish victory. Instead, 
both the direct membership of some Young Turks into the Bektashi orders
60– as well 
as the collaboration of Sufi orders with Freemasonry
61
 – and the parallel alliance 
between the latter and some Young Turk members, would have ensured the survival 
of Sufism. Probably thanks to such aspirations, Sufi tekkes (lodges) were used as 
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safe meeting places of the Young Turks or as centres for the distribution of their 
publications.
62
 
 
The necessity for exile, I: the trajectory of the internal and external Young 
Turk 
This section examines the concept of voluntary exile, which some members of the 
opposition adopted in order to develop an organisation capable of defeating or co-
opting Abdülhamit II. It should be clear by the end of this section that the experience 
of exile was a focal part of the founding, development, and eventually success of the 
Young Turk movement in re-instating the Constitution in 1908.  
 
The link between voluntary exile and drastic changes in the Ottoman Empire has not 
been highlighted to the degree it deserves, while scholars of other movements of the 
Middle Eastern and Mediterranean area have explored the strategy of self-imposed 
exile and publication abroad. McDougall has argued, for example, that the space that 
Algerian exiles occupied abroad was instrumental in creating revolutionary-populist 
groups and in developing a new idea of Algeria and of Algerian nationalism.
63
 Exile 
presented a number of advantages: first of all, the proper existence of an outside 
branch, in exile, of the opposition movement (it will be referred to as the ‗external‘ 
branch of the Young Turk organisation) ensured that, when the internal branch had 
been silenced by the Sultan, the workings of the opposition did not come to a halt. 
Moreover, free from the tight censorship that the Hamidian regime had put in place 
internally, most of the opposition groups in exile were able to publish journals and 
                                                          
62
 Hanioğlu, Young Turks in Opposition, 54. 
63
 McDougall, History and the Culture, 34.  
58 
 
newspapers that became the basis for the intellectual development of the Young 
Turk thought. Linked to this is the fact that, in exile and specifically in cities such as 
Paris, Geneva and Brussels, members of the opposition were able to engage 
intellectually with a similarly minded European elite and were able, thanks to the 
tight co-operation with Freemasonry, to enter into important European philosophical 
circles. By opting for exile, Young Turk members were able to internationalise the 
struggle of their umbrella organisation and advertise their commitment to the rest of, 
what they referred to as, the ‗civilised world‘. Exile as state of consciousness 
became an important frame for the political vision of the Young Turks in question, a 
vision founded upon the synthesis of various cultures and social systems. However, 
in order to analyse the necessity for exile for the members of the Young Turk group, 
it is essential to look briefly at the constitution of the first nucleus of the Young 
Turks and at what took some of them to Europe. 
 
In 1889, at the Royal Medical Academy, a student movement began and soon spread 
across to the majority of higher education institutions of the Empire.
64
 The 
mastermind behind the constitution of the movement was İbrahim Temo, of 
Albanian origin and former student of the same school. According to a letter that 
Temo wrote to Karl Süssheim,
65
 the exact date for the establishment of the first 
nucleus of organised opposition was the 2
nd
 of July 1889. The four founding 
members were İshak Sükûti, Mehmet Reşid, Abdullah Cevdet and Temo himself.66 
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In his own memoirs, Temo provides an account of how he approached İshak Sükûti 
exhorting him to form the society and mentioning the other members that would be 
involved. The account is in the form of a conversation between Temo and Sükûti 
taking place in the school Gülhane Mektebi, in Sarayburnu, during recess: 
Me – Come friend, let me share with you some thoughts I am having. 
We all know that under today‘s conditions and with the [present] form 
of rule our noble fatherland will dissolve. We discuss between us this 
situation all the time and whenever we have free time; but we cannot 
think of a solution to get rid of this danger. I think that instead of belly-
aching [whining] with these dry remarks and observations we need to 
get into action. 
İshak – What type of activity? 
Me – By working in the form of a society. 
İshak – This is nice but who do you think we can trust to undertake 
such a dangerous work? 
Me – Well firstly you, one; I looked at Mehmet Reşid (scarface who 
exited from the dormitories heading towards us), that is two, we are 
now three. This means a society has been formed! 
We signalled to Mehmet Reşid to call him over. We told him [about] 
our thoughts. At that moment, Abdullah Cevdet who at the time was 
very devout had just completed his afternoon prayer and when he came 
to us from the school mosque: There you have number four I said ... 
Four hands touched each other. This initial contractual pact was made 
on a coincidental day of May 1305 (1889) and the society was 
established.
67
 
 
The name given to the newly founded society was the Ottoman Union Society, 
İttihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti. Temo‘s memoirs are a precious source in providing more 
details on the members and the profile of prospective members of the emerging 
organisation:  
This [was] the first meeting of the society and of those present [,] shall 
be listed: one of the then high court civil servants Hersekli Ali Ruşdi, 
one of the editors of the newspaper İzmirli Ali Şefik, medical student 
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Asaf Derviş (Paşa) (university professor and mamoş), Muharrem Girid 
(lecturer at Damascus Faculty of Medical Jurisprudence), Dr. Abdullah 
Cevdet, İshak Sükûti, Şerafeddin Mağmumi, Çerkes Mehmed Reşid 
(the one who committed suicide), me and three more persons whose 
names I cannot remember. 
[The positions] were distributed [as such] [Hersekli] Ali Ruşdi Effendi 
[was appointed] chief, because of [his] being the elder of us all and a 
hodja, Şerafeddin [Mağmumi] secretary of minutes, Asaf Derviş 
treasurer. However in the rank of numbers that were to be used I [was] 
1/1[;] head of this series. 
On this first meeting of this national and secret society we knew that 
some decisions were to be taken and especially [knew] that the course 
of events [will lead to] discussion about who we were to except into 
this national [and] secret society … rather cautiously and [after] going 
through all sorts of trials, we reached the point of view that every 
Ottoman who is able and trustworthy could be accepted [into the 
society].
68
 
 
Following the publication and circulation of a programmatic brochure in 1894, the 
society expanded and started to permeate other schools, such as the Military 
Academy of Pangalti, the veterinary school, the Mülkiye (civil college), the naval 
academy and the artillery and engineering schools, reaching some functionaries of 
the Porte and of the administration.
69
 After its founding, one of the members, Dr. 
Nâzim, was sent to Paris to establish contact with Ahmet Rıza70 who had, by then, 
moved to France on voluntary exile and had started the publication of Mechveret.
71
 
The two men established the first nucleus of the Young Turk opposition abroad. 
Rıza accepted the leadership of the society in Paris but had it renamed, in 
accordance with his positivist beliefs, Nizam ve Terakki (a translation of Auguste 
Comte‘s motto Ordre et Progrès). The other members, those from the internal 
branch, accepted the second term, Progress, but thought that Union, more than Order, 
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was to be used. They settled on Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti – the Ottoman 
Committee of Union and Progress, a two-branch organisation with internal and 
external branches, which was united in the pursuit of the same goals, and, at this 
stage, through the same, peaceful, means. By 1895, the Committee had managed to 
establish its central branch in Istanbul, composed mainly of students, and two 
external branches, in Paris and Cairo.  
 
By the beginning of 1896, however, a wave of arrests drastically changed the nature 
of the internal Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, resulting in voluntary 
exile for many members. By then, there was little ideological affinity between the 
internal and external Young Turk branches. This is because, in Istanbul, the students 
had been replaced by high-ranking bureaucrats from various ministries, men from 
the military establishment and some ulema, all of whom were men of action rather 
than of thought:  
 
―[i]n this manner the CUP in the capital was transformed from a 
student organisation into a committee of high-ranking bureaucrats and 
ulema. İbrahim Temo [who by then had fled to Romania] later 
confessed that he did not even know the new director of the Istanbul 
branch. This caused problems in relations between the Istanbul 
organisation and the Paris branch.‖72 
 
Moreover, ―… there were no similarities between the group surrounding Ahmet 
Rıza and the leaders of the Istanbul center. Also, the latter, influenced by 
distinguished ulema, asked the committee not to enrol Christians in the organisation, 
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in opposition to Ahmet Rıza‘s efforts to unite the opponents around the Ottoman 
Constitution of 1876.‖73 
 
As for the external branch, the leadership of Ahmet Rıza had been severely criticised, 
by the end of 1895, as being too ideological and too committed to the Positivist 
circle.
74
 Mechveret, the mouthpiece of the Rıza‘s faction, which had been until then 
regarded as the official organ of the Young Turk movement abroad, came to be 
challenged by the journal published in Cairo by Murat Bey, Mizan.
75
 The latter 
journal was more in line with the activist leanings of the internal Young Turk branch: 
it proposed a coup d‘état to remove Abdülhamit II and advocated considerable 
outside interference, especially from the British. By contrast, Rıza opposed the idea 
of a coup d‘état on the grounds that, as explained in the programme of the 
Mechveret faction that was published in the journal, the group was in principle 
opposed to violence. To resolve the friction within the external branch of the 
organisation, a meeting was organised in mid-November 1896; in line with the new 
activist and more militaristic nature of the internal branch, echoed by Murat‘s 
faction, a committee of inspection and execution to oversee the action of all 
branches was set up: 
This committee was to have a director, an assistant director, and three 
members. By secret ballot, Murad Bey was elected director … 
Çürüksulu Ahmed became the assistant director, and Doctor Nâzim, 
Şerafeddin Mağmumî, and İshak Sükûti were nominated members … 
recognition of the Paris branch‘s director as the leader of the 
organisation was denied, and this branch was demoted to a normal one. 
Çürüksulu Ahmed replaced Ahmed Rıza. Ahmed Rıza, who entered 
the meeting as leader of the movement, departed as editor of 
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Mechveret Supplément Français on the condition that each issue be 
subject to the review and control of a board … then it was determined 
that only Mizan would represent the CUP as its central organ …76 
 
At this stage, the official Young Turk task became that of saving the Empire and 
Caliphate through a coup d‘état, made possible by the help of high-ranking 
bureaucrats who contemplated the assassination of Sultan Abdülhamit II.
77
 
The future would prove that both this course of action and Murat Bey‘s leadership 
was fragile, since the first attempt of an active and united political opposition against 
the Sultan was abortive. In fact, under the leadership of Mizancı Murat, the external 
branch of the organisation drove itself into the hands of Abdülhamit. In Ramsaur‘s 
words, 
[t]he most devastating blow of all fell without warning: the Young 
Turks of Europe, with one or two notable exceptions, suddenly gave up 
the struggle against Abdul Hamid. Some of them, led by the idol of the 
society, Murat Bey, even trooped back to the shores of the Bosphorus 
to kiss the feet of the man for whom their vocabularies of vilification 
had only the day before been stretched to the utmost.
78
 
 
The bait consisted in a promise made by the Sultan to grant some reforms and, in 
assuring full amnesty for all the Young Turks who were either in exile or in prison, 
in return for the cessation of subversive action and their return to the Empire.
79
 In 
the Sultan‘s view, the cessation of action abroad would enhance his position inside 
the Empire and, simultaneously, alleviate the diplomatic pressures resulting from 
Young Turks‘ lobbying with foreign governments and European public opinion. Yet, 
many of those who returned were soon imprisoned or exiled, while others were 
received as heroes, were granted good positions and were presented as patriots. 
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After having started publication of a journal, Mizancı Murat, İshak Sükûti and 
Abdullah Cevdet returned to the Empire; some were awarded posts as medical 
officers at embassies in Europe, as in Rome and Vienna. During this period, a large 
majority of the Young Turks abroad decided to give in and return to Ottoman lands: 
notable exceptions were Ahmet Rıza and Halil Ganem. 
 
Seeing the failure of one side of the external branch to hold its ground, the internal 
branch went ahead with its plans for a coup d‘état. This was to be the last move of 
the internal branch. With most of the external movement now in check, the Sultan 
could concentrate on discovering internal plots through his strong network of secret 
police. A huge wave of arrests ensued after the discovery of the plot to assassinate 
him, after which the Istanbul branch never recovered its organisational and 
numerical status. From then until the revolution of 1908, the internal branch almost 
disappeared. According to Fesch, two more committees were established at the 
Military School of Pangalti, the ‗Committee Hussein Avni‘ and the ‗Committee 
Süleyman Pasha‘.80 They were eventually discovered and, in June 1897, all of the 81 
members or affiliates were condemned to death, exile and imprisonment, and 
endured torture. According to a letter dated 1899 and sent to the journal Osmanlı by 
Abdullah Cevdet, who had been imprisoned there in 1895, the fortress of Tripoli 
became the home of a large number of figures accused of siding with the supposed 
revolutionaries. Cevdet lists the names of 69 people, including students and military 
personnel, who were periodically tortured and kept in dark cells.
81
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At the same time, the external organisation, having lost most of its members, seemed 
on the verge of dissolution. The only influential figure abroad was Ahmet Rıza, who 
was torn between dedicating himself to philosophy and positivism or continuing the 
struggle ―… sur le champ de bataille, à la tête de la lutte.‖82 During that period, the 
battle between the opposition and the Sultan seemed to have been won by Istanbul. 
In 1899, however, a new event bolstered the members and supporters of the Young 
Turk movement, at least those residing in Europe. This event was the flight of 
Damat Mahmut Pasha,
83
 who landed in Marseilles and moved to Paris with his two 
sons Sabahettin and Lutfullah. His departure from Ottoman lands stirred reactions 
among the opposition as well as the establishment. For the establishment, it meant 
that the Sultan would potentially be challenged by someone who was part of his own 
Palace circle and who knew the Sultan‘s secrets and fears. Moreover, Damat 
Mahmut‘s voice of dissent would be regarded highly by the European government 
and contribute to discrediting the Sultan‘s regime. On the other hand, Damat 
Mahmut was an important ally for the members of the Young Turk movement since 
he had previously represented the establishment and, thus, was proof that the Young 
Turk organisations were appealing to and representative of different strata of 
Ottoman society.  
 
With the arrival of father and sons in Paris, the organisation seemed to come to life 
again. Between the end of 1899 and 1902, it looked as if the much sought-after unity, 
based not only on intent but also on a programme, was to become a reality. In this 
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frame, the different organisations that made up the Young Turk movement could 
present themselves as a coherent and unified front and thus act cohesively against 
the rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II. The impact of the arrival of Damat Mahmut and 
his two sons managed to attract influential figures towards the Young Turk camp 
which, until then, had either remained autonomous or had lost hope of tangible 
results. Among these were Ali Haydar Midhat, the son of Midhat Pasha, and İsmail 
Kemal, by then governor of Tripoli in Lebanon. 
 
In some ways, the rupture between the two branches of the organisation – the 
internal and external ones – was a key event in the intellectual development of those 
Young Turks who remained in exile after 1896. Their distance from the regime and 
their quasi-autonomy in the absence of a unified leadership gave some of the 
opponents the space to associate themselves with both Ottomans and Europeans who 
were engaged in political and social engineering on a global scale. The previous 
example of the Young Ottomans using publications for political purposes and the 
fact that, outside the Empire, journals could actually be published freely, convinced 
these Young Turks that the press was their primary tool against Hamidian despotism. 
 
The necessity for exile, II: the press, Hamidian censorship and the publication 
of journals abroad 
This section investigates the choice of some Young Turk members to go on exile 
from another perspective, their freedom to use the press for their advocacy. I will 
start by contextualising the place of the press in the Ottoman Empire up to the first 
years of Abdülhamit‘s rule. I will then narrate how some Ottoman exiles started the 
publication of journals and reflect on the role of these journals in the intellectual and 
67 
 
activist flourishing of the movement. As I stated before, the mixed nationalities and 
background of the contributors to the publications, as well as the visibility of some 
of these journals, turned out to be core elements of the Ottoman opposition 
especially as it was viewed by the European public opinion and governments. 
 
The role of the invention of the printing press, one of the key instruments in the 
production of nationalist ideologies in Europe and elsewhere, has been extensively 
discussed.
84
 In Europe, this development engendered the institutionalisation of 
vernacular languages and contributed to the cultivation of national affiliation as 
subjective experience. In the Ottoman Empire, the introduction of the print served a 
similar, yet not identical, purpose. While the spread of the printing press fostered 
sentiments of community in contradistinction with the ruling class, in this case seen 
as despotic and non-representative, these stirrings of nationalist affiliation were 
inclusive – in opposition to the more essentialist European national identities – and 
took the shape of a renewed cultural and intellectual Ottomanism, which for the 
Young Turk groups generally meant ―… the notion of one Ottoman nation, 
consisting of individuals with equal rights [in front of the law and regardless of the 
ethnic and religious background], sharing the same mother country, and loyal to the 
state and the sultan… The policy of Ottomanism was developed particularly to 
prevent the development of nationalism in non-Muslim communities.‖ 85  This 
Ottomanism was in stark contrast with the politics of the Palace, which were more 
geared to an emphasis on strictly controlled religious polarisation and ethnic 
fragmentation. In relation to the public and political sphere, the advent of 
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widespread print led to new opportunities for those opposing power configurations 
so far unchallenged. Enlarging the audience of such confrontations, voices of 
dissent were able to turn what the establishment wished to present as individual 
issues into communal, and in some cases transnational, conversations. 
 
The ruler Mehmet Ali
86
 was the first to publish a newspaper in the Islamic world, in 
Egypt during the late 1820s. This initiative ―encouraged [Sultan] Mahmut to 
undertake a similar project[,]‖87 and, therefore, the first official Ottoman journal was 
issued in French under the name Le Moniteur. The journal was intended to describe 
the reforms taken by the Ottoman State under the modernising sway of the Bâb-ı Ali, 
the Sublime Porte. In 1831, Sultan Mahmut founded the first newspaper in Ottoman 
Turkish, the Takvim-i Vekayi (Calendar of Events), which was mainly a translation 
of Le Moniteur. Already by 1851, with encouragement from the government, a 
whole series of new journals was being launched. According to Paul Fesch, by the 
second half of the nineteenth century the number of newspapers and journals in 
different languages had reached 13: two in Turkish, four in French, four in Italian, 
and one respectively in Greek, Armenian and Bulgarian.
88
 Up to 1854, the annual 
circulation of these papers was estimated at around 100,000 to 150,000.
89
 The 
impetus to publish continued under the reign of Abdülaziz (1861-1876). It was 
under his rule, in the 1860s, that the ―first newspaper of opinion in the real sense‖90 
came out: it was the Tercüman-i Ahval of İbrahim Şinasi.  
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From the 1860s onwards, the press increased exponentially: in 1866, there were at 
least 43 papers published in Istanbul in various languages, of which four were in 
French, one in German, one in Italian and one in English. In the provinces, journals 
were published in both Ottoman Turkish and the local languages.
91
 During this 
period, certain newspapers became privately owned and featured more criticism of 
ideological positions and of practiced governance. By the time Abdülhamit II 
assumed power in 1876, the number of newspapers published only in Istanbul had 
reached 47: 13 were in Turkish, one in Arabic, nine in Greek, three in Bulgarian, 
nine in Armenian, two in Hebrew, two in French and English, and one in German.
92
 
Moreover, under the influence of the Midhat Pasha circle, a vigorous ‗Young 
Turkish‘ press – as he himself termed it – had managed to outdo in popularity the 
more conservative political publications. As we have seen, the figure of Midhat 
became a key source of inspiration for all those opposing the rule of Abdülhamit. 
Many Young Turks developed their political ideals out of the experience and 
intellectual work of Midhat; a running thread in his thought was the conviction that 
government officials owe their loyalty to the people and not to their ruler. One of the 
main ideological axes of this Young Turk press was to introduce and discuss with 
readers the idea that citizens have rights, that these rights cannot be arbitrarily taken 
away from them and that a constitution would be the panacea of most problems of 
the Empire. Midhat Pasha found that his support base steadily expanded to 
encompass the religious circles as ―[m]any of the religious dignitaries and the 
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theological students were believers in this panacea, and had become strong 
supporters of [his] … .‖93 
 
At the time of Abdulhamid II‘s accession to the throne, in 1876, the Sultan found a 
press that felt entitled and empowered enough to articulate a harsh political critique: 
The Vakit (Time) stated on every occasion that the real sovereignty 
rested with the people and that they could depose their Sultan 
whenever they chose to do so. The Istikbal (Future) reminded the 
people again and again that the constitution was not a gift of the 
sovereign, but was obtained by a group of patriots after a hard 
struggle.
94
 
 
According to Ahmet Emin, the new Sultan, at the time of his ascension, considered 
the press to be too open in its treatment of political actors: ―[h]e understood 
perfectly that absolute power could not go hand in hand with a free and vigorously 
edited press.‖95 An article from the journal Osmanlı confirms that, until the first 
years of Hamidian rule, the Ottoman press was free and independent. With the 
closing of parliament and the prorogation of the Constitution, Osmanlı states that the 
environment changed drastically: ―… la liberté de la presse a subi une atrophie 
progressive par suite d‘une oppression de plus en plus intense et enfin elle est 
aujourd‘hui réduite presque à zéro.‖96  
 
The Sultan‘s first step was to implement a tough regime of censorship, which was 
inaugurated with the issuing of a list of regulations.
97
 This list stated that priority in 
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the news was to be given to reports on the Sultan‘s health, the outcome of the 
harvest and progress in the commercial and industrial sectors. Sure enough, no news 
could be published without official prior approval. Gradually, the prohibition was 
extended to cover most domains of public life including the mention of historical, 
political and geographical names and terms. Among the banned vocabulary featured 
words such as: constitution, revolution, freedom, anarchy, tyranny, peoples‘ rights, 
equality, fraternity, fatherland, youth, dynamo, dynamite, nation, internationalism, 
hereditary prince, republic, deputies, senators, bombs, reforms, Midhat Pasha and 
Armenia.
98
 Censorship was not limited to internal news; it extended to foreign 
affairs such as the mention of assassination attempts on foreign rulers to prevent 
inspiration and emulation. For instance, regarding the assassination of the President 
of the French Republic Marie François-Sadie Carnot in 1894 by an Italian anarchist, 
the Istanbul press reported it as following: ―nous avons le vif regret d‘annoncer à 
nos estimables lecteurs que Carnot, l‘honorable président de la République 
française, qui était souffrant depuis quelques jours, vient de mourier hier à minuit.‖99 
On a similar occasion, Osmanlı wrote that, in the case of Iran, the Ottoman press 
initially did not even mention the death of the Shah, Nasreddin,
100
 while, after a few 
months, the journal revealed that when news did come out, it was completely 
distorted: ―L‘assassinat du Schah de Perse Nasreddin par Moulla-Riza, était, comme 
on s‘en rappelle, transformé par la presse turque en une mort plausible et douce! 
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Charge d‘ans et de gloires, le roi des rois avait rejoint ses augustes ancêtres dans la 
tombe!‖101 
 
Press censorship went as far as the banning of words that were remotely connected 
to the figure of the Sultan. A term such as burun – nose – was to be avoided, 
―because it was perceived as an implied reference to Abdülhamit‘s particularly large 
nose … [but] … since burun also meant the geographic term cape in Turkish,‖102 
writers had to avoid using the term cape or were obliged to substitute it with a 
paraphrase. In a scientific article, the equation AH=0 was not be permitted because 
it could be taken to mean Abdülhamit (initials AH) equals zero.
103
 At the same time, 
censorship was to ―educate writers to write in the proper way.‖ 104  This 
circumscription of the domain of political deliberation led to a race for the 
publication of semi-scientific articles and treaties which had little or nothing to do 
with the political situation of the time: ―Travel in Air or Under the Sea, [and] The 
Intelligence of Cats, [or] Myopia among Students in Germany‖ were the sort of 
article titles published most frequently at the time. In less than a year, the free, 
opinionated and vigorous press had been turned in a tool in the hands of the 
establishment. Censorship was issued by the Ministry of Interior and the publication 
of both periodicals and books was under the scrutiny of the Ministry of Public 
Instruction. Everything, down to the smallest detail, was closely overviewed and 
censored:  
Les brochures et les livres à imprimer doivent être présentés en deux 
exemplaires qui sont revus et scrupuleusement censurés et pour ainsi 
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dire, analysés par deux conseils de censure différents; la plupart de ces 
manuscrits sont refusés et les autres sont grossièrement tronques. 
Cette vigueur de censure a pour but de tarir toutes les sources de 
réforme et de pensées nouvelles,…105 
 
By the beginning of 1900, things had deteriorated to such an extent that Fesch went 
as far as declaring that: 
[d]epuis trente ans, la presse n‘existe plus en Turquie. Il y a bien des 
journaux, même assez nombreux; mais les ciseaux de la censure les 
taillent, les mutilent de si émasculante manière qu‘ils n‘ont plus 
aucune puissance. Si j‘osais, je dirais que le sont des journaux 
hongres, ou mieux, pour rester dans la couleur locale, des eunuques.
106
 
 
The outcome of this set of regulations, which applied to all newspapers, books, and 
publications of all languages, but especially to those in Ottoman Turkish, had a 
twofold effect: on the one hand, there was the anticipated outcome of the systematic 
persecution and disappearance of journals and printing presses. As soon as 
publications treated subjects that would undermine the position of the Sultan (such 
as praising works of individuals directly or indirectly related with the First 
Constitutional Period) they would be closed down, their editors and journalists 
would be sent to prison or exile and a considerable number of publishing houses 
would find themselves out of business. A very high stamp tax for newspapers was 
instituted so that many would either be prevented from opening or forced to close 
down. Those that managed to remain open were coerced through bribes and 
honorary titles in order to stop publication. The tough censorship had economic 
repercussions on a large number of publishers who went almost or entirely bankrupt. 
In a very short period of time, the free, opinionated and vigorous press turned into a 
tool in the hands of the state.  
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However, another outcome of this situation, unanticipated by the regime, was the 
gradual migration, during the 1890s, of the voices of opposition, among whom the 
Young Turk groups. Aware that Hamidian censorship and control would be too tight 
inside the Ottoman lands, the only option for opponents who wanted to publish 
articles on political dissent was to leave the Empire and start publication abroad. 
This consideration led to an outflow of Young Turk members. They chose countries 
where the press was freer, such as France and Switzerland, or other places where 
opposition to the Sultan would be positively viewed, such as Egypt and Greece. 
Consequently, a large number of Young Turk publications were inaugurated in 
Paris, Geneva, London, Cairo, and Athens. Among these, especially worthy of 
notice are: İctihad, published in Cairo and Geneva; Mechveret, published in Paris, 
Geneva and Brussels; Mizan, published in Cairo and Geneva; Osmanlı, published in 
Geneva, London and Folkestone; and Vatan, published in Athens. 
Osmanlı commented on the outcome of Hamidian censorship in the following 
manner: 
La réaction de cette oppression fit fonder à la jeune génération pleine 
d‘énergie et d‘espoir, des organes indépendants publiés dans les villes 
libres comme Paris, Genève, Le Caire, Bucarest, Bruxelles, etc. Les 
publications sont introduites clandestinement en Turquie. Le nombre 
des journaux paraissant à l‘étranger en différentes langues est 
supérieur à celui qui se publie actuellement à Constantinople.
107
 
 
Regardless of the dynamism of their founders, some of these publications were 
short-lived for various reasons. Many lacked the funds necessary either to buy a 
printing plant and the required typing characters or, once bought, were unable to pay 
for their maintenance. Others inaugurated the publication of a specific journal and, 
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not long after, would merge with another political group and work on different 
projects. Among these publications that were short lived were those that: 
were merely published to blackmail the Sultan. In 1898 and the 
following years, it was, in fact, the usual practice for ambitious 
functionaries without strong palace protection, to make a European 
trip as Young Turks, to publish, or to make an attempt to publish, 
mutinous literature, and then to sell their silence for a superior 
position in the government service.
108
 
 
The necessity for exile, III: the city, the environment and the intellectual milieu 
This section emphasises how vital some of these centres of exile became for the 
intellectual development of many Young Turks for both ideological and practical 
reasons. This section also shows that most of the European cities, and more 
specifically Paris, were centres of intellectual and cultural ferment during the late 
nineteenth century. Positivists and followers of social science, just to mention two 
currents, were extremely active in the French capital and, as we shall see later, Rıza 
and Sabahettin became regular participants in these and other philosophical circles. 
Civil society and a more liberal public were to become good partners of Young Turk 
members, providing economic, moral, and legal help on many occasions. 
 
In the discussion above, I hinted at the various difficulties involved in setting up a 
publication in exile. An important obstacle that had to be faced in setting up and 
funding the mouthpiece of the opposition was of economic nature. All of these 
publications were of a non-profit character; this implied that many of the issues were 
distributed for free and that any return would be subject to the voluntary 
contribution of the more affluent and more committed readers. Moreover, these 
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journals constituted only one of the many activities of a Young Turk organisation. 
Thus, the income generated by the distribution of the journals was to be used not 
only for the mere sustenance of the publication itself, but also served for the 
organisation of meetings and the funding of trips in which representatives of 
different Young Turks groups would liaise with each other. By being in exile, many 
editors were able to tour the whole of Europe trying to broker loans and donations 
from European governments, political parties, influential interest groups, and some 
dedicated Ottoman exiles. We know of two instances of this kind that involved 
Ahmet Rıza and prince Sabahettin, which are indicative of the benefits of living and 
acting outside Ottoman borders. For the launch of the journal Mechveret, Ahmet 
Rıza had to raise an initial capital that would help with buying a printing press and 
the necessary typing characters. This was done by organising a meeting of Ottoman 
students and other exiles residing in Paris. During the meeting, the group raised an 
initial amount that jumpstarted the publication. The total amount raised during this 
meeting, according to different sources, ranges from 100, to 400 and even 500 
francs.
109
 
 
As for prince Sabahettin, once based in Paris, he embarked on trips to both London 
and Geneva very frequently and that the raising of funds became a very time- and 
energy-consuming task.
110
 When the prince arrived in Paris with his father and 
brother, the three were lodging at the Grand Hotel. From the archives of the 
Préfecture de Police de Paris, it is possible to understand that they were closely 
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monitored by the French establishment. The reports that police officers wrote on a 
daily basis, state that on the 3
rd
 of January 1900 – that is 10 days after their arrival in 
France – the two brothers, Sabahettin and Lutfullah left the Grand Hotel on their 
way to London, returning respectively nine and five days later. According to the 
police, they went to London to try and broker a loan of 629,000 francs, but their 
request was turned down. Again in March of the same year, they left for Geneva, 
where, according to the police, they pursued the donation of funds. After being 
turned down repeatedly, it seems that they managed to get some sponsorship. In fact, 
towards the end of 1900, and precisely on the 6
th
 of November, the two brothers 
came back to Paris but, instead of lodging at the usual hotel, they managed to rent an 
apartment for which they needed to pay an advance sum of 25,000 francs and a fee 
of 4,500 as lager annuel. Yet, funds were never enough for organising a congress 
and uniting the opposition to the Ottoman regime. Therefore, in 1901, police sources 
report that Damat Mahmut Pasha, Sabahettin‘s father, desperately tried to borrow 
300,000 francs, probably from a banking institution. This request was once more 
rejected because his guarantees were his assets in the Empire and these had been 
recently confiscated by the government.
111
  
 
Another way to raise funds for the editors of opposition journals in exile was the 
organisation of banquets, where foreigners could make their contribution by 
subscribing to the journal. Banquets had an added benefit: by organising one, 
members of the opposition could exchange thoughts, familiarise themselves, and 
tighten their links with European intellectual circles. A clear example of the 
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opportunities that some of the European cities offered and of the link that was 
emerging between Young Turk exponents and French intellectuals, is narrated by 
Mechveret in an article titled ―Banquet de la Jeune Turquie.‖112 
 
Organised by the Mechveret group on December 23
rd
 1896 to celebrate the twentieth 
anniversary of the constitution of 1876, the banquet was attended by some of the 
most en-vogue intellectuals of the time as well as by a number of journalists, many 
of whom took the floor during the evening. ―M. Pierre Laffitte, le chef vénéré des 
Positivistes et professeur au collège de France, …‖113 and Pierre Quillard,114 as well 
as other professors, journalists of Le Figaro, of La Paix, and members of the foreign 
press spoke to the ground, praised the work of the opposition to Abdülhamit, and 
wished the next anniversary of the Constitution to be held on the shores of the 
Bosphorus. These banquets served as platforms for making acquaintances and for 
the discussion of the socio-political situation of the Empire. Most importantly, they 
served as loci of exchanges and for the development of an Ottoman synthesis 
between the intellectual and political trends of Europe and of the Empire. Meeting 
an intellectual at a banquet could lead to a friendship, co-operation or, even, to the 
affiliation to some philosophical circle – as in the case of Ahmet Rıza, who 
befriended George Clemenceau, became a disciple of Pierre Laffitte, joined the 
Positivist group in Paris, and contributed to the founding of the International 
                                                          
112
 ―Banquet de la Jeune Turquie,‖ Mechveret Supplément Français 2, no. 26 (1 Jan 1897): 4-8. 
113
 Ibid., 4. 
114
 (1864-1912) Pierre Quillard was the founder of the review Le Pléiade (1884).He was a poet, a 
political activist with anarchist leanings, the translator of classical Greek works, a defender of 
Dreyfus and an opponent of the Hamidian regime, which Quillard held responsible for the massacre 
of Armenians between 1894 and 1896. Quillard lived in Istanbul between 1893 and 1897 and, in 
1900, founded the journal Pro Armenia.  
79 
 
Positivist Society.
115
 Rıza participated in the Positivist Review and La Revue 
Occidentale, of which Laffitte was the founder. Rıza was particularly busy with the 
latter review, in which he wrote on various occasions and he equally contributed to 
courses organised by French positivist societies. He also gave a lecture entitled ―La 
politique sociale de la Turquie‖116 within a seminar series held at the College libre 
des sciences sociales; spoke at a conference on ―Les Institutions sociales en 
Turquie,‖117 which took place on Sunday, 5th of March, 1899; participated at the 
meeting of the Société Positiviste de Paris held on 18
th
 January 1901 where he spoke 
on ―La Religion islamique;‖118 and gave a speech at the ―Hommage international à 
Auguste Comte‖ organised by La Revue Occidentale on 18th May 1902.119 Evidence 
of Rıza‘s membership in the positivist intellectual circles can be found within the 
pages of La Revue Occidentale. In one of the issues dedicated to Comte, relating the 
proceedings of a conference dedicated to the memory of the founder of positivism, 
the Revue states: ―Quand on fait les honneurs à des hôtes de passage, on néglige les 
amis de tous les jours, ceux de la plus grande intimité; aussi nous tairons-nous sur le 
succès qu‘ont obtenu M. Simon, parlant au nome des positivistes du Brésil, et M. 
Ahmet Riza, directeur du Mechveret.‖120 
 
Among the various cities that hosted Ottomans exiles, the most populated by 
Ottoman émigrés were Athens, Cairo, Folkestone, Geneva, London, and Paris. Paris 
was particularly important for a number of reasons that have partially been surveyed. 
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However, there were also other motives to choose France and Paris. There, the press 
had taken up a pivotal role in political dissent earlier in the nineteenth century and 
had experienced state censorship. It, therefore, presented an environment in which 
techniques to bypass censorship could be learned and one in which the local civil 
society would have been sympathetic to the struggle of the Young Turk movement. 
The role of the political press in France and its possible influence on Ottomans in 
their choices for exile has been presented by Erdal Kaynar.
121
 The French press, and 
simultaneously, the Ottoman press in Paris, was seen as a central aspect of political 
engagement. For France, it had been one of the central vehicles for the production of 
a public opinion favourably inclined towards the ideas of Republicanism and had 
been a constant player in the struggle for the reinstatement of the Republic in 1870. 
Moreover, as it was happening in the Empire, French intellectuals and political 
activists had had to deal with state censorship.
122
  
 
The Young Turk members also enjoyed the participation and contribution to their 
journals of members of the European intelligentsia. The masses in the Empire might 
not have been reached by the content of these publications, but they must have been 
impressed by the news of an intellectual co-operation between what was perceived 
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as the modern intelligentsia of Europe and the Ottoman one, in this case treated as 
equal by its European partner. Furthermore, the battle that had been fought in France 
against censorship, the type of individuals who had fought this war, and the outcome 
of this struggle were encouraging for the members of the Young Turk organisation. 
They thought that, publishing while in exile, they would have found a plethora of 
local intellectuals staunchly criticising possible attempts by the Hamidian regime to 
suppress them. This can be inferred by the following extract: ―[Victor] Hugo 
compared the dramatic censorship to the Inquisition, terming it ‗detestable‘ and a 
‗prison‘ for writers, which ‗like the other Holy Office,‘ had its ‗secret judges, its 
masked executioners, its tortures and mutilations and its death penalty‘.‖123 
 
Members of the Young Turk organisation were also convinced that the liberal 
section of the French public that had fought strongly against censorship in their own 
country would be ready to support the Young Turk struggle in case of need. They 
were vindicated: when, as we shall see in detail in Chapter 3, the journal Mechveret 
was put on trial after diplomatic pressure from the Ottoman Embassy,
124
 not only did 
the journal and his editor receive support in the court case proper, but also ―Rıza 
[himself] acknowledged that the trial had promoted the Young Turk cause more than 
one year of publication of Mechveret.‖ 125  When the news of impeachment of 
Mechveret and of its two editors, Rıza and Ganem, reached the public, an impressive 
number of newspapers started a campaign to support the Ottoman journal and 
condemned the French government for giving in to the pressures of the Ottoman 
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Embassy.
126
 Another opportunity presented by France was that, in the minds of most 
Young Turk members, the press there had worked as the most effective means of 
dissemination of elite ideas to the masses. The ―‗culture of the journal‘ represented 
also the new basis of elite formation. The cultural basis and legitimacy of the 
Ottoman intelligentsia was the press. … Contributors to journals were considered 
the most enlightened men of the Empire, closest to the West and to modernity.‖127  
For the Young Turk movement as a whole, their self-perception was that they 
constituted an intellectual elite that would spread knowledge to the masses. As the 
old aristocratic elite had disappeared, the Young Turks thought of themselves as the 
natural and legitimate heirs to this old aristocracy, capable of assuming specific 
political roles, as agent of change, on behalf of the population at large. 
 
This view echoes some French intellectuals and, particularly, it came out of 
proximity to – in Paris – and a very close reading of Gustave Le Bon.128 In his book, 
Le Bon provides the perfect ideological source for the role that many Young Turk 
members wanted to take up and for the group‘s decision for doing this in such 
specific terms. Talking about the French Revolution, Le Bon claims that it ―had as 
its real object the substitution of the power of the nobility by that of the bourgeoisie; 
that is, an old elite which had become incapable was to be replaced by a new elite 
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which did possess capacity.‖129 Le Bon also explains why this role cannot be held by 
the population at large, since ―[t]he part of the people has been the same in all 
revolutions. It is never the people that conceives them nor directs them. Its activity is 
released by means of leaders. … new ideas penetrate the people very slowly indeed. 
Generally, it accepts a revolution without knowing why, and when by chance it does 
succeed in understanding why, the revolution is over long ago.‖ 130  This view 
undoubtedly captured the imagination of the Young Turk leaders who saw 
themselves as equals to their French counterparts in bringing modernity and reform, 
although not necessarily through the same Revolutionary means that the French had 
employed. However, Le Bon‘s approach provided more than a justification for 
elitism, but it also highlighted the ethical underpinnings of its perspective. Le Bon 
claims that the new elite needs to be open to dialogue since, to be successful, it 
needs to be tied both to tradition as well as to change, a stance characterised by both 
rigidity and malleability. Rigidity provides a historical and cultural justification for 
change, while malleability provides the readiness to adapt to changes resulting from 
general progress. Clear proof of the impact of Le Bon‘s ideas on the movement is 
given by Halil Ganem in an article published in Mechveret.
131
 In the article, Ganem 
not only explains the importance of elites in processes of change, but also 
contextualises the specific type of elite the Mechveret group was intending to 
constitute: 
Si elle [the elite] se recrute exclusivement dans une aristocratie, c‘est 
le gouvernement monarchique dans toute sa beauté; si elle se recrute 
exclusivement dans une démocratie, c‘est le gouvernement 
oligarchique. Le mieux serait évidemment qu‘elle prît sa source dans 
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les deux classes, voire dans toutes classes de la société, sans 
distinction; car l‘Élite est partout.132 
 
From Ganem‘s writing emerges something that is in between a justification for 
acting as proto-elite and a new definition of aristocratic elite. The writer claims that 
the strength of an elite is its eclectic background, which both justifies a multi-ethnic 
and multi-confessional composition. Thanks to the already mixed composition of the 
Young Turk movement, the opposition had the rightful claim to become the elite 
that would act as agent of change. The elite that emerged for the organisation itself 
was primarily an intellectual one, as Ganem explains: 
Ce que nous appelons nous l‘Élite, c‘est l‘Élite intelligente et pensante, 
l‘Élite qui demande à la foi ses hautes inspirations, à la raison ses 
lumières, à la science ses expériences les plus concluantes et ses 
brillantes découvertes. L‘Élite pour nous, c‘est la glorieuse phalange 
des hommes qui ont souffert pour les propres convictions et de ceux qui 
ont combattu pour la liberté et la justice. L‘Élite pour nous, ce sont les 
hommes qui ont du [sic] et de la fermeté, les courageux, les vaillants, 
les incorruptibles ceux qui osent penser haut et élever la voix en faveur 
de la vérité.
133
 
 
Besides the influence of French thinkers on the Young Turks, France‘s republican 
history presented these activists with a variety of models. The French Revolution 
served as a model for action, possibly too drastic for some within the movement, yet 
suggestive of how to deal with oppressive systems of government and of the 
possibilities available in a country that had undergone dramatic social and political 
changes. An interesting aspect to note, connected to the symbolic load of the French 
Revolution across the world, is that Rıza attempted to go to Paris, initially under an 
official capacity, for the Exposition Universelle that took place in 1889. This visit 
had created anxiety among the Ottoman administration as it coincided with the 
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celebration of the 100
th
 year from the French Revolution. In his memoirs, Ahmet 
Rıza writes of his desire to go to Paris on that specific occasion in order to voice 
some concerns he had with the regime: 
I had been observing the works of the state closely for a year and a 
half. I had understood that everything was so appalling that it was 
impossible to serve either at the ministry or at any other similar place. 
I decided to go to Paris to voice my concerns from there. After the 
exams were over [Rıza was at the time the Director of Education in 
Bursa], I asked permission to leave for holidays. I came to Istanbul. ‗If 
you allow me to have a month off, I will dedicate my holiday to an 
exhibition in Paris. There is no obstacle to that.‘ I said to Münir Pasha. 
‗That is wrong! You are appointed by a ferman, you need permission 
from the palace. Who else was planning on going there? The Palace is 
concerned that the exposition coincides with the anniversary of the 
Revolution. …134 
 
This refusal on the part of the Ottoman government to send any official 
representative was due to its apprehension about its international image in relation to 
politics. According to Deringil:  
The occasion of the opening of the 1889 Paris Exposition on the 
centenary of the French revolution was something of an 
embarrassment for the powers still ruled by monarchies. The Ottoman 
ambassador in Paris, Esad Paşa, somewhat anxious as to the 
appropriate course of action, telegrammed that the British, Austrian, 
Russian and German ambassadors had made it clear to him that they 
would absent themselves from Paris on the occasion. This would 
mean that he would be the ‗only ambassador of a Great Power to 
attend the ceremony.‘ He was instructed by the Porte to absent himself 
‗from so insalubrious an event so damaging to the idea of monarchic 
sovereignty.‘135 
 
On the part of Rıza and other members of the Young Turk organisation, there are no 
clear sources explaining the real motives behind visiting the Exposition Universelle; 
yet, we can speculate. First, the writings of previous Ottomans or Muslims who had 
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visited Europe, and had remained impressed by its industrial and technological 
modernity, must have given these figures the idea that, by going to the Expo, 
members would be inspired and motivated to influence the Ottoman society in 
similar terms. A second consideration, in the case of Rıza, is that he was planning to 
go to Paris in order to escape and had already in mind the setting up of an anti-
regime publication in exile. In his memoirs, in fact, he wrote: ―[a]fter I visited the 
Industry Exhibition in Paris in 1889, I started to arrange all the necessities to publish 
a collection, a book and a newspaper.‖136 In this case, the visit to the Exposition 
Universelle was a pretext. Lastly, going to such an exhibition had the aim of putting 
forward a new face for the Empire. One of the worries of Ottoman statesmen,
137
 
similar to the Egyptian ones,
 138
 was that much of the representation of the Orient at 
these fairs was, as Edward Said would put it, Orientalist – displaying a constructed 
or outdated picture of the Orient. There is a substantial chance, therefore, that some 
Young Turk members would be interested in going to such exhibitions in order to 
project a more realistic image of the lands and, in fact, a different one than that 
which Abdülhaimd would want to  promote. We know that, on many occasions, the 
Sultan himself intended to send Ottoman representatives to these types of fairs in 
order to modify the image that Europe had of the Ottoman Empire.
139
 
 
Lastly, Paris could also be seen as offering a uniquely welcoming environment, as 
many of the Ottomans who had been sent abroad, during the Tanzimat, were sent to 
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the French capital. In fact, French was the foreign language most studied by 
Ottomans of the upper classes. According to Naum Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador 
to France at the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman presence in Paris 
amounted to around 20,000 people, while the Service des Etrangers and the 
Ministère du Travail estimated the number at a maximum of 15,000.
140
 According to 
police sources, the Ottoman diasporic community was founded in the late 1870s and 
included, ranked according to size, Jews, Armenians, Syrians, Greeks, Lebanese, 
and a small number of Turks. They resided mainly in and around the 11ème 
arrondissement (nearby the Père Lachaise Cemetery, which had a Muslim section), 
Rue de la Roquette, Rue Sedaine, and St. Ambroise, and in the 8ème arrondissement, 
mainly around Boulevard des Malesherbes. As briefly mentioned before, Ahmet 
Rıza joined the Paris Ottoman community in 1889. Prince Sabahettin, his brother 
Lutfullah and father Damat Mahmut Pasha, as we shall see in more details in 
Chapter 4, arrived in December 1899 via the port of Marseilles. 
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter contextualised the struggle of the Young Turks in the wider frame of 
Ottoman debates on modern governance and modernity more generally and, 
simultaneously, located it within the space of transnational dynamics – such as a 
flourishing of Muslim intellectuals, exchanges between European and non-European 
ideologies, the spread of the press and a larger negotiation with censorship in France 
and in the Empire. The chapter opened with the acknowledgement that the Young 
Turk organisation was structurally loose and multi-faceted. Despite such multiplicity, 
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this chapter highlights some sources of common inspiration and support that the 
members of the Young Turks received from allies and sympathisers. 
 
I want to highlight the fact that the loose nature of this organisation gave rise to two 
sub-groups, the internal and external branch. Without this first split, the trajectory of 
the opposition could well have stopped in 1896-7, when the Sultan managed, 
through his secret police, to discover the plot to kill him, arrest most members of the 
opposition and essentially dismantle the internal branch. It is at this juncture that the 
importance of exile emerges clearly. While the Sultan co-opted part of the external 
branch, it did not reach all of its members – such as Rıza and the Mechveret group. 
For these figures, apart from ensuring continuity in the life of the Young Turk 
organisation, exile also provided the ideal ideological and logistical opportunities to 
publish an opposition journal that would otherwise have perished within Ottoman 
borders. 
 
The publication of a journal was thought to be the central means through which to 
oppose the rule in Istanbul for a variety of reasons: it was the perfect forum where 
intellectuals could exchange views, influence each other, and synthesise the 
experiences of a wider spectrum of cultures in the interest of envisaging the 
Empire‘s future. Given the elitism of most members of the Young Turks, the 
publication of a journal was seen as the most modern and most clearly intellectual 
vehicle for political opposition. However, this idea did not appear in a void, but was 
known already from a direct influence of the French experience, namely the struggle 
that the French public had endured towards the proclamation of the Third Republic 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This consideration pushed many 
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members of the Young Turk, and Rıza and Sabahettin more specifically, to France 
and Paris rather than anywhere else. They were convinced that taking up exile and 
publishing opposition journals would ensure a degree of freedom for the expression 
of their visions and, most importantly, would benefit from the help and support of 
the politicised French left and scholarly circles. 
 
Through their publications, Young Turk members abroad and specifically in Paris, 
managed to internationalise their struggle, present an alternative to Sultan 
Abdülhamit II to the European public, and most importantly, participate in 
intellectual circles such as the positivist and Science sociale schools. There, they 
were accepted as partners as well as active contributors to similarly positioned 
magazines, of which La Revue Occidentale was prime example. It is important to 
stress that the perception of the political Young Turk organisation among foreigners 
was paramount to the realisation of these activists‘ final ends. The elite that these 
Ottomans were attempting to build was not an isolated one, confined to the 
boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. Rather, for them it represented an international 
one, where reforms in their own country would be only a step in the constitution of a 
politically progressive and scientifically and technologically advanced world 
civilisation. In the following two chapters, I interrogate in details the ideology, the 
activities, and the networks of Ahmet Rıza and Mehmet Sabahettin, who I consider 
the most significant Young Turk leaders, while in Paris. 
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CHAPTER 3 – AHMET RIZA AND THE MECHVERET GROUP 
In this chapter, I examine the background, political activities and philosophical 
development of one of the two most influential figures that headed the Young Turk 
movement between the second part of 1890 and the early 1900s. I intend this and the 
following chapter as deeper contextualisations of the history of the opposition to the 
rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II in the late nineteenth century and of the overall struggle 
for modernisation in the Ottoman Empire. The reality and importance of exile, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, is a central element in the intellectual and activist 
endeavours of the figures in question.  
 
In the next pages, I follow the ideas of Ahmet Rıza as these were expressed through 
the pages of his memoirs, his monograph and, most importantly, the journal he had 
founded while in exile in Paris, Mechveret. I will delve into these ideas in order to 
appreciate the synthesis that Rıza attempted to reach between what he regarded as 
traditional Ottoman and Eastern values and beliefs, with the philosophical current of 
positivism. I claim that what emerges from these writings is the Mechveret group‘s 
own version of Ottomanism, different from that of Abdülhamit II and, to some 
extent, from that of other groups within the Young Turk organisation. Exploring 
Rıza‘s ideas as well as the geographical and political frame in which they were 
shaped (that is, Paris) will shed light onto the most formative period of Young Turk 
history and produce a more nuanced picture of the diversity of visions within the 
opposition. Nonetheless, what also emerges from this detailed gaze into Rıza‘s work 
is a number of tensions and dilemmas within his ideology. These dilemmas have to 
do mainly with: the role of religion, a rather blurry picture of a political plan, and his 
remoteness from the population, that is, the actual space where his agenda would 
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potentially unfold. To these factors, one needs to add a somewhat naive approach, 
on Rıza‘s part, towards the feasibility of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire 
without the inclusion of drastic legal changes at the local level which would ensure a 
real balance between the various groups of the population – which, instead, 
Sabahettin does provide, as I will show in the next chapter, through the adoption, in 
his political vision, of a federalist plan. While reading through their work and 
encountering these dilemmas, I have been aware of the fact that Rıza‘s, as well as 
Sabahettin‘s, intellectual and activist plan was evolving over time and that the less 
articulated or contradictory aspects of their thought need to be seen as part of an 
ideology in the making and in a process of constant re-adjusting.  
 
Introducing the figure of Ahmet Rıza 
Ahmet Rıza1 was the son of İngiliz Ali Bey, who was nicknamed this way due to his 
admiration for England, and of a foreign mother – it is not certain whether she was 
Hungarian or Austrian. After being educated at the Galatasaray High School, he 
started working at the Translation Office (Tercüme Odası) of the Bab-ı Âli; this 
workplace proved to be formative in intellectual terms, instilling in Rıza the will to 
establish both intellectual and physical contact with the West. In 1884, he went to 
France and attended the Grignon Agricultural School. Upon his return to the Empire, 
Rıza was appointed Principal of the Bursa High School and director of the 
Education Department of the Bursa province, officially known as the Vilayet of 
Hudavendigâr.  
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In 1889, Rıza moved back to France – this time, however, motivated by the idea of 
establishing a journal of opposition. His formal excuse for leaving the Empire was to 
attend the Exposition Universelle in Paris, which, incidentally, coincided with 
celebrations for the centenary of the French Revolution, ―an event which served as 
an inspiration to many Ottoman students and young civil servants at the time.‖2 Rıza 
recalls his background in a concise manner in his memoirs: 
My father sent me to Paris for agriculture studies. Three years later, 
while passing my exams, I received a notification about his death. I 
was looking for a job as I returned to Istanbul. But I was neither hired, 
nor was I provided with money to open a farm. Finally, although I did 
not want this, I had to take a state job. Arab Hakki Paşa was the 
agriculture minister. He told me that there was no job at the ministry. 
In France, there is a big agriculture university and three agriculture 
academies; over 100 students graduate from there each year, and all of 
them find jobs. Although nothing has been done about agriculture in 
our country and there are many things to do, a man who studied 
[abroad] with his own money and came back [to the Empire] is told 
―there is no job.‖ I applied to the Education Ministry. I was offered a 
job as a chemistry teacher and high school manager in Bursa with a 
2,400 kuruş salary. I accepted. The Bursa education director was a 
turbaned man called Veli Efendi. Being satisfied with my efforts, 
Education Minister Munif Pasa [soon] appointed me as Bursa 
Education Director with a 3,000 kurus salary. … I was observing state 
works closely for a year and a half. I understood that everything was 
so messed up that it was impossible to serve either at the ministry or at 
any other similar place. I decided to go to Paris to express my 
concerns from there.
3
 
 
At first, Rıza moved to Paris individually and was not part of any organisation:  
After I visited the Industry Exhibition in Paris in 1889, I started to 
arrange all the necessities to publish a collection, a book and a 
newspaper. While trying to sustain my life, I was also trying to 
publish the collection. I was going to the library every morning and 
attending conferences every evening. Soon after, I presented my first 
project to the Padishah. The project was taken into consideration and a 
verdict was issued that as an output of my education, I should not 
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present the project to the Padishah‘s office and not publish anything. 
They sent me a 2,000 lira award as well. I did not accept it. The reply 
followed that ―the money bestowed [upon you] cannot be denied. It 
has to be taken.‖ I denied it again.4 
 
Once in Paris, Rıza socialised with Halil Ganem. Ganem was a Syrian Maronite 
Christian born in Beirut in 1846, who began his career in 1862 as member of the 
commercial court in his native city. Initially appointed as ―dragoman of the Beirut 
mutasarrifiyya, and subsequently of the wilāyet of Syria,‖5 he went on to hold the 
same post at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the Constitutional period, 
Ganem held the post of Syrian delegate to the first Ottoman parliament, but he fled 
to Paris once Sultan Abdülhamit II had suspended the Constitution. In Paris, he 
began an active career as writer and publisher of newspapers and journals; he 
contributed to the Journal des Débats and Figaro and was the editor of the Paris 
based journals La Jeune Turquie and al-Bāsīr as well as of the Hilāl in Geneva. He 
also published a two-volume book entitled, Les Sultans Ottomans.
6
 Ganem 
represented an ideal partner for Rıza, since he was ready to actively oppose 
Abdülhamit and was simultaneously well positioned within the French intellectual 
circles. 
 
The two men forged a long-lasting cooperation and friendship. In 1895, they began 
the publication of a new journal, Mechveret – Consultation – with the help of an 
initial fund raised, as explained earlier on, during a meeting and fundraising event in 
Paris.
7
 The journal was comprised of two sections, one in Ottoman Turkish and a 
supplement, in French. The supplement, which I examine in detail in this chapter, is 
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especially interesting because it does not only publicise opposition to the Sultan but 
also clearly envisages recruiting support from the European public and some specific 
political actors. Its emphasis on modernism (suitable to an Ottoman reality as much 
as to a European one) may be the expression of the desire to appeal to this wider 
intellectual and political community, as well as to the idea of belonging to it. The 
establishment of Mechveret followed the familiar pattern used in the late 19
th
 
century by opposition groups outside Ottoman dominions. Unlike many other such 
publications, however, Mechveret was to have a profound impact on the future 
development of Young Turk history. 
 
Who did Mechveret represent? 
After its launch, Mechveret started attracting a substantially large number of 
different people. The group was comprised of ―prominent men, Christian and 
Muslim,‖8 bound together by the will to modernise and reform the Ottoman Empire 
through a progressive approach.
9
 Contrary to other organisations, both in exile and 
in the Empire, the Mechveret group repudiated any violence in the process of such 
change. Armed revolution as a means for transformation was not a viable option, a 
stance that was expressed clearly at various times. Ahmet Rıza wrote that his group 
had ―a horror of concessions obtained by violence,‖10 and Halil Ganem added that 
―[i]l serait inutile, sinon dangereux, de recourir de nouveau aux révolutions de palais 
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qui n‘ont jamais donné à la nation que des résultats négatifs.‖11 According to Ahmet 
Rıza, a revolution would result in the collapse of the Empire and would 
automatically invite foreign military presence on the pretext that this would be 
needed to safeguard ethnic and religious minorities. Even before foreign occupation, 
the chaos resulting from a revolution would put the various ethno-religious 
components against each other, shattering any hope of an Ottoman pluralistic society. 
Indeed, this pluralistic society was a focal point of the ideological visions of 
Ottomanism as imagined by the Mechveret group, as it will be discussed further on. 
As Rıza wrote, the ideological message of history is that ―ce ne sont point les 
massacres qui ont fait la Révolution française, ce sont le grands penseurs du XVIII 
siècle.‖ 12  Thus, a gradual, intellectually-initiated change from above would 
transform the status quo and the nature of despotic rule, embodied in Sultan 
Abdülhamit II, without upsetting the frail but crucial ethno-religious balance that 
still kept the Empire together and which was central to the group‘s project. 
 
The figure of Rıza dominated the Mechveret faction and therefore the journal 
provided a venue for his thoughts, while other members dithered between 
association and dissociation.
13
 The only other stable member of the group was Halil 
Ganem, as the intellectual affinity between the two was considerable. Decline, for 
them, was the result of two main aspects, despotism and fanaticism: ―voilà les deux 
principales causes de la décadence de l‘empire ottoman et de la dégénérescence, de 
plus marquée, de la dynastie.‖14 A corrupted Islam, highjacked by the ulema, was 
now being used by these same figures as a tool to remain in power, while despotism 
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was thought to be the manifestation of a dying entity, an ultima ratio, to hold on to 
the Sultanate. In order to stop the course of decline, the elitist Ottoman intellectual 
circle had to propagate the modern and progressive ideals, as ―[l]a prospérité d‘une 
nation dépend de la culture intellectuelle de ses chefs.‖15 
 
It has proven challenging to determine the specific composition of the Mechveret 
group, since both primary sources and the secondary literature are vague and 
contradictory regarding the issue of membership. Some members were part of the 
group only for a short period, or were simultaneously part of other factions within 
the Young Turk organisation or other intellectual circles. Others may have been 
allied with Ahmet Rıza but decided to formally stay outside the group. What we do 
know is that the group was not only composed of Ottomans, but also of French 
intellectuals and positivists with whom Ahmet Rıza co-operated simultaneously on 
different projects, such as La Revue Occidentale,
16
 The Positivist Review,
17
 the 
newspaper La Paix, on which Rıza wrote on Armenian affairs,18 as well as working 
together for the founding of the International Positivist Society.
19
 These French 
scholars regularly contributed to the issues of Mechveret developing a positivist 
ideology applicable to the realities of the Ottoman Empire and constantly debating 
the topics of religion and scientific progress.  
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Ahmet Rıza’s philosophical and political ideology 
As leader of one of the two most influential factions in the Young Turk movement, 
Ahmet Rıza had an important role in shaping Ottoman history in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. Yet tenets of his ideology reverberated until much later 
in the Empire as well as in modern Turkey due to his role in the transmission of 
modern and reformist ideals that influenced a generation of Turks including Mustafa 
Kemal.
20
 He was, without doubt, the most prominent intellectual of the Young Turk 
movement and has been described by Erik Zürcher as the figure who was ―to 
dominate the opposition movement for nearly twenty years.‖21 
 
Once in Paris, Rıza became extremely influenced by the positivist philosophy of 
Auguste Comte,
22
 of Edmond Demolins
23
 and, as briefly hinted at, of Gustave Le 
Bon,
24
 allegedly after having bought by chance a Reader on positivism in a Parisian 
bookshop.
25
 According to some sources,
26
 Rıza also enjoyed the friendship of Pierre 
Laffitte and the company of Demolins and Le Bon by participating in the weekly 
Wednesday lunches, les déjeuners du mercredi. These were organised by Le Bon 
and were frequented by the most prominent figures of the intellectual circle of the 
time. At the end of the nineteenth century, the French newspaper La Dépêche 
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described Rıza‘s ‗folder‘27 as containing ―… de la philosophie, de l‘histoire, de la 
politique, de la métaphysique; [inside it] Confucius et Zoroastre s‘y rencontrent avec 
Luther et Voltaire, les pères de l‘Eglise y heurtent l‘Encyclopédie, Mahomet y 
coudoie M.J.B. Say et Michelet. Mais celui qui domine de toute sa grandeur, c‘est 
Auguste Comte.‖28 
 
It is in the sphere of philosophy that Rıza grounded his political convictions, as well 
as the view that the achievements of the West in the intellectual and technological 
fields had been enlightening for the rest of the world – this view was generally 
shared in the Young Turk organisation. However, marking his own position within 
the wider organisation of the Young Turk movement as well as his specific blend of 
Ottomanism, Rıza argued that the West itself had succumbed to vices that had 
undermined its own achievements and were responsible for an aggressive and 
colonialist foreign policy. The West, for Rıza, had halted the advancement of 
civilisation and become immoral in its dealings with other peoples and cultures.
29
 
Hence, while many Young Turks were convinced that the West had to be imitated in 
its totality, ―with its roses and its thorns‖30 and others thought that the West could 
have been an excellent partner in reviving the past glory of the Empire and helping it 
enter into the modern era, Ahmet Rıza had a different stance. As he expressed it in 
his book La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient,
31
 the positive, 
long-term achievements of the West remain in the high plain of immortality, are 
timeless and belong to humanity as a whole. Any society and civilisation could take 
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inspiration from them since they had been elevated to the level of an enlightened 
universalism. This way, other cultures could synthesise and adapt them to their own 
reality, thus making in turn these achievements an asset for humanity as a whole. On 
the other hand, the immoral politics of the West – as Rıza continuously referred to 
the political interventions of the West in the nineteenth century in particular – 
belong to a set era, representing a particular society at a specific point in time. 
Therefore, according to Rıza, other cultures, and specifically the Ottoman Empire, 
had to bear in mind this distinction and be wary of a foreign physical presence in 
their own country. The essence of his stance is summarised well in one of the 
passages of his book: ―[j]‘aime ma Patrie, mais j‘aime aussi, et d‘un même amour, 
l‘humanité et la vérité. Autant la politique barbare de l‘Occident me révolte, autant 
ses progrès intellectuels, ses découvertes scientifiques et leurs prodigieuses 
applications m‘inspirent d‘admiration et de respect.‖32 This view, supplemented by 
other concerns, foreshadows the tough anti-Western intervention position Rıza was 
to adopt at the Congress of 1902.
33
 
 
The positivist ideology was so appealing to Rıza that he took up the motto ‗Order 
and Progress‘ for his group and publication. The same motto would later be taken up 
by the whole opposition movement. ‗Order and Progress‘ was thought to be 
especially appropriate as the words ―…mean, among other things, growth in 
accordance with law, as contrasted on the one hand with stagnation, on the other 
with anarchy; they mean evolution, as distinct alike from revolution and from 
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dissolution.‖34 In sum, these words exemplified all the features that Rıza thought 
should be introduced in the Ottoman Empire in order to jumpstart its positivist 
modernisation. Order and Progress were the intellectual opposites of the prevailing 
spirit of the Ottoman Empire of the Sultan, a spirit that, according to Rıza, had 
brought its decay. 
 
Through examining its written production, it emerges that one of the major 
misconceptions regarding the Mechveret group has to do with the issue of religion. 
As I have showed before, most of the contributors to Mechveret had positivist 
leanings and, for this reason, have been branded by the more widespread historical 
literature as vehemently rejecting any idea of religion. Şükrü Hanioğlu maintains 
that all the exponents of the Young Turk organisation were committed to ―Büchner‘s 
battle against religion [and that this was] a mainstay for the Young Turk ideology at 
the outset of the movement.‖35 However, I contend that while there certainly was a 
drive to tailor a new role for religion and religious discourse, it is also clear that the 
Young Turk exponents in general – and Ahmet Rıza in particular – considered 
religion as an important feature in the development of their version of Ottomanism. 
 
Many historians have highlighted the incongruence of Rıza‘s stand as positivism and 
religion are seen as incompatible. The view that I put forward here is different. In Le 
Bon‘s writings, but equally in those of other positivists, Rıza found an interesting 
defence of the Oriental civilisation, including Islam; this discourse recalls the 
arguments used by Arab Muslim defenders of their own past and provided, for the 
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Mechveret group, a link across constructed religious boundaries towards a unifying 
belief. Moreover, science, as positivism formulated it, is cumulative and trans-
cultural, entailing equality among different cultures.
36
 Hence, the ‗religion of 
science‘ became a discourse that provided Rıza with the ideological tools to combat 
fanaticism as well as greed and hunger for power that, in his opinion, had led Islam 
astray.  
But, and this is what I want to highlight here, this view of science did not abolish 
religion as experience altogether. In fact, the Islamic heritage as cultural foundation 
of the Ottoman state would be important in maintaining unity in the face of its multi-
ethnic and multi-religious composition. Whether this was a naïve assumption that 
underestimated the diverse investments and desires of the Empire‘s citizens is 
another question altogether.  
 
What is evident is that Rıza used a religious discourse in many of his writings 
addressed to a European and Ottoman or Muslim audience. In many of his articles 
written in French, Rıza repeatedly stated that the true political spirit of Islam is very 
close to a republican regime
37
 and that, even in the early years of Islam, scientific 
knowledge had always been encouraged.
38
 He stated, moreover, that Islam as a 
religion had supported progress, philosophy and reason until Islam itself had become 
a tool of the despotic regime. 
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This is clearly formulated in the booklet Tolérance Musulmane: 
Comment une doctrine qui fut un élément si puissant de régénération 
et de progrès est-elle devenue aujourd'hui entre les mains de quelques 
fanatiques ignorants, hypocrites et malveillants, un instrument 
d'intolérable tyrannie? Question redoutable sur laquelle j'appelle 
l'attention du khalife actuel et dont la solution contribuerait plus que 
toute autre réforme au relèvement du monde musulman. N'est-ce pas 
un signe de décadence profonde que de voir des gens mal renseignés 
ou mal intentionnés qui se disent pourtant musulmans, s'opposer à 
toute critique des croyances religieuses et interdire de les soumettre 
aux lumières de la philosophie et de la raison?
39
 
 
This particular view is reinforced in French journalists‘ depiction of Rıza. In various 
articles written in France, the authors refer to Rıza as a Muslim, which indicates, if 
not an effort on his part to appear as a religious person, at least his willingness not to 
deny this. Writer and journalist Phillippe Dubois, for example, described Rıza as 
follows during latter‘s trial in France: ―[Rıza] … est un des rares musulmans de la 
Jeune Turquie qui aient conserve intact leur patriotisme et leur religion.‖ 40  I 
maintain therefore, that, had Rıza addressed a Muslim audience, his stance could be 
correctly seen as a political expedient for moving the masses towards his own plan. 
However, as this was not the case, one needs to include the possibility that religion 
and science could, effectively, co-exist in Rıza‘s political vision – whether in 
practice feasible or not. It is debatable whether this was a first stage in the 
construction of Rıza‘s ideology, or whether the religious ethos would, according to 
an already formed plan, give way in due time to a scientific ideology, but dismissing 
his evident acknowledgement of the importance of Islam as a political expedient, 
seems somewhat reductive. Yet a further explanation for the possibility of co-
existence between positivism and Islam rests in the fact that, as I have argued, most 
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of Rıza‘s disaffection with religion had to do with the corruption and personal 
interest of most of the Ottoman religious class of the time. As science for the 
positivists was not a goal in itself but a means to achieve a specific outcome, then 
Rıza could have intended to use it as the vehicle through which to escape what he 
regarded as unhealthy links with the past and loyalties to corrupt loci of power.  
 
Moreover, Rıza‘s own work, which should be seen as the result of his synthesis of 
positivism and his own cultural heritage, stitched this positivist-scientific discourse 
onto an Islamo-Oriental jacket, proving, first and foremost, that the Eastern/Muslim 
civilisation was as important as the Western/Christian one. Once that intellectual 
balancing had been accomplished, he could move on to state that Islam was truly 
based on scientific discourse in its purest form and, therefore, that there was not 
much difference between the positivist ‗religion of Science‘ and Islam, as Islam 
itself was for Rıza a religion that embodied science. One could probe what at first 
seem to be tensions within his discourse: having established that all cultures have 
more or less the same weight and that religion really did not work towards progress 
in the same way as science, how could one uphold the scientific purity of religion 
first, and the primacy of one religion over another? This ambivalence can be 
explained by looking at the writings of the founder of positivism, Auguste Comte. 
The French philosopher explained that, among other things, positivism has no 
connection to atheism. 
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As Comte theorised, all metaphysical explanations of reality are to be discarded, and 
the only way to explain worldly phenomena is through the physical experience, 
positivism cannot be related to atheism since the latter‘s tendency is: 
to prolong the metaphysical stage indefinitely, by continuing to seek 
for new solutions of Theological problems, instead of setting aside all 
inaccessible researches on the ground of their utter inutility. The true 
Positive spirit consists in substituting the study of the invariable Laws 
of phenomena for that of their so-called Causes, whether proximate or 
primary – in a word, in studying the How instead of the Why.41 
 
Thus, to some degree, positivism did leave space for a certain amount of theism in 
its conception of philosophy. Moreover, by stressing the importance of science in 
the conceptualisation of social philosophy, positivism would tailor a pivotal role for 
both Islam as religion and Muslim civilisation. This optimism rested on the 
historical premise that without the transmission of astrological and mathematical 
studies carried out in the Muslim world during the intellectually dark ages of 
Western civilisation, it would have been impossible to speculate on science and, 
consequently, to formulate the tenets of the positivist philosophy itself. Moreover, 
Comte himself, in his attempt to make positivism a religion, expressed both his 
admiration for some aspects of the Catholic faith during the Middle-Ages and took 
inspiration from Thomas à Kempis‘s fifteenth-century book, About the Imitation of 
Christ.
42
 Comte‘s own synthesis proves that some aspects of religion can indeed be 
embodied in the positivist philosophy. However, it is true that Rıza‘s formulation of 
how exactly Islam as religion would fit into a reformed pluralistic Ottomanism 
remains vague and, at best, idealistic (if not utopian). The dilemma, therefore, 
becomes one of theory versus action and not one of science versus religion.  
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In the conceptualisation of the reconcilability of science and religion Gustave Le 
Bon, who, as I have enphasised, was instrumental in influencing Young Turk view 
of elitism,
43
 also proved decisive. Reading his work La Civilisation des Arabes, 
Ahmet Rıza came to regard Le Bon‘s views and approach towards the East as the 
practical application of Comte‘s theoretical discourse. Le Bon proved to be both a 
source of inspiration and what Rıza regarded as a precious ally in spreading new 
ideas acceptable to eastern culture throughout the Empire and, at the same time, 
ensuring that changes would be positively accepted by at least part of the intellectual 
milieu in the West. In his book, Le Bon upheld the importance of the Arab influence 
in the history of civilisation in Europe, stressing that this influence had been 
generally neglected and that, in reality, it was through the works of the Arab 
civilisation that Europe in the Middle Ages stayed in touch with classical antiquity, 
allowing Christian Europe to escape barbarism.
44
 Le Bon‘s praise of Arab 
civilisation did not stop there, but extended to the substantial influence of the Arab 
civilisation on the West‘s experience of science, literature and moral teachings: 
―Nous allons essayer de démontrer maintenant que l‘action exercée par les Arabes 
sur l‘Occident fut également considérable, et que c‘est à eux qu‘est due la 
civilisation de l‘Europe.‖ 45  The importance of such statement should not be 
underestimated. It is usually thought that it is only the dominant culture – in political 
and military terms – that has an impact on the less powerful one – in this case the 
Ottoman Empire. In this one-way narrative, alternative dynamics are considered to 
be historical exceptions or divergences, which are frequently omitted. Instead, Le 
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Bon suggested that cultures pass from a dominant position to a more marginal one in 
a rather cyclical way; de-mythologising the idea of cultural superiority. Le Bon put 
forward here the historical frame of mutual cultural bargaining. This view caught the 
interest of Rıza, who could present himself, and other Ottoman intellectuals, as 
equal partners in a list of positivist thinkers that spanned across many countries and 
continents. 
 
Even though Gustave Le Bon is not openly cited in any of the issues of Mechveret, 
Rıza made continuous references to Le Bon‘s views in his work La Faillite morale 
de la politique occidentale en orient.
46
 It is also known that Young Turks in general 
considered Le Bon‘s La Civilisation des Arabes as an important source of 
inspiration.
47
 As mentioned before, what seems to have specifically motivated Rıza 
was Le Bon‘s eulogy of the Arab civilisation: ―L‘ardeur qu‘ils [Arabs] apportèrent 
dans l‘étude est véritablement frappante …‖. 48  On the subject of education and 
intellectual development, Le Bon praised the establishment of universities in 
Baghdad, Cairo, Toledo and Cordoba – to mention a few – which were equipped 
with up-to-date laboratories, observatories and libraries. In the discipline of 
philosophy, the Arab school was presented as the natural heir to the Greek one, 
developing complex philosophical currents such as skepticism, which went as far as 
contesting the meaning and role of religion. However, it was in the field of scientific 
advancement that Le Bon thought the Arab legacy was paramount. Achievements in 
mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, physics, mechanics and geography were seen 
not only as a legacy for civilisation as a whole, but also as a pillar for the 
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development of positivism as a philosophical trend.
49
 Le Bon referred to discoveries 
and advancements in the fields of algebra and geometry;
50
 in chemistry, he 
mentioned the discovery of alcohol, sulphuric and nitric acid and of distillation; in 
physics, he discussed the treaty on optics of Alhazen that formed the basis of 
Kepler‘s study.51  
 
Positivism and religion as the basis for the modernisation of the Empire 
It is significant that, even if Rıza adamantly opposed the active help and intervention 
of the Western powers because of their self-interested intentions, he was not equally 
unyielding in rejecting some sort of external aid, namely that of human solidarity. 
This sentiment of shared community could potentially help to get rid of prejudices in 
relationships and at the same time contribute to fighting ignorance and reactionism 
in the pursuit of progress. Human solidarity, shared among the literate elites, could 
have brought about a ‗positive truth‘ characterised by fraternity between different 
religious beliefs. And it was positivism itself that was to provide the framework for 
harmony, solidarity and mutual dependence across religious, ethnic and nationalistic 
barriers in order to inaugurate the positivist stage of intellectual development and 
create a progressive element in science, art, religion and politics in the Ottoman 
Empire.
52
 In sum, positivism held a very important role in the conceptualisation of 
the Mechveret-promoted Ottomanism. 
 
Gustave Le Bon was convinced that it was possible to create a point of convergence 
between religion and science; Rıza was trying to construct this synthesis and 
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introduce it to the Ottoman lands. According to the French philosopher, Islam and 
science had, for centuries, walked a similar path.
53
 This allowed Muslims to believe 
in Islam and in scientific advancement not as two antagonistic approaches, but, 
rather, as two compatible experiences. Actually, Le Bon recognised that having built 
a set of rules that regulate the lives of people based on religious belief constituted 
the origin of power for the Arabs. They had always profited from the teachings of 
science and the divergences between religion and science had never worried 
Muslims as a possible threat to their religion. This approach was extremely 
important for the feasibility of the philosophical approach of the Mechveret group, 
as it gave Ahmet Rıza the space and hope that his synthesis of Islamic religion and 
scientific advancement could be accepted and, in time, spread among the various 
Ottoman communities – specifically within the Muslim one. 
 
In his book La Faillite morale de la politique occidentale en orient, which consists 
of a series of attacks on Western politics and ideology, Ahmet Rıza mounts a 
staunch defence of Islam and its compatibility with science. The type of discourse he 
uses in defence of Islam, which tellingly follows the conventional approach used by 
Muslims advocating the superiority of Islam vis-à-vis other religions, is beyond our 
interest here. Concerning the role of religion in world progress, Rıza praised the 
achievements of Islam for its role in the advancement of world civilisation by 
adopting a strictly positivist approach. Islam has helped to safeguard philosophical 
and scientific treaties for centuries, translating them and passing them on to future 
civilisations as well as honouring the work of Muslim thinkers and scientists who, 
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during the dark ages of the West, had contributed to the advancement of world 
civilisation. 
 
As I have mentioned earlier, Rıza has so far been portrayed in historiographical 
works as the positivist, irreligious, secular intellectual who had no knowledge of the 
Muslim calendar.
54
 I argue, instead, that his defence of Islam, through the pages of 
La Faillite morale de la politique occidentale en orient, and his parallel belief in the 
importance of positivism in the construction of a reformed Ottoman Empire can be 
seen in a rather different manner. His approach is very similar to that of the much 
better known and studied Ziya Gökalp. What Gökalp formulated as Western 
civilisation and Turkish culture,
55
 should be intended as positivism and Islam for 
Rıza. Accordingly, religion would provide a set of values and mores which would 
discard the necessity to succumb to a process of Westernisation; while positivism 
would allow the adoption of a scientific approach and provide the basis for a more 
technological and modern organisation of society which would maintain all cultures 
as equals. In this way, the emphasis on Islam would be on its tolerant side,
56
 making 
the Ottomanist plan of multi-ethnicity and multi-confessionalism a feasible option, 
in the eyes of both Ottomans and Europeans. At this point, the view that Rıza was 
waging a war against religion and was an atheist should be re-formulated with one 
according to which religion was to be tailored a new role in society, not erased from 
it. Therefore, the fact that, in Rıza‘s works, the religious discourse comes to the 
surface and fades away in a cyclical manner, as it is obvious in the contents of both 
                                                          
54
 Ramsaur, Young Turks. 
55
 Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilisation – Selected essays of Ziya Gökalp, translated and 
edited by Niyazi Berkes (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959), 284-289. 
56
 See by the same author, Rıza, Tolérance Musulmane and ―Une nouvelle tactique,‖ Mechveret 
Supplément Français 1, no. 13 (15 June 1896), 3-4. 
110 
 
Mechveret and La Faillite morale de la politique occidentale en orient, is testimony 
to an ideology that is constantly being renegotiated. Where a definite incongruence 
emerges in Rıza‘s thought, is in the idea of multi-ethnicity as a basic tenet of 
Ottomansim in an environment in which the Muslim majority grants liberties and 
rights to the other components from a superior position. I will, however, deal with 
this issue further on in the chapter.  
 
On the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire 
Throughout his works and his political activity, Ahmet Rıza treated the issue of 
stagnation in the Ottoman Empire as a multi-faceted affair. The following section 
deals with the way in which he generally viewed the problems affecting the Empire 
and what he thought were the material and ideological causes for such difficulties. 
Comparing what Ahmet Rıza considered the causes of decline of the Empire to what 
Lutfi Pasha, the Grand Vizier of Sultan Süleyman, and Kochu Bey, advisor of Sultan 
Murat IV, respective wrote 300 and 250 years earlier,
57
 give us an idea about how 
Rıza envisaged change. Many of the features that these two statesmen cite are 
specific to their own times as much as many are peculiar only to Ahmet Rıza‘s times. 
However, it is worth noticing that the general features of decline are common to all 
three; this helps me position the efforts of Rıza within a longer and broader 
discourse around religious and political reform in the Ottoman Empire.
58
 Their joint 
accusations were directed at: the increasing favouritism in granting important 
appointments at high-level, a degeneration of morality among the ruling elites, and a 
lack of technical competence of the people entrusted with leading and reforming the 
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Empire. Examining the writings of the sixteenth and seventeenth century with those 
of Rıza underscores how far the need to reform the Ottoman Empire dates. Their 
dialogue highlights the importance of ideologues such as Ahmet Rıza in bringing the 
Empire into the modern era ideologically, and organising a political opposition set 
on this goal. 
 
Lutfi Pasha wrote that appointments and promotions should be accorded ―on the 
basis of merit, without favouritism and interest,‖59 and, in a similar tone, Kochu Bey 
warned that offices should be granted on the basis of ―competence and merit.‖60 
Similar, though more developed and elaborated on, are the problems identified by 
Rıza in the Ottoman Empire of the 19th century. In Rıza‘s time, advisory councils, 
the bureaucracy and the religious establishment were manned by figures appointed 
to places of influence through nepotism and their allegiance to the Sultan. This 
created a dynamic of mutual dependency whereby the Sultan could not hold on to 
power without them, while they would occupy much less important places without 
his help. In 1896, Rıza wrote about the men around the Sultan that, far from being 
able to understand the sacred mission bestowed upon them as statesmen, ―[ils] n‘ont 
songé qu‘à fonder leur fortune personnelle sur les bonnes grâces de leur 
souverain‖.61  
Two years later the same idea was expressed again but in a harsher way: 
Les hauts personnages et la plupart des agents de la Préfecture, se 
recrutent dans les rangs des vulgaires criminels condamnés à 
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perpétuité, mais qui sont gracies par décret spécial de leur Auguste 
collègue, le Sultan, violateur de lois.
62
 
 
As for the ulema, they had become, according to Rıza, ―une corporation de 
théologiens généralement ignorants, paresseux et réactionnaires …‖,63  who were 
greedy for power. For this reason, they had decided to side with the despotic 
establishment in order to maintain their own power, keep the people in ignorance 
and perpetuate a dictatorial rule. This turned the tolerance of a previously fair ulema 
into ―… une sorte de terreur jésuitique qui épaissit les ténèbres de l‘ignorance et fit 
perdre à l‘Islam son perfectionnement moral.‖64 This perspective reinforces the view 
that Rıza was convinced that religion had always played a positive constructive role 
in society and good governance, while the fault resided with those entrusted with its 
application. Tellingly, the closing of the relevant chapter confirms: ―La vérité 
m‘oblige à dire de suite que si le Koran avait contribué en partie à la grandeur, ce 
n‘est pas lui qui a fait la décadence.‖65  
 
Both Lutfi Pasha and Kochu Bey identified moral corruption as a key culprit for the 
declining state of the Empire. The former wrote that the Grand Vizier, as much as all 
government officials, ―should be disinterested … everything he does should be for 
God and in God and for the sake of God,‖66 while the latter thought that ―[t]he 
Imperial household had been corrupted and had become a source of contamination 
to the rest of the apparatus of government.‖67 
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The moral decline of the ruling elite preoccupied both Rıza and his predecessors. 
This degeneration had been the result of socio-political transformation. Drawing 
inspiration from one of the main pillars of the Hatt-ı Sherif of Gülhane – fact that 
proves an intellectual link between Rıza‘s ideas and the ideologies that imbued 
earlier attempts at the revival of the Empire – he cited the lack of security for the life 
and property of the Ottoman population.
68
 This was the outcome of a general 
malfunction of the government, which had resulted, mainly in the nineteenth 
century, in the dissolution of a class that Rıza identified as the aristocracy. Busy 
with wars and keeping a tight hold on power, the Ottoman statesmen had neglected 
education and modernisation, both of which would have been the basis for the 
constitution and survival of this class. This aristocracy represented the intellectual 
elite of the Empire, the engine for progress and, above all, the safeguard of critical 
moral values. 
Elle dirigeait le peuple, lui servait d‘exemple; elle constituait une 
autorité intermédiaire entre le souverain et la nation; elle tempérait, 
mitigeait l‘omnipotence de l‘un et les exigences de l‘autre; aux heures 
de crise, elle les relevait et leur donnait l‘élan. Leur maison était le 
refuge des talents, le foyer commun de l‘hospitalité, les archives 
vivantes des traditions et de la constitution morale de la nation.
69
 
 
The above exemplifies both Rıza‘s view of the work and aim of the Mechveret 
group, and to an extent, that of the Young Turk organisation in general, both of 
which aimed at filling the void left by the degeneration and dissolution of the 
aristocratic class. In the case of the late nineteenth century, as we have seen in 
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Chapter 2, the place of the aristocratic class could be filled by the elitist intellectual 
class of Young Turk members.  
 
In the writings of the sixteenth and seventeenth century statesmen, the main point 
accentuated is that the state and its administrators were not trained as well as they 
should have been and, hence, they could not respond to the demands of their role. 
Translating this into the nineteenth century, Rıza underlined a similar problem, the 
malfunction of the educational system which, for him, was the foundation for the 
future modernisation of the Empire. The beginning of an article titled ―L‘Instruction 
publique en Turquie‖70 points to the fact that the reforms in the public education 
system up to 1896 were mainly cosmetic and resting, in fact, on ―l‘apparence – 
brillante assurément – des édifices, des institutions.‖71  However, the Mechveret 
group credited Abdülhamit for having aspired to reform the system, especially at the 
beginning of his reign. The founding of the School of Civil officials, the School of 
Law, School of Foreign Languages, and the School and Museum of Fine Arts, 
anticipated that suitable civil servants and bureaucrats would be trained there. But 
the problem resided in three factors. The first, more structural, factor had to do with 
the lack of instructors who had received a modern education and training. The 
second involved government spies. These managed to deceive the Sultan into 
believing that a large amount of turbulent students had turned the schools into a 
venue for the propagation of liberal ideas and revolutionary politics. This had 
important consequences, leading to the third factor. People were either encouraged 
to stay away from schools or decided to leave the Empire, which resulted in a brain 
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drain. According to the writer, the Sultan had opted for breeding an uneducated 
youth, or one moulded at schools according to his specific interpretation of 
Ottomanism
72
 in order to keep it under the yoke of the state. The Sultan had in fact 
engaged in strong school censorship, going as far as censoring textbooks that 
mentioned terms such as ‗fatherland‘ or ‗revolution‘.73 
What I want to emphasise is that neither the problems of the Empire were new to 
Rıza‘s time or raised exclusively by the Young Turk group. Instead, the Young Turk 
movement in general, and leaders like Ahmet Rıza, fitted into a more general effort 
of modernisation that dated back to much earlier times, as I point out in Chapter 2, 
however adding a new component to the agency of reform. While Kochu Bey and 
Lutfi Pasha were part of the status-quo, in the late 1800s, a group outside the centre 
had taken up the role of ‗agent of reform‘ and had done so in sidestepping forms of 
traditional power. 
 
The Issues of Mechveret Supplément Français 
I have this far surveyed the general ideas of Rıza and the Mechveret group; what 
follows here is an analysis of Rıza‘s ideology through the journal that, as explained, 
became the mouthpiece of the group around him. A deeper appreciation of the value 
of Mechveret in the constitution of a specific Young Turk ideology must be based on 
the following considerations. First, the journal represented the mouthpiece of a 
group of political opponents in exile; without the opportunity of exile, Mechveret 
would have lasted very little due to Hamidian censorship. Secondly, precisely 
because it was published abroad, and specifically in France, it allowed for 
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contributions from a large number of intellectuals, influenced by various 
philosophical and political currents, and it contributed to the creation of a new, 
multi-faceted ideology in tune with global ideological waves – but still adaptable to 
the Ottoman Empire. Lastly, exile and interdisciplinary contributions gave the 
Young Turk members exactly what they wanted: membership to an enlightened, 
international elite, ready to conceptualise a different meaning of Ottomanism and to 
take up the role of an aristocracy and agency of reform. 
 
The journal Mechveret and its supplement Mechveret Supplément Français started 
publication in 1895 in Paris. The two are good examples of the Ottoman dissident 
publications abroad, analysed in the previous chapter, which belonged to an 
intellectual circle and served as forums where followers of different trends within 
the Young Turk umbrella movement would exchange views, discuss heated topics 
such as the ethnic composition of the Empire, the rights of ethnic and religious 
minorities and, above all, the meaning of Ottomanism. It was through journals such 
as Mechveret and its supplement that a collective imaginary, crucial for the 
expansion of the idea of Ottomanism, was forged. This imaginary gave many 
supporters the feeling of belonging to an emergent counter-current that could 
transform, in a modern and progressive way, the future of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
I will mainly engage with the supplement of the Mechveret journal, Mechveret 
Supplément Français. Written in French, the supplement had a wider circulation 
than the Ottoman version and, due to this, gathered a large pool of Ottomans and 
Europeans who debated on what seemed like central elements in the formation of a 
Young Turk policy. In this sense, it would do precisely what Ganem and Rıza had in 
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mind, namely, achieve a political plan and a philosophical approach to the reform of 
the Empire by negotiating this with an elitist forum. This forum garnered moral and 
intellectual support from the West as well as from Ottomans of different ethnic and 
religious backgrounds. Moreover, it is important to remember that the Ottoman 
contributors to the journal were addressing a European audience with whom 
common grounds for claims for political reform had to be created. In this light, the 
supplement is more organically tied with the reality of advocacy in exile than its 
Ottoman counterpart. Furthermore, through the French supplement, the Ottoman and 
non-Ottoman contributors and readers were positioning the Empire in the wider 
framework of world politics and events and, in doing so, attempted to draw parallels 
between countries such as France and the Empire in their common struggle against 
despotism and corruption. There is yet another reason why I find Mechveret 
Supplément Français particularly intriguing: as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Rıza, as many of his contemporaries, thought of himself as the member of an 
enlightened elite which belonged to an international milieu, and therefore, the way 
he positioned himself vis-à-vis the outside becomes vital in an understanding of his 
political thought.  
 
As mentioned before, Mechveret Supplément Français was intended as a journal 
featuring both Ottoman and foreign writers. Together with the intellectually oriented 
lines of Ottoman opposition publications as well as positivist reviews of the time, it 
included a long series of articles and translations dealing with all sorts of issues 
about learning and science coupled with treatises on the political and social situation 
of the Empire. The first were intended as general, and more globally oriented 
scientific, philosophical and literary topics, while those dealing with politics dealt 
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more directly with the rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II. The initial aim, as set out by 
Ahmet Rıza through the pages of the journal, was to spread knowledge in modern 
fields and awaken the dormant Ottoman populace, while at the same time providing 
for those outside the Ottoman dominions a picture of an intellectually vibrant group 
of Ottomans working for reform and pacification of the various religious and ethnic 
components of the Empire. This last aspect was also of paramount importance in the 
maintenance of sovereignty for the Empire, as in the preceding years, the frictions 
between the centre and some of the minorities had been used by the West as 
expedients for intervention in Ottoman internal affairs. 
 
To what extent, however, can historians use Mechveret as a document to reconstruct 
not only the actions and thoughts of the advocates it represented, but also those of 
other opposition groups and of the regime back in Istanbul? Since the journal served 
as the organ of a particular political faction, it represents a revelatory historical 
source insofar as it communicates the way the Mechveret group tried to portray and 
position itself, how it approached the issues of reform, and how it viewed other 
actors involved. It cannot be considered a representation of actions and thoughts of 
other factions, beyond Rıza‘s group. As declared by the rédaction in no. 19 of the 
first year, “tout ce qui émane de notre Comité est intégralement publié dans le 
Mechveret.‖74  
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Mechveret: layout and content 
Rıza was heavily influenced by positivism, so it was no coincidence that he decided 
to give Mechveret a positivist character in its layout. The issues of the French 
supplement, of which the first appeared on the 1
st
 of December 1895, were dated 
according to the Comtean positivist calendar. This calendar started with the 1
st
 of 
January 1789 – the date of the French Revolution – and named the months according 
to the names of saints and heroes of human history that Comte considered the most 
important, as among others, Aristotle, Descartes and Shakespeare. 
 
The first issue of Mechveret was published with the date 27
th
 Frédéric 107 and its 
publication was reported in the European press in the following manner: 
The Young Turkey party has started a fortnightly paper in French and 
Arabic, which is to be the organ of the Turco-Syrian committee of 
reforms presided over by [sic] Hali Ganem Effendi, … The object of 
this committee is the restoration of the Constitution and reforms…75 
 
For the first 32 issues of the journal Rıza emblazoned the positivist motto Ordre et 
Progrès on the front page under the main heading. Below the header, the journal 
was branded as an organ of the Young Turk opposition movement, ‗Organ of the 
Young Turkey‘ (Organe de la Jeune Turquie), and the editor highlighted that the 
aim of the supplement was to make ―les lecteurs étrangers au courant des tendances 
et des vœux du parti de le Jeune Turquie.‖76 Mechveret had a wide readership since, 
even without precise numbers at hand, we know that the journal was sold in 
numerous cities. By 1899, selling points existed in public spaces in Paris, Christiana, 
Copenhagen, Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Brussels, Geneva, Athens, and Cairo and it 
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was sold in Algeria at the house of an Ahmed Ben Derrah, in the town of Bougie.
77
 
As far as the consumption of the journal inside the Empire is concerned, it is very 
difficult to have a definite figure. What is known for those journals published abroad, 
is that circulation inside the Empire was estimated by 15,000 to 20,000 by Muge 
Göcek.
78
 
 
A fair question to ask is why Rıza decided to give the journal such a visual 
affiliation with a political party, the Young Turk opposition and openly claiming to 
represent the voice of the Young Turks as a whole? Did he think at the time that 
there was, or could potentially, be a tight alliance among the numerous factions 
comprising of the various members of the Young Turk opposition? Or did this 
choice point to his conviction that his group alone represented the ‗real‘ Young Turk 
movement? A fair evaluation lies somewhere in between. Undoubtedly, he thought 
that his way was the only viable path to save the Empire from lagging behind and 
from Western intrusion. At the same time, until at least the Congress of Ottoman 
Liberals held in Paris in 1902, there was a general feeling of optimism that the 
various factions within the opposition could actually be brought to work together 
under one homogeneous organisation. The name of Ahmet Rıza is very visible on 
the header of the journal, which suggests that he believed to carry a certain weight 
among the myriad of factions of the Young Turk movement. However, tensions of 
leadership among Young Turk members eventually became one of the major 
problems in constituting a unified group against Sultan Abdülhamit II. 
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In its content, Mechveret was not as ideologically based on positivism as its layout 
seemed to suggest. In its pursuit of followers who were still undecided about which 
faction of the Young Turk movement to join, and in its wish to present the European 
public with an image of the Empire that is balanced but still infused with Ottoman 
values, Mechveret merged the religious with the secular. It also praised Western 
civilisation with the importance of the Ottoman and Islamic tradition. This hybridity 
is also reflected in the way Rıza was viewed by those outside the Empire. As I have 
mentioned earlier, in France he was regarded as a liberal,
79
 a lover of his 
motherland,
80
 and a patriotic Muslim.
81
 The French public referred to Rıza, in late 
1896, as ―un des rares musulmans de la Jeune Turquie qui aient conservé intacts leur 
patriotisme et leur religion.‖82 Inside the Empire, on the other hand, many branded 
him as an atheist and a figure whose actions were to lead to the final 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. This was due to two factors: one was the 
counter-propaganda mounted by Sultan Abdülhamit II in his attempt to discredit the 
opposition; the other was a similar technique employed, from 1896 onwards, by 
other Young Turk exponents who were fighting for leadership inside the 
organisation.
83
 
 
There is, also, a third explanation. The alternations of religious and lay discourse, 
and the importance of both Western intellectual influence and Ottoman tradition, are 
frequently cited alongside the importance of justice, humanity and fraternity and 
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should be seen as a stage in Rıza‘s philosophical development. They can be viewed, 
as I have suggested earlier as well, as the gradual, back and forth, process of the 
conceptualisation of an ideological Eastern-modern model infused with a synthesis 
of positivist philosophy and the social achievements of the modern West. I claim 
that we need to appreciate the efforts of Rıza, to draw the Ottoman Empire culturally 
and politically closer to Europe. 
 
The Programme of Mechveret 
As editor of the journal, Ahmet Rıza introduced the programme of ‗Le Comité 
Ottoman d’Union et Progrès‘ in the opening article of the first issue of Mechveret. 
The programme was activist in nature, it was to be carried out through peaceful 
means, was indicative of the major features of the Young Turk opposition as a 
whole, and highlighted the specificities of the Mechveret group within the broader 
ranks of the opposition: 
Nous voulons travailler non pas à renverser la dynastie régnante que 
nous considérons comme nécessaire au maintien du bon ordre, mais à 
propager la notion du progrès dont nous désirons le triomphe 
pacifique. Notre devise étant ‗Ordre et Progrès‘, Nous avons horreur 
des concessions obtenues par la violence. Nous demandons des 
reformes, non pas spécialement pour telle ou telle province, mais pour 
l‘Empire tout entier; non pas en faveur d‘une seule nationalité, mais 
en faveur de tous les Ottomans, qu‘ils soient Juifs, Chrétiens ou 
Musulmans. Nous voulons avancer dans la voie de la civilisation mais 
nous le déclarons hautement, nous ne voulons avancer qu‘en fortifiant 
l‘élément ottoman … Nous tenons à garder l‘originalité de notre 
civilisation orientale et, pour cela, n‘emprunter à l‘Occident que les 
résultats généraux de son évolution scientifique, seuls vraiment 
assimilables et nécessaires pour éclairer un people dans sa marche 
vers la liberté … Nous nous opposons à la substitution de 
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l‘intervention directe des puissances étrangères à l‘autorité 
ottomane.
84
 
 
Since Mechveret has been referred to as a propagandistic tool of one of the 
opposition groups in the Young Turk organisation, it is important to understand 
whether the programme – as laid out in the journal – can be considered a stable 
agenda of its group in the period up to 1902, or whether its ideology changed 
considerably over time. Two years after the first issue was published, the 
programme had not changed. In fact, in the preface to the booklet detailing the trial 
that the Mechveret stood in France, on the 4
th
 of August 1897, the ‗rédaction du 
Mechveret’ underlined once more that:  
Les principes dont s‘inspire le Mechveret sont bien connus: nous ne 
faisons pas de distinction entre races et religions, nous défendons 
l‘égalité et la justice. Ces principes se retrouvent tous dans la 
législation religieuse et civile de l‘Empire ottoman, et nous qu‘y obéir 
en citoyens respectueux de toute institution établie et équitable.
85
 
 
By 1902, at the Congress of Ottoman Liberals held in Paris, when the split between 
the two most representative factions – the Mechveret group and the one headed by 
prince Sabahettin – took place, it is clear that the Rıza‘s agenda has remained 
distinguishable from that of Sabahettin. The Mechveret group clashed with prince 
Sabahettin on decisions such as: a peaceful course of action versus revolutionary 
options, the indivisibility of the Empire as opposed to a conception of a federal 
Empire where the different vilayets (districts-provinces) would attain a high degree 
of autonomy, and, most significantly, on the extent of influence that European 
countries should exercise on the Ottoman Empire and its population.
86
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Genesis of the opposition according to Mechveret 
Six months after the publication of the first issue of Mechveret, Rıza expanded on 
his view of the group‘s programme and placed the ideas of the Young Turk 
movement in a broader Ottoman historical context. In 1896, the writer traced the 
first attempts at reform during the reign of Sultan Selim III. Faltering as it had been, 
this beginning set the tone for the efforts of the following two sultans, Mahmut II 
and Abdülmecit. According to Rıza, with the latter Sultan there had been a genuine 
inauguration of reforms put in practice, the Tanzimat. Rıza regarded the Hatt-ı Sherif 
of Gülhane, the edict that gave way to the beginning of the reform era, as ―le décret 
de réorganisation de l‘empire dans le sens d‘un rapprochement entre toutes les 
confessions.‖87 The ideals of the Tanzimat were brought forward by Midhat Pasha, 
the man who Rıza identified as the ―chef du parti de la Jeune Turquie,‖ 88  and 
translated into a constitutional framework of government (1876-1878). These ideas 
marked a break between the Palace, which was drifting away from delegating 
powers, and the Young Turk group, which was made up of ―... membres appartenant 
à toutes les confessions, qui ont pris pour règle de s‘unir en leurs communs intérêts 
pour la sauvegarde et la défense de leurs idées et de leur Patrie.‖89 Ahmet Rıza 
viewed the period from the 1840s to 1876 – the date of accession to the throne of 
Abdülhamit II – as a time of slow but steady progress, marked by moderate and 
conciliatory domestic and foreign politics coupled with the development of an 
educational infrastructure and a military apparatus.
90
 This view of the Tanzimat 
became one of the markers of the ideology of the Mechveret group; contrary to the 
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‗reading‘ of such period by the group around Sabahettin as I will show in the next 
chapter. While for Rıza the Tanzimat represented an important step, for Sabahettin 
the period amounted to a series of aborted or cosmetic attempts at reform. 
 
In the issue of October 1897,
91
 Ahmet Rıza described in detail the nature of the 
organisation of the Young Turk. The party, he wrote, was a political formation like 
the Junges Deutschland or the Giovine Italia but, unlike these two, it was not a 
secret association. Even though the Ottoman version of a ‗young‘ organisation had 
different aims and a different agenda, it drew its organisational and ideological 
inspiration from the above German and Italian groups. The Junges Deutschland, 
which existed from around 1830 to the 1850s, was a youth movement born out of 
the need to reverse the primacy of Romanticism, which the members of the group 
saw as lacking the activist spirit needed at the time. However, the group was 
conceived as a literary movement bent on changing the nature of the involvement of 
writers and other engaged intellectuals. On the other hand, La Giovine Italia, 
founded by Giuseppe Mazzini in 1831, was an activist movement with a tangible 
political aim, namely the unification of Italy under a republican system. It was 
equally a movement in arms since its leaders and the people fought, however 
unsuccessfully, both the Austrians and the Papal States.  
 
Ahmet Rıza was aware of the fact that as a political faction of the opposition, the 
Young Turk organisation represented nothing new to the Muslim world. The 
Muslim world, claimed Rıza in his writings, had always allowed criticism, since the 
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latter was ―une des essences de l‘islamisme.‖ 92  Moreover, the approach of this 
particular opposition followed the footsteps of the various ideologues and statesmen 
mentioned in Chapter 2, such as al-Tahtawi and Namık Kemal. Thus, Mechveret‘s 
ideals attempted to amalgamate the old and the new, tradition and innovation. It both 
wished to be acceptable from a traditionally Islamic perspective and to become a 
movement of the intelligentsia and the elite, which would change the nature of the 
populace and the state in a progressive and liberal way under a philosophically 
positivist framework.  
 
The West according to Mechveret 
The various Young Turk groups had contradictory views about the European powers, 
their motives for interfering in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, and the level of 
engagement that the opposition would allow them to have in a new state-order. On 
this last issue, the groups‘ views ranged from a wish for strictly intellectual 
involvement to a call for active political influence down to a physical and military 
intervention by some of the powers. For the Mechveret group, as has been touched 
upon in previous sections, direct foreign encroachment was highly undesirable and 
should have been kept at bay. The only contribution the group desired, at least until 
1896, was ideological support and intellectual cooperation. As explained previously, 
in fact, Ahmet Rıza was convinced that all the European governments had a vested 
interest in the involvement in Ottoman affairs. 
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Straight from its first issue, Mechveret made clear how its group viewed the West 
and its interference, even if some thought of it as beneficial to the overall plans of 
the opposition. It was important to the Mechveret group that the reformed Empire 
incorporated the originality of the Ottoman civilisation and respected its heritage. To 
this end, progress and advancement were to be attained reinforcing the Ottoman 
element, which implied that the West was to serve only as scientific inspiration: 
―n‘emprunter à l‘Occident que les résultats généraux de son évolution 
scientifique.‖93 Accordingly, Rıza wrote: ―nous espérons un appui moral. Nous nous 
opposons à la substitution de l‘intervention directe des puissances étrangères à 
l‘autorité ottomane.‖94 
 
This position was reinforced over time. In an article that appeared in 1895, Rıza 
underlined that the motive for active foreign involvement in Ottoman dominions 
could only emerge from the political and economic interests that European states 
had in Ottoman lands. Broadly speaking, Rıza noted that all attempts at intervening 
had been justified as a means to ―…sauvegarder les chrétiens contre les Softas qu‘on 
accuse de vouloir l‘extermination des infidels,‖95 while the real goal was to bring 
more friction within the already fragile social balance within the Ottoman Empire. A 
demonstration of the self-interested attitude of European involvement was the spread 
of missionaries throughout Ottoman lands. These missionaries and the governments 
behind them – which Ahmet Rıza identifies primarily as France and Russia – 
continuously broke international law, stirred up nationalist feelings among the 
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minorities, and placed increasing economic duress on the Ottoman population, 
Muslim or not. They did the latter by requesting indemnities for those missionaries 
who, in their views, had experienced material damages. In January 1896, Rıza wrote 
―[p]uisque la France et la Russie, ces deux puissances chrétiennes par excellence, 
défendent aux missionnaires protestants de faire de la propagande, … de quel droit 
ces missionnaires veulent-ils que nous leur permettions de venir chez nous raviver 
les haines des âges passés?‖ 96  Regarding Russia and France, Rıza‘s view was 
supported by other publications. In the case of Russia, we know from a pamphlet 
dated 1876 written by a French author, that in relation to the insurrections in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria, ―… il y a quinze ans que la Russie préparait cette 
insurrection.‖97 Similarly, Russia had tried to stir up rebellions in Greece during the 
temporary occupation of Morea in 1770, while, in 1797, Bonaparte‘s France was 
pushing his generals to foster ideas of independence throughout the Ionian Islands.
98
 
Requests to reform in the Ottoman Empire voiced by other main powers of the time 
were often nothing but a pretext for involvement from the dubious position of 
guarantor and saviour. In the future imagined by Rıza, a reformed Empire would 
give no reasons for such foreign pronouncements; this in turn gave substance to the 
claims of the Mechveret group that the Empire urgently needed drastic reform.  
 
In mid-1896, Rıza raised another issue concerning the Russian government, which 
had convinced him further of the ambiguity of foreign involvement. He stated that 
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Russia had dealt another blow to the Ottoman Empire aiming at its total collapse.
99
 
After having ruined the Empire as an outcome of the wars between the two 
countries,
100
 Russia had taken part in what Mechveret identified as ‗the Armenian 
inquiry‘ with the purpose of stirring up religious fanaticism within the Ottoman 
dominions. Following these events, Russia had finally decided to support the Sultan, 
seen by the Young Turks as the enemy of all reforms, in order to justify – in the eyes 
of the other European powers – its intervention as conciliatory. With regard to 
England, Ahmet Rıza viewed the motives behind its encroachment as emerging from 
a different source. Hegemony, he wrote, had developed a sense of superiority in the 
English government and had culminated in regarding those who are not ―anglais et 
protestant,‖ 101  as inferior; and this stance theoretically enabled England to act 
against the Empire at any point in time. 
 
Having recognised the impossibility of uninterested political involvement by the 
European governments, the Mechveret group developed a policy of seeking only 
ideological support on the part of European civil societies. That would be the only 
type of rapprochement between Ottomans and Europeans. As far as the French 
government was concerned, it was initially thought that France could have worked 
as partner in the opposition to Sultan Abdülhamit II. However, these hopes were 
soon shattered and relations between the French government and the Mechveret 
group reached a low point in mid-1896. On the 11
th
 of April, following pressures 
from the Ottoman Ambassador Munir Bey, Antoine Puybaraud, who was branded 
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by many French intellectuals as the ―grand eunuque blanc de la police 
républicaine‖102 from the Préfecture of Paris, announced to Ahmet Rıza the decision 
taken by the Minister of Interior to expel him and ban his journal. French public 
opinion deplored such act, revealing that Rıza had been falsely accused of receiving 
a sum of money from England in order to enhance the politics of the Foreign Office 
in Egypt. As reported a few days later in the press, the exchange between the 
functionary of the Prefecture and Ahmet Rıza went as follows: 
Vous combattez la politique du Sultan, dit M. Puybaraud à Ahmed-
Riza. Or le gouvernement veut être agréable au Sultan. Je suis chargé 
par M. le ministre de l‘intérieur de vous inviter à quitter Paris dans le 
plus bref délai possible. Partez, on vous paiera les frais du voyage. 
Mais n‘essayez pas de vous soustraire à cette expulsion officieuse, 
sinon le gouvernement se verrait réduit à prendre contre vous une 
mesure de rigueur.
103
 
 
Rıza understood that the official reasons put forth by the French government were 
just a pretext. So, he asked Puybaraud: ―‗Why do you expel me, does an honest man 
not have the right to reside in Paris?‘ [Puybaraud replied], ‗This is about 
politics.‘‖104 
 
This led to the breakout of what was widely referred to in the French press of the 
time as L’affaire Ahmet Rıza, during which the French press vehemently attacked 
the decisions of its government. The first contention of the press dealt with the fact 
that the government had given in to pressures exercised by the despotic Ottoman 
state. A vivid example of this accusation can be seen in an article by the journalist 
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George Clémenceau.
105
 The article criticises Ahmet Rıza‘s expulsion on the basis of 
two precedents: the refusal of England to expel and hand over the refugees of the 
Commune to France, and the request of the Ottoman authorities to the Khedive 
Abbas to expel Murat Bey, exponent of the Young Turks in Egypt. Why, the writer 
asks, does France behave like a vassal to the Sultan? In the eyes of Clémenceau, this 
submissive stance was even more reprimandable given that the Sultan had been the 
perpetrator of the killing of 50,000 Christians in the Armenian vilayets. The press 
contested the expulsion of Rıza on other grounds as well: he was believed to be 
fighting for justice and freedom, the pillars of post-revolutionary French political 
ideals, as well as for the right to freedom of expression. 
 
This event marked the end of the relations between the Mechveret group and the 
French government, which Rıza and his followers had, prior to this event, 
enthusiastically invited to play an active role in sustaining the opposition against the 
Sultan, as the pages of Mechveret demonstrate. However, the same incident 
simultaneously proved that France and Paris had been the right choice for émigrés to 
settle and publish an opposition journal. French civil society had rallied around the 
Mechveret group and, as reported in the previous chapter, Rıza claimed that the 
expulsion of the journal and the subsequent events had increased the popularity of 
the group more than a full year of the journal‘s publication.106 After this rupture with 
the French government, the group established an even tighter alliance with the 
French press and public. Evidence of this is the fact that a French publisher, 
Chevalier-Marescq, funded both the booklet Proces contre le Mechveret et La Jeune 
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Turquie and the book authored by Halil Ganem Les Sultans Ottomans.
107
 The day 
after the notification of Rıza‘s expulsion, articles appeared across the spectrum of 
the French press expressing similar indignation: 
Pauvre France! Longtemps elle fut le refuge de la pensée libre, qui n‘a 
rien de commun avec ce que de grotesques suppôts de loges ont 
baptisé libre-pensée; pendant des siècles les révolutionnaires – flétris 
de l‘épithète de révolutionnaires pour les besoins de la cause des 
jouisseurs – y trouvèrent un véritable asile contre la persécution, 
toujours odieuse d‘où qu‘elle vienne et qui qu‘elle vise…108  
 
The press referred to Ahmet Rıza as ―nullement un révolutionnaire ... simplement un 
libéral …‖.109 L’Evénement, Le Jour, La Paix, La Libre Parole, L’Autorité, L’Echo 
de Paris, L’Intransigeant, La Justice, and La Dépêche formulated similar 
accusations against their government with titles ranging from ―Odieuse Attitude‖ to 
―Lamentable Mesure‖ and ―Une Expulsion sournoise.‖110 
 
The friction between the Mechveret group and the French government was never 
resolved and in fact reached a definite clash in 1897. The French government, once 
more under pressure from the Ottoman diplomatic service, decided that the 
interdiction alone was not enough and therefore opened a court case against the 
journal. The case resulted in the mild pecuniary conviction of Rıza and Halil 
Ganem,
111
 and a reprimand about the verbal accusations addressed to the Sultan and 
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the Ottoman government of the time.
112
 Another outcome of the ‗Rıza Affair‘ was 
the suspension of the issues of Mechveret in Ottoman Turkish from publication on 
French soil, while the supplement was left unharmed by the accusations. At first, 
Rıza tried to move to Geneva to continue publication. However, his stay in 
Switzerland was brief as he was unable to find sources of funding despite gaining 
residency there. He subsequently moved to Belgium, where he received a modest 
donation. From Brussels, he remained the editor of the Ottoman Mechveret until 
September 1897 when the Belgian government put a ban on its publication with the 
accusation that Rıza featured unfit articles and attempted to arrest and exile him. In 
order to continue his work, Rıza placed this edition under the name of a Belgian MP, 
a Georges Lorand. Sources on Mechveret published in Geneva and Brussels are very 
scarce and dates are contradictory, thus we cannot be sure of when exactly the 
Ottoman Mechveret was allowed back into Paris.
113
 
 
The persecution of Mechveret in France and Belgium brought a large part of the 
French and Belgian public opinion to side again with Ahmet Rıza and critically 
condemn the action of their respective governments. After all the skirmishes with 
French, Swiss and Belgian governments, Mechveret became even more critical of 
Western governments and their policies. In the article, ―La Constitution Ottomane‖, 
published in Mechveret of 15
th
 March 1896, the author explains the expectations of 
the Mechveret group from the European powers at this stage: 
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… nous ne demandons pas à la France ou aux autres puissances 
d‘intervenir manu militari en faveur de la liberté pour soutenir la 
nation contre la tyrannie exorbitante du sultan et pour rétablir la 
Constitution. Nous sommes les adversaires décidés de toute 
intervention matérielle. Mais l‘intervention morale et puissante de la 
presse en faveur de la noble cause de la Constitution, nous l‘avons 
toujours désirée et provoquée.
114
 
 
In the July 1897 issue, Mechveret took up the theme of foreign intervention in the 
Ottoman Empire in an open letter to the French parliament. At this stage, the 
Mechveret group found it necessary not only to exhort Europe to stay away from 
internal Ottoman issues, but also to vehemently attack the hypocrisy of European 
politicians. The latter were said to be criticising the Ottoman population of being 
inactive in the social and political reform of the Empire while, in the meantime, 
these same governments supported the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II: ―Le Sultan 
actuel étant soutenu par le Tzar et par l‘empereur d‘Allemagne … c‘est elle 
[referring to Europe] qui a fortifié l‘omnipotence du Sultan et l‘a rendu 
indomptable.‖115 
 
Besides cooperating with an oppressive regime, European governments were 
pushing for the protection of minorities and pressing for a selective reform that 
would only touch these sections of Ottoman society. From Rıza‘s point of view, 
instead of encouraging reform beneficial to the whole Empire led by the goals of ―… 
l‘égalité, la sécurité de la vie, de l‘honneur et des biens, enfin les garanties et le 
contrôle auxquels toute agglomération d‘êtres humains a droit en ce siècle …,‖116 
this attitude would lead to religious conflict and undermine the belief in the Young 
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Turk versions of Ottomanism. It is especially in this domain that the legacy of the 
Tanzimat (1839-76) and of the First Constitutional Period (1876-78) emerged as 
significant for Rıza‘s vision. Both had proclaimed a reform that would benefit all 
Ottoman citizens regardless of their religious or ethnic background. Of similar 
content and tone to the article above, is another one published in Mechveret on the 
15
th
 July, 1898.
117
 It appeared in the form of an open letter to the French parliament 
signed by Halil Ganem. Despite its praise for the positive impact of French literature 
and the impact of its liberal ideas on the aspirations of the Ottoman population 
towards progress, Ganem accused the French, as much as Rıza had done, of 
cooperating and helping Sultan Abdülhamit in his exacting vengeance on his 
subjects. 
 
Finally, there was also a practical reason that pushed the Mechveret group to oppose 
foreign involvement. It was thought that intervention had been so negative thus far, 
that its envisagement was now unpopular among the population and therefore 
counterproductive; the Sultan could publicly oppose any foreign request on the basis 
that it amounted to infringement of sovereignty, that it protected minorities at the 
cost of the Muslim population and ultimately envisaged the political collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire. From this reasoning, it followed that if Western encroachment was 
kept at the lowest possible level, the Sultan could not use this as an excuse to oppose 
any kind of reform from being implemented. 
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By 1900, Mechveret still featured articles taking a definite stance against foreign 
intervention in the affairs of the Empire, with its wording becoming more and more 
hostile. At this stage, the Mechveret group was 
… complètement opposés à toute ingérence des Puissances dans les 
affaires intérieures de notre pays. Désirant garder à notre civilisation 
orientale son caractère propre et ses traditions [repeating that] nous 
n‘avons voulu emprunter à l‘Occident que ‗les résultats généraux de 
son évolution scientifique, seuls vraiment assimilables et nécessaires 
pour éclairer un peuple dans sa marche vers la liberté et le progrès‘.118 
 
England, which in the past had been an ally in the battle against Mehmet Ali Pasha 
of Egypt, had lost interest in the modernisation and reform of the Empire once Egypt 
had been occupied (in 1882). The new player, Germany, had allied with the Sultan 
and, according to Rıza, had benefited greatly from this alliance while providing little 
if anything to the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Rıza‘s book, La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient, hovers the 
same hostility. The book traces European intervention back to the beginning of the 
tenth century, when, at the time of the crusades, European politics was moved by 
higher moral principles than in the subsequent centuries. His narrative culminated, 
as the title suggests, with the total moral bankruptcy of the West during the 
nineteenth century. The opening of the book sets the tone of the whole volume: 
Le titre que je donne à cet ouvrage n‘est pas tout à fait juste, car la 
politique de l‘Europe à l‘égard de la Turquie n‘a jamais été 
subordonnée à la morale. Le succès était le seul but, la force seule 
créait le droit. De tout temps, l‘intérêt religieux et l‘intérêt matériel 
ont été les mobiles essentiels de cette politique.
119
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In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the materialist drive had become the 
leading motive for European intervention
120
 although at times disguised in high 
religious discourse, since religious tolerance was never common practice in Europe. 
Even France, which had experienced an anti-Catholic revolution and had produced 
men of democratic conviction and free thinkers, did not show the same open-
mindedness in the field of foreign policy. The Foreign Office, wrote Rıza, the Quai 
d‘Orsay and the Consulta have supplanted the Church, and their excuses for 
destabilising interventions hardly vary.
121
 If Western governments could not find a 
justifiable pretext to militarily occupy a country and exploit its resources, they 
would then fabricate their own acceptable reasons, appropriating the role of 
defending humanity and furthering the ‗civilising mission‘ against an ‗inferior race‘. 
And the scientific and technological advancements that had contributed to the 
growth of civilisation in these countries, which were so envied by the less advanced 
civilisations, did not really transform the West into a better society devoid of 
injustice. On the contrary, Rıza was convinced that ―[l]a civilisation n‘a pas 
supprimé la barbarie, elle l‘a tout simplement raffinée.‖122 By way of redemption, 
though, Rıza argued that the bankruptcy of Western politics, while upheld by those 
in power, was not an all-encompassing feature of Western civilisation. In fact, 
honesty and moral principles were still present in the majority of the population, 
albeit not in the governments.
123
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On ethnic and religious pluralism 
An important part of the plan of the Mechveret group dealt with the ethnic and 
religious composition of the Empire. The wider ideology of change touched upon a 
number of issues: the philosophical approach, the role of religion and that of the 
West in the reform process. An equally central aspect of the plan, one on which the 
two groups headed by Sabahettin and Rıza were to disagree fundamentally at the 
Paris Congress of 1902,
124
 had to do with the ethno-religious composition of the 
Empire. Mechveret Supplément Français gives us an insight into the issue of ethnic 
and religious minorities inside Ottoman lands. Throughout this period, minorities 
were a concern for Ottomans as well as for European governments; and this issue is 
crucial for our understanding of what is possibly the major flaw in Rıza‘s ideology 
as well as of the friction that led to the failure of the Congress of Ottoman Liberals 
of 1902. In fact, it is specifically on the role, self-identification and presence of 
ethno-religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire where Ahmet Rıza and prince 
Mehmet Sabahettin found themselves at odds.
125
 
 
Through an analysis of the writings of Rıza on the pages of Mechveret, one can 
identify some general trends around the predicament of ethnic and religious 
minorities. The Young Turk organisation, according to the positivist ideologue, 
rested upon the belief that it was its mission to represent all Ottoman liberals beyond 
their ethnic or religious affiliations both in its internal composition and its political 
agenda. The first issue of Mechveret, succinctly stated the multi-confessional vision 
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of the organisation: ―Nous demandons des réformes, non pas spécialement pour telle 
ou telle province, mais pour l‘Empire tout entier; non pas en faveur d‘une seule 
nationalité, mais en faveur de tous le Ottomans, qu‘ils soient Juifs, Chrétiens ou 
Musulmans.‖126  One year later, in 1896, Mechveret reasserted the stance of its 
members: ―La Jeune Turquie se compose de membres appartenant à toutes les 
confessions, qui ont pris pour règle de s‘unir en leurs communs intérêts pour la 
sauvegarde et la défense de leurs idées et de leurs Patrie.‖127 As stated by Rıza, the 
victory of the Young Turks against the Sultan would translate into a multi-
confessional shaping of the Empire: ―la Jeune Turquie, quels que soient les 
changements qu‘elle pourra introduire dans l‘état actuel des choses, maintiendra 
intacts ces privilèges [being, in the context of this article, the right of Christians to 
maintain their language, schools and church].‖ 128  However, victory against the 
regime of Abdülhamit II depended on two prerequisites: a united activist front, and 
the realisation on the part of all opposition groups of the danger that any 
individualistic or regionalist actions would play well in the hands of the Sultan. 
 
During a banquet organised by the Young Turk organisation on the 23
rd
 December 
1897 in Paris to celebrate the 20
th
 anniversary of the Ottoman Constitution, different 
members of the group, which represented all the confessional groups of the Empire, 
came together. On that occasion, Rıza stressed the necessity of cohesiveness: 
A ce banquet des Grecs, des Arméniens, des Arabes et des Turcs, tous 
enfants de la même patrie, se trouvaient réunis. Une seule pensée de 
paix et de concorde unissait tous les cœurs: c‘était une protestation 
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contre le despotisme du Sultan et les scènes d‘horreur dont la Turquie 
a été le théâtre dans ces deux dernières années. Puisse l‘union cordiale 
et sincère qui a caractérisé cette soirée être un gage de fraternité qui 
règnera un jour dans l‘Empire, lorsque, délivré de la tyrannie qui 
l‘opprime, il prendra son essor vers la liberté.129 
 
It is, of course, difficult to determine how feasible an alliance of this sort was within 
the Young Turk movement by 1898.
130
 At least one positive response to Rıza‘s call 
for unity came in 1898 from an Armenian exponent of the CUP: 
Cette lutte [against the regime of Abdülhamit], pour la continuer, pour 
la mener à bien, il faut que les Arméniens s‘unissent aux Turcs. … Les 
Turcs – du moins les Turcs dont nous entendons parler, et ils sont 
légion – ont les mêmes aspirations que nous, souffrent des mêmes 
iniquités, visent au but où nous visons. Un rapprochement s‘offre de 
soi-même, la cause commune s‘impose. C‘est un devoir. C‘est plus: 
c‘est une inéluctable nécessité. Inéluctable par la nature de nos mœurs, 
le genre de notre prime éducation, le caractère de nos rapports. 
L‘identification est là, claire et nette. … La main dans la main, avec 
les Turcs libéraux, nous sommes une force. Abandonnes à nous-
mêmes nous nous ne représentons plus qu‘un principe qu‘aucun 
effectif n‘étaie. A cette caduque règle machiavélique: «Diviser pour 
régner», dont le Sultan s‘est fait une loi, opposons cette autre vieillerie 
toujours neuve: «L‘union fait la force».131 
 
Rıza had precise guidelines as to what was needed to withstand the fight against the 
regime of Sultan Abdülhamit II. This organised resistance would have to: 
... isoler les différents partis les uns des autres, diviser les membres 
d‘un même parti, tel est le dernier dessein de la politique du Sultan. 
Les massacres des Arméniens et la guerre turco-grecque on 
malheureusement servi cette politique néfaste en contribuant à 
accentuer l‘antagonisme entre musulmans et chrétiens. … Nous prions 
donc nos compatriotes Arméniens, comme nous en avons prié 
dernièrement les Hellènes, de ne pas se prêter a cette politique 
astucieuse d‘Abdul-Hamid, en se livrant, par quelques-uns de leurs 
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organes, à des critiques contre l‘islamisme, critique qui ne peuvent 
qu‘éloigner de nous autres, libéraux, les croyants fanatiques, et qui, en 
somme, servent au Sultan de prétexte pour soulever contre les 
Arméniens et les Jeunes-Turcs des haines religieuses. La religion doit 
toujours rester dans le domaine privé; elle ne doit jamais servir de 
base à un mouvement social et politique.
132
 
 
Certainly, a total convergence of intent between the various Young Turk 
organisations could only have been possible through a substantial restructuring of 
specific areas of governance and politics. As explained earlier, pivotal in this 
reconfiguration of the multiple components of the Empire would be a new position 
for religion and a revival of an egalitarian national Ottoman sentiment. According to 
the Mechveret group, the proto-national ideology upon which the Ottoman Empire 
was to rest, at least until 1902, was the specific version of Ottomanism that is being 
reconstructed and analysed throughout this chapter. This implied two reforms: first, 
religion would not be part of the state and of its policies, but would be relegated to 
the private sphere. In the words of Rıza himself, ―[l]a question religieuse étant pour 
nous affaire d‘ordre absolument privé, … Il n‘entre pas dans notre programme de 
mêler la religion à la politique; nous avons le respect de toutes les croyances.‖133 
The second reform, dependent on the first, would consist in the full inclusion of 
ethnic and religious minorities within the state‘s representative branches – that 
would be resuscitated with the revival of the 1876 Constitution – and within its legal 
system. The Mechveret group did not want to change the ethno-religious balance of 
the Empire but to uphold it. The will for inclusion was confirmed to the journal‘s 
European readers through the pages of Mechveret: ―La Chambre [referring to the 
chamber of parliament formed after the re-instatement of the constitution] ne 
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touchera …, ni aux autres privilèges accordés aux sujets israélites et chrétiens de 
l‘Empire.‖134 In the view of the Mechveret group, the application of existing laws 
and regulations would suffice to create equal citizenship rights and obligations for 
all components of the Ottoman population. 
 
Sure enough, this attitude entailed the negation of rights, reforms and privileges 
granted to any single ethno-religious group. This meant that Macedonians, 
Armenians and Albanians had to regard themselves as Ottoman first and foremost 
and only assert their particular identity within this framework. Rıza and his group 
ostracised from the Young Turk umbrella movement any group that worked for the 
acquisition of independence, or special status of a minority, as individualistic 
attitudes.
135
 Such factions would not be partners in the struggle against the Sultan 
but, on the contrary, their actions would result in the destabilisation of governance 
and end up being of help to the Sultan‘s oppressive measures. 
 
The constitution of activist groups based on ethnic affiliation, as shown by the 
Armenians in the previous years, was considered to be counterproductive to the 
interests of their compatriots, and dangerous because it aimed at constituting a 
national league (of Albanians in the north and Macedonians) that would harm the 
idea of the Mechveret-style Ottomanism. The specific interests of some of these 
committees had contributed to the consolidation of sentiments of hostility towards 
Muslims, and had drawn the Christian population of the Empire closer to Europe, 
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forging for themselves the appearance of religious martyrs. This had been made 
clear when, referring to certain revolutionary committee, Rıza wrote: 
Avant de parler des comités révolutionnaires je tiens à maudire la 
détestable administration du Sultan qui leur à donné naissance. Les 
comités ou ligues politiques sont toujours, dans un Etat, un signe de 
désordre et de faiblesse. L‘Empire ottoman est devenue un champ de 
rivalités, où chaque parti sème des haines et ne récolte souvent que la 
mort. … C‘est dans cette anarchie que l‘égoïsme d‘Abdul-Hamid 
trouve complète satisfaction. Il est donc de son intérêt de laisser se 
créer, se développer des parties révolutionnaires, qui, par leur 
propagande séparatiste, divisent le peuple ottoman et l‘empêchent de 
travailler, de concert avec ces différents comités, contre le tyran 
commun.
136
 
 
What emerges from the above is that the plan of the Mechveret group for the future 
Ottoman Empire was unconditionally based on a unitary national entity that 
nonetheless preserved pluralism understood here as the equal status of all ethnicities 
with their respective particularities and religions being allocated to the private 
domain. This idea of Ottoman citizenship, if reflected in country-wide institutions, 
would strengthen the cohesion of a newly-emerging state but would simultaneously 
relegate ethnicity to a marginal place: the common good, seen by Mechveret as the 
ideology behind Ottomanism, was in no way to be endangered by any type of other 
sentiment of belonging or affiliation. 
 
In formulating this approach, however, Rıza did not consider a number of aspects. 
The fact that he regarded the existing laws as sufficient, if properly applied, to 
uphold a real equality between different ethnic and religious groups does not entail 
that the minorities were of the same opinion. Moreover, as I will argue in detail in 
Chapter 5, there were undoubtedly sections of the minorities which believed in the 
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Ottomanist plan but they did so either because they thought the alternative would 
position them in a worse situation, or because they opted for the federalist plan of 
Sabahettin which, in their eyes, gave them more assurance of the real possibility of 
equality and self-administration than that of the Mechveret group. It seems evident, 
therefore, that Rıza misread the intention of those members of the minorities within 
the Young Turk organisation as these would at first work together with the 
Mechveret group in order to get rid of Abdülhamit, only to move on to a more 
autonomous plan of action in a later stage, unless sufficiently satisfied with further 
changes. Here, the tension in Rıza‘s ideology rested in the fact that he did not 
consider that his plan had been formed from a dominant position and was not wholly 
appreciative of the ‗next‘ necessary step that the Mechveret was to develop if the 
minorities were to be incorporated in the group he headed. 
 
Mechveret and Sultan Abdülhamit II: from cooperation to confrontation 
As the plan of the Mechveret group evolved, so did its relationship with Abdülhamit 
II. With the passing of time this disintegrated, as Rıza‘s group thought that a plan of 
reform and the Sultan in power could not be reconciled. This following section 
traces, through the pages of the journal, the trajectory of the relationship between 
this faction of the opposition and the Sultan.  
 
Throughout the issues of the Mechveret Supplément Français, it is possible to 
identify three different stages according to which the group headed by Ahmet Rıza 
viewed the rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II. The three stages vary from a policy of 
cooperation with the Sultan to a constructive criticism of his rule, and, eventually, to 
outright opposition and a call for his deposition. On one level, these stages reflect 
145 
 
the particular policies of the Mechveret group, but on another level they correspond 
to the policies of the broader Young Turk movement. These stages of engagement 
also reflect the Mechveret group‘s relationship with European governments: by 1896, 
it had become clear that European states could not provide disinterested help and the 
Sultan had no intention of compromising for the sake of Western concessions. In the 
years 1896 to 1897, the whole Young Turk opposition had witnessed the near 
decimation of its external branch, and, between 1897 and 1898, the actual defeat of 
the internal one. These developments pushed the émigrés in question towards open 
requests for the removal of Sultan Abdülhamit through even more drastic actions 
than those advocated by the Mechveret group. In this section, I argue that the change 
of attitude towards the Sultan responded to the growing activism and militarism that 
Rıza saw as mounting among some organisations within the Young Turk movement. 
Hence, even if he actually did not share this tendency, he was evidently trying to 
ally himself with the largest possible number of opponents in order to constitute a 
united front against Abdülhamit II. 
 
The period in which the policies of the Mechveret group were geared towards 
cooperation with the Sultan corresponds to the period from 1895, the beginning of 
publication for Mechveret, to the middle of 1896. As it will be shown, many articles 
appearing in Mechveret Supplément Français during this period deal with the Sultan 
in a conciliatory tone. The articles are generally polite, requests are addressed as 
pleas and accusations point at the administration and at those close to the Sultan who 
have betrayed his trust and have brought the country to the brink of collapse. The 
first issue of the supplement featured an open letter addressed to Abdülhamit. The 
letter highlighted three important aspects exemplifying the stance of the Mechveret 
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group at this stage. First, the tone of the whole article sounded respectful of the 
person of Abdülhamit: ―tout le monde sait que Votre Majesté, depuis qu‘Elle dirige 
les destinées de l‘Etat, a toujours été animée des meilleurs sentiments,‖137 showing 
that, by then, the group believed that the Sultan‘s attempts to reform were moved by 
good intentions, and its requests called upon the Sultan to lend a benevolent ear.
138
 
This tone is indicative that at this stage the Sultan as source of power was not 
challenged yet and that reform was thought possible within the existing political 
structure. Secondly, requests put forward the idea of a possible convergence of 
interests between the opposition and the Sultan. In case of the open letter, the author 
was exhorting the Sultan to revise the Capitulations – measures that had granted 
foreign powers the ability to interfere economically and politically in the internal 
affairs of the Empire. Furthermore, the blame for the state of affairs of the Empire 
was placed upon the Sultan‘s circle of aides. These men were seen as having 
betrayed the country: 
[d]evenus flatteurs en devenant vos serviteurs, au lieu d‘être le trait 
d‘union qui rattache un souverain à ses peuples et les interprètes des 
sujets dans les conseils de Votre Majesté, ils ont élevé entre eux et 
Vous une barrière afin d‘étouffer la voix du peuple qui s‘élevait pour 
les condamner et pour déposer jusqu‘aux pieds de Votre Trône les 
doléances auxquelles votre âme est si sensible.
139
 
 
The middle phase in the relationship between the Mechveret group and Sultan 
Abdülhamit II only lasted a few weeks, and is really a transitory stage that links two 
longer phases. However short, I mark this period as a separate one as it appears to be 
a prelude to a definite break between the central power and Rıza‘s group. After this 
definite rupture, Rıza moved to an ideological and territorial redefinition of the 
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meaning of the Ottoman Empire.
140
 From mid-1896, and for about one month, the 
tone of the articles in Mechveret remained similar to the previous phase and the 
group still appeared to be willing to work in cooperation with the Sultan, however, 
the demands started to sound more urgent; and at points, the Sultan‘s position was 
presented as the source of many of the problems. 
 
These intermediate-stage demands were concerning the restoration of the 
Constitution, without which, as Rıza himself wrote, the Mechveret group will not 
cease to oppose the status-quo: 
Notre campagne contre le Sultan cessera aussitôt que ce dernier aura 
mis à exécution la Constitution qu‘il a solennellement promulguée et 
dont il a proclamé lui-même les bienfaits et l‘indispensable utilité dans 
un Hatt demeuré célèbre, et que, du reste, il n‘a jamais rapporté. Nous 
ne lui demandons que d‘assurer l‘ordre et le progrès … Que le Sultan 
se mette à l‘œuvre et il trouvera en nous de sincères auxiliaires.141 
 
From the above, it emerges that, once the Constitution had been re-instated, the 
Mechveret group would have been ready to work hand in hand with the Sultan in the 
pursuit of political and economic reform. On the whole, the Mechveret group 
appears here as a pressure group rather than as an outright opposition movement 
with the aim of substituting the source of power. 
 
During this phase, the group aimed at introducing its specific reading of Ottomanism 
within the policies of the Sultan and forging a unifying basis of allegiance with the 
Palace based on the idea of a country common to all. In other words, it wished to 
transmit to the ruler the notion of a country that was produced within the Young 
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Ottoman ideology, implemented during the First Constitutional Period and perfected 
by the influence of positivism. This notion would equate the country with the 
concept of an Ottomanist motherland. This was made clear throughout the pages of 
Mechveret which reiterated in an on-going way its patriotism: ―... ces Jeunes Turcs 
[sont] ... animés d‘un profond amour pour leur pays.‖142 
 
It is precisely for the love of their country that the members of the Mechveret group 
were working towards a new conception of power and rights. This new picture 
suggests a country that belongs to all segments and strata of society and goes 
decisively beyond the structure of ruler and his subjects. The country was an asset, a 
legacy, a heritage and a right that everyone is entitled to enjoy: a nation. 
Unfortunately, this view was in complete contrast with the path that Abdülhamit II 
had chosen to follow. According to the Sultan, there was no space for political 
decentralisation at a time when the Western powers were attempting to bring down 
the Empire. Indeed, the palace had long abandoned the idea of equal rights for the 
ethno-religious components of the Empire, together with the vision of a multi-ethnic 
entity and had now embarked on a reform programme different from that of the 
opposition. 
 
A more radical change of tone among the pages of the supplement took place during 
the second half of 1896, a period which coincided with what Rıza referred to as 
―déplorables événements … [referring to] … les récents massacres d‘Arménie.‖143 
In fact, throughout Mechveret, the tone became hostile and accusatory; ―Ils [the 
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massacres] sont le résultat propre du gouvernement du Sultan, qui sème dans son 
empire la division et la discorde et qui est impuissant à en réprimer les terribles 
conséquences.‖144 In this specific article, one can notice the surfacing of a religious 
discourse used against the Sultan, whose policies were starting to be branded as anti-
Islamic. According to the writer, both the Sultan and the ulema had departed from 
the Islamic path, a path that the Mechveret group regarded as important. It is unclear 
whether the Islamic path to which Rıza was referring to is used for propaganda, or 
that, as was suggested earlier, he referred to an Islamo-scientific path within a 
positivist conception of religion. 
 
This ambivalence gets fairly clarified in an article published one month later, on the 
15
th
 of June 1896, titled ―Une nouvelle tactique.‖145  Ahmet Rıza wrote that the 
religious issue was one of private concern, that the Mechveret group did not mix 
religion and politics in its programme, and that the group had respect for all different 
beliefs. What he was attempting, was the preservation of the sensitive balance 
between Islam and religious pluralism, which both the Sultan‘s despotism and the 
West‘s request for selective reform were threatening severely. As many small, 
strategically important opposition groups were emerging, especially in the Balkans 
and among Armenians, this repositioning of the role of religion could have attracted 
these groups towards Rıza‘s camp. Still, any religion, when used moderately and 
rationally, could contribute to good governance. Namely, if the Sultan and those 
around him were moved by the pious and peaceful tenets of the traditional 
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enlightened Islam of which Rıza referred to, those in power would have been on the 
right path to shaping an Ottoman nationalism. 
 
Two weeks later, an editorial in Mechveret put things more boldly. Under the title 
―Soumission ou Déposition,‖146 the article shows how the Mechveret group had by 
then shifted from cooperation with the Sultan or constructive criticism to actually 
envisioning his deposition. The general view was that ―… une pacification durable à 
l‘intérieur de notre pays est impossible avec le régime gouvernemental actuel.‖147 
Twenty years of Abdülhamit‘s rule had created moral and material chaos; a chaos 
that was directly attributed the Sultan himself:  
… le souverain qui viole toutes les lois de son pays et toutes les 
traditions de sa maison, qui a été cause de catastrophes sans précédent, 
qui a alimenté les passions religieuses, énervé l‘armée, détruit la 
marine, ruiné les finances, perdu le quart de l‘Empire, humilié la 
dignité nationale, fomenté les plus terribles représailles, oblitéré les 
sens moral des fonctionnaires, créé partout le chaos et l‘anarchie – un 
tel souverain est un danger public et un usurpateur.
148
 
 
The message shifted swiftly from a call for deposition to more drastic measures: by 
then, the concept, boldly put, was that if the state was in decay, the fault resided with 
its head. The only contention was around whether the revolutionary option would be 
violent or non-violent. As stated in the article ―Révolution & Réformes,‖149  the 
Mechveret group was willing to work for a legal and non-violent revolution, aimed 
at the reinstitution of the Constitution prorogued by the Sultan in 1878. The peaceful 
option could only be viable with the establishment of a parliament that would 
effectively overview the workings of the administration. Whatever the response of 
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the Sultan, by now the Mechveret group had a clear idea: ―Que le Sultan suive les 
conseils qui lui sont donnés par l‘Europe ou qu‘il les néglige, le despotisme a vécu, 
il a fait son temps et l‘ère de liberté ne tardera pas à se lever sur notre malheureuse 
patrie.‖ 150  It is also clear that the Mechveret group had dropped the option of 
peaceful cooperation between Yıldız and the opposition. As Ahmet Rıza wrote in 
1897: ―[l]orsque, il y a cinq ans, nous avons pour la première fois, soumis au Sultan 
notre rapport sur la nécessité des réformes, nous avons usé à son égard de toutes les 
formes de la prière.‖ 151  However, things had not changed and, therefore, the 
approach of the opposition had to evolve.  
 
From the end of 1896 onward, Mechveret featured a series of direct attacks against 
Sultan Abdülhamit II, using both political arguments and religious ones. Politically, 
the Mechveret group viewed the rule of the Sultan as having brought the country to 
the state it found itself in. The claims varied from territorial
152
 (the loss of half of the 
Empire‘ domains and the loss of sovereignty over the Balkan states, Tunisia and to a 
certain extent Egypt) to economic
153
 (a ruined agricultural, industrial and 
commercial system). There were social grievances
154
 (postal and telegraphic 
services had been either shut down or were tightly controlled and most of the more 
capable individuals of the Empire had been exiled or left of their own choice, or 
even killed) and geopolitical complaints
155
 (the Empire had lost its authoritative 
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weight in Europe).
156
 The Mechveret group intelligently deployed religious 
arguments to discredit the Sultan‘s legitimacy among the Muslim community. In the 
article ―Mechveret & Sultan,‖ 157  Rıza reminded the readers that, according to 
Islamic precepts, the Sultan is an individual chosen by his co-religionists to 
safeguard society and ensure its wellbeing. Abdülhamit, however, had put himself 
above law and justice and had shown no respect for both civil and religious 
institutions. 
 
In line with the above, a remarkable piece was written in the following issue of the 
Supplément Français, under the self-explanatory title of ―Le Sultan Illégitime.‖158 It 
consisted of a religiously-based attack on the Sultan, who was illegitimate, a usurper, 
and who, on the basis of this, needed to be replaced according to Islamic rule. What 
followed was that every Muslim was therefore exhorted and called upon to take the 
drastic step of being actively involved in the Sultan‘s deposition, also from a legal 
point of view: 
L‘autorité du Sultan est donc légitime tant qu‘elle procure le bien-être. 
L‘islamisme défend d‘obéir à un chef dont les actes ne sont pas 
conformes aux principes de l‘Islam; il oblige même la nation de 
déposer ou de punir de mort, le souverain qui, par ses crimes et sa 
tyrannie, rend son peuple malheureux.
159
  
 
Thus, Rıza was exhorting people to rise against the Sultan and provided the religious 
legal basis for such an action, by citing how similar situations had been dealt with 
legally, through fetvas, in the past. In order to increase the religious appeal, the 
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writing of Rıza replicated the technique of question and answer format that is a 
feature of fetvas themselves. 
The first instance, which we are told held its emphasis since the election of the first 
of the Rashidun Caliphs Abu-Bakr (Caliph from 632 to 634), reads as follows: 
Demande – Lorsque la présence d‘un chef de croyants au siège du 
Khalifat cesse d‘avoir l‘approbation des Musulmans ou seulement 
d‘une grande partie d‘entre eux, le chef des croyants peut-il continuer 
à se maintenir à son poste contre le gré de ses coreligionnaires? 
 
Réponse – Non, il doit se rendre à leurs désires et abandonner sa 
fonction. 
(On sait qu‘Abou-Beker, après la cérémonie de la soumission monta 
sur l‘estrade en criant: ―S‘il y a une partie mécontent de mon élection, 
je suis prêt à me retirer‖).160 
 
Since this example referred to the distant past, Ahmet Rıza provided another legal 
basis for his argument, dating back to the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. This was an 
attempt to show that these legal decisions were solidly based within Ottoman 
culture, and thus, it would not have been unthinkable to apply the same methods on 
Sultan Abdülhamit himself. 
Demande – Si le commandeur des croyants tient une conduite 
insensée et s‘il n‘a pas les connaissances politiques exigées pour 
gouverner, s‘il fait des dépenses personnelles que l‘Empire ne peut 
supporter, si son maintien sur le trône doit avoir des conséquences 
funestes, faut-il, oui ou non, le déposer? 
 
Réponse – La loi du Chéri dit: Oui. 
Si l‘on compare le règne d‘Abdul Aziz à celui d‘Abdul Hamid, on 
n‘hésiterait pas à reconnaître, que ce dernier a mérité cent fois plus 
que son prédécesseur d‘être frappé par un des fetwas ci-dessus.161 
 
From 1897 onwards, the Mechveret group did not change its attitude and strategy 
towards the Sultan in the relevant articles in Mechveret. Subsequent articles feature 
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ever harsher accusations launched on both political and religious grounds, which 
severely deplored and contested the rule of Abdülhamit II. The above examples are 
written during the period 1895-97, which was a formative one for the Mechveret 
group and for all the groups that made up the Young Turk organisation. Other 
similar articles fill the pages of following issues but they were mostly repetitions or 
do not add new elements to the argument. These repetitive accusations maintained 
that: the Sultan had destroyed the country and brought poverty,
162
 while the 
modernisation of the Empire appeared even more unattainable;
163
 the Sultan was 
illegitimate because politically-speaking he was seen as a despot and religiously-
speaking his rule was un-Islamic.
164
 These ideas were repeated constantly every 
single year, up to 1902, the year in which the Ottoman liberals meet in Paris to 
discuss a common strategy, a programme, and the ethno-religious composition of 
the Young Turk organisation. After 1902, the Mechveret group, as well as the other 
factions comprising the opposition to Sultan Abdülhamit, concentrated less on the 
conceptualisation of an heterogeneous, strong and united Young Turk organisation 
and more on the crystallisation of drastic measures that would lead the way to 
military action and signal the end of ideological politics. 
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Concluding remarks  
In this chapter, I have surveyed the actions and intellectual development of one of 
the most important and influential exponents of the Young Turks and highlighted the 
key features of his philosophical and political thought. Elements of Rıza‘s life and 
action illuminate the potential of exile for some Young Turk groups in opposition. 
First, the role of the Translation Office, Tercüme Odası, in shaping intellectually the 
modernisation of the Ottoman Empire becomes clear. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the office became the channel through which Ottomans could deepen their 
knowledge of Europe through contacts but also become aware of some of the 
misconceptions regarding the West: since part of the training entailed being posted 
abroad, they could witness prima facie the dichotomy between the theory of 
government and philosophical currents and the actual regimes and their actions, 
especially in foreign policy. Secondly, the establishment and activities of Mechveret 
and Mechveret Supplément Français were made possible exclusively through exile; 
at times of harsh controversies with both the Palace and the French government, 
Rıza and his group could benefit from the political and ideological help of liberals 
and positivists in Paris. Exile was also directly responsible for allowing the group‘s, 
and especially Rıza‘s, participation in European intellectual circles and become part 
of a positivist aristocratic elite which would, in the ideas of the Mechveret group, 
take up the role of active agent of reform in the Ottoman Empire. This emerged 
clearly from his tight association with many French journalists and intellectuals who 
take an important stance in defence of Rıza when the latter is threatened with 
expulsion from France. 
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The work of synthesis between positivism and Islam carried out by Rıza proved that 
the Empire could retain its Eastern heritage and Muslim background and fuse this 
with ideas, inspired by the Western experience, of a society organised and 
functioning according to the demands of modernity. In Rıza‘s scheme, religion was 
to be tailored a new role but, nonetheless, an important one from the perspective of 
the individual. In this scheme, positivism was to serve as the vehicle through which 
all this could actually be attained: it was a philosophical approach that did not 
oppose religions, it gave the Ottomans a sense of equality both in the internal 
composition of society as well as on the international scene, and provided a 
framework that encapsulated the greatness of the Muslim civilisation of the past. 
The work of Rıza and of the Mechveret group, therefore, must be seen as 
instrumental and formative for further important developments to come. 
 
Another important aspect of the Mechveret group has to do with the trajectory of 
reforming ideals in the recent history of the Empire. Rıza and other contributors to 
the journal were convinced that the Tanzimat represented the real beginning of the 
Ottoman reform process. Without the period inaugurated with the Hatt-ı Sherif of 
Gülhane in 1839, the activities of the Young Ottomans, of Midhat Pasha, and of 
those behind the establishment of the Constitution in 1876 would not have opened 
up the stage for the Young Turk movement, contrary to what other exponents of the 
Young Turk movement believed.  
 
This chapter also shed light on other ideas specific to the Mechveret group within 
the whole Young Turk movement. Rıza totally rejected the concept of violent 
revolution. This came out of the idea that such a process would strain the already 
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difficult relationship among ethnic and religious groups and would invite Europe to 
interfere and possibly occupy the Empire. Armed revolution was also counter to the 
peaceful attitude of positivism. Tightly connected to this non-violent vision is the 
role that the West would be expected to play in the process of reform. According to 
the Mechveret group, no European government would provide disinterested help to 
the cause of reform, and, consequently, the only constructive support was the 
ideological cooperation of the European liberal civil society. 
 
The idea of moral help becomes central when considering the importance of Rıza‘s 
plan to build a national sentiment based on multi-confessionalism and ethnic 
plurality as the basis of the future Empire. This plan envisaged a particular blend of 
Ottomanism both in contrast with the policies of the West, with the Ottomanism 
envisaged by the Sultan, as well as with the one advocated by other factions within 
the Young Turk organisation – as I shall explain in the next two chapters. The 
pluralism of the Mechveret group is of major importance, as it was taking place 
simultaneously and, in some cases after, the development of nationalist sentiments 
elsewhere that were based on ethnicity and were fostered by Europe. Even if this 
was an approach shared by the various factions, what is unique to the Mechveret 
group is the outmost importance it gives to the indivisibility of the Empire without a 
consideration of other alternatives, such as the federalist option of the group headed 
by Sabahettin. The different exchanges with Armenian exponents and the extracts on 
what the Mechveret refers to as ‗bands‘, makes clear the importance given to a 
unitary plan: whoever would push for reform or achievements that would benefit 
only one ethnic or religious part of Ottoman society could consider himself as an 
enemy of the reform and type of Ottomanism the Mechveret group supported. This 
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stance, apart from being peculiar to the Mechveret group, as I have stressed, also 
brings to the surface the intellectual nature of Rıza‘s plan which lacked, in this realm, 
applicability as a political programme. 
 
There are, however, a number of other dilemmas that emerge from the view that the 
group held of religion and its role in society. The first has to do with the fact that the 
plan of the group seemed to have only a short-term plan, but lacked a long-term 
vision. The immediate need of dealing with the Sultan is not coupled with a social 
organisation of the Empire in its post-Hamidian era, as, for example, Sabahettin did. 
Also, ambiguity emerges from some aspects of the political plan. The Mechveret, as 
we read, was opposed to violent measures, but through the pages of the journal the 
reader finds no mention of what would happen after the deposition of the Sultan, 
especially in relation to who would take his role. Lastly, Rıza does not tell us how 
the elite to which he belongs and in which he was to play a leading role, was 
supposed to practically go about enlightening the masses: no plan on education and 
social reform is devised by the Mechveret group. 
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CHAPTER 4 – PRINCE MEHMET SABAHETTIN AND LA SCIENCE 
SOCIALE 
The following pages analyse the second figure that emerged as decisive in the 
ideological development of the Young Turks in exile during their intellectual phase. 
I will argue that, as was the case with Rıza, Sabahettin equally influenced the 
debates that took place at the beginning of the twentieth century, some of which are 
still relevant in today‘s Turkey. As in the case of Ahmet Rıza, exile in Paris as well 
as the proximity to, and mixing with, the intellectual elite of the time proved to be of 
paramount importance for the cultural and ideological formation of Sabahettin‘s 
thought. Moreover, Sabahettin, like Rıza, exemplifies the figure of Young Turk 
émigré, in terms of his elitism and his self-perception as a cosmopolitan intellectual.  
 
The first issue I will raise regarding Sabahettin‘s ideology is his strong affiliation to 
the West, and especially to England. This was the case for two reasons: first, 
England was considered ready to work in a partnership with the Young Turks in 
bringing about the Empire‘s reform.1 In Sabahettin‘s view, England‘s interest in 
safeguarding the minorities was genuine, since the final goal of the country was to 
help re-instate an Ottoman Empire able to stave off external attacks, especially from 
Russia. Second, Sabahettin, as I will emphasise, was convinced of an Anglo-Saxon 
superiority in the realm of social organisation. In Sabahettin‘s thought, such model 
was the basis for the construction of a functioning and forward-looking system, in 
which minorities would play an influential role. As we shall see in a few pages, 
France had provided Sabahettin with the ideologues and the tools – in this case 
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Edmond Demolins
2
 and social science – to examine human behaviour, but England, 
and the Anglo-Saxon world in general, had applied these intellectual tools to 
become the best organised society as well as having a stable and coherent plan for 
the future. 
 
Among the various writings of Demolins, the book that caught the admiration of 
Sabahettin was his Anglo-Saxon Superiority, to What is it Due? This book provided 
Sabahettin with ideas upon which to build his reform plan. As I will discuss, 
according to this approach, all societies fall within two broad categories: 
individualist and communitarian. What Sabahettin started to work on, as the first 
task that the elite he would constitute had to take up, was to shift the Empire from its 
predicament as a communitarian society to an individualist one. This shift is 
important as it illustrates some more features of Sabahettin‘s plan:  a total reform of 
the educational system and a much more limited role of the state in the lives of 
individuals. These two changes would lead to the emergence of what Sabahettin 
held to be central to the success of the Anglo-Saxons and to his scheme of reform 
for the Ottoman Empire: the creation of a sense of private initiative, especially 
among the younger generation. In turn, this private initiative would contribute to the 
recovery and development of three key areas: industry, agriculture and commerce. 
But how did Sabahettin envisage such a huge shift in many domains of Ottoman 
society? The key lay in the importance given to minorities. In fact, the prince had 
imagined a future Empire organised on a federal system, emphasising the 
importance and richness of locality. A political, administrative and judicial 
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Science sociale and founder of l’École des Roches (1898). 
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decentralisation would render all the approaches to reform viable. How all these 
changes were argued and presented will be the topic of the coming sections of this 
chapter.  
 
Another major feature of Sabahettin‘s ideology was his tight affiliation with and his 
support of the Empire‘s minorities. In this, we encounter a striking difference with 
Rıza‘s approach to reform in general and to the role of non-Muslim communities in 
this process. The predicament of the minorities was a central component of 
Sabahettin‘s plan, which anticipated the constitution of a federal Empire. While for 
Rıza the value of an Ottomanist ideology had to take precedence over and any ethnic 
or religious belonging, for Sabahettin the reality of ethnic and religious 
differentiation, and its legitimation through legal, administrative and political 
measures, would lead the way to the Empire‘s future. As I have highlighted in 
Chapter 2, the role of an enlightened elite was a shared feature among the whole of 
the Young Turk organisation, and Sabahettin and Rıza were no different in that 
sense. But while, as I discussed in the previous chapter, Rıza constituted the middle 
ground between aristocracy and what Halil Ganem referred to as ‗democracy‘,3 
Sabahettin‘s palace court background placed him in a different realm of exclusivity. 
His background represented an obstacle to the constitution of a new elite/aristocracy 
that would act as agent of reform, since he was already in close proximity to the 
current status-quo.  
 
Before turning to an analysis of Sabahettin‘s background, I want to consider the 
following: the success that the prince enjoyed abroad, gathering a large following of 
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Young Turks, was very much connected to his own person. He was surely 
charismatic, but one also needs to consider the specific moment in which he took up 
the public role of an opposition leader. He landed in France, with his father and 
brother, at a particular temporal juncture in the trajectory of the Young Turk 
organisation. It is important to appreciate that the three left the Empire at a time 
when the internal branch of the organisation had been silenced while the external 
one was experiencing a substantial loss of legitimacy.
4
 Sabahettin‘s arrival, in short, 
provided an important boost and reinvigorated the organisation as a whole. As with 
Ahmet Rıza, exile gave Sabahettin the chance to discuss and debate with non-
Ottoman intellectuals, study in depth and evaluate the merits of social science as 
well as liaise with foreign governments. Additionally, and particularly in his case, 
exile gave Sabahettin the space to negotiate his ideas and plans with the 
representatives of Ottoman minorities in exile, who were also investing in the 
possibility of the multi-confessional plan.  
 
As it will emerge from the following sections, Sabahettin‘s ideology and the plan 
that he put forward in the book analysed here, How can Turkey be saved?, had some 
inherent tensions. His political and social ideas clearly recall English conservative 
liberalism, leading to the adoption of a secular approach to the state, in which 
politics and religion would be divided. However, if on the one hand, Sabahettin 
clearly states that the federal option would relegate religious values to the 
community, on the other, he does not make clear his evaluation of Islam and its 
place in the future Empire. Finally, Sabahettin‘s plan also reflects a 
misunderstanding of Ottoman realities. In fact, the adoption of federalism and the 
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upholding of the institutionalisation of ethnic and religious difference, coupled with 
a long term solution, did not match the ideas of the Young Turks inside the Empire, 
who opted for quick and pragmatic solutions. 
 
Introducing Sabahettin 
Mehmet Sabahettin was born in 1879 into a very influential family of Istanbul 
known for its reformist background. His father was Damat Mehmet Celalettin Pasha,
 
son of the late Minister of the Navy, Bahriye Gürcü Halil Rifat Pasha. His mother, 
Seniha Sultan, was the daughter of Sultan Abdülmecid. The significance of 
Sabahettin‘s family background lies in its legacy as innovative and progressive in 
political terms, a legacy that had a great impact on the ideas of the prince himself. 
Sabahettin‘s background shaped his subsequent opposition to the policies of Sultan 
Abdülhamit II, which he viewed as too traditionalist. His maternal grandfather, 
Sultan Abdülmecid, had been a reformer. It was during his reign, in fact, that the 
Tanzimat period was officially inaugurated with the Hatt-ı Sherif of Gülhane on 
November 1839 and then reinforced with the Hatt-ı Hümayun on February 1856. In 
line with the Tanzimat ideals, Sultan Abdülmecid shifted the locus of power from 
the Palace to the Porte, the bureaucratic administration. Sabahettin‘s mother, Seniha 
Sultan, apart from having a wide knowledge of Western culture, ardently followed 
political issues and developments inside and outside the Ottoman Empire.
5
 
 
Sabahettin‘s father, who served at the Sublime Porte and acted briefly as Minister of 
Justice, was appointed to the Ottoman Embassy in Paris, where he came into contact 
with French culture and political thought. In line with the family background and 
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with the spirit of the time, Sabahettin received a modern and eclectic education. 
Another important influence on the development of Sabahettin‘s political and 
philosophical leanings came from one of his personal tutors, Şemseddin Sami Bey, 
who worked at the Translation Office.
6
 According to both Hamit Bozarslan and 
Nezahet Ege,
7
 the prince was greatly influenced by two other private tutors, the 
Swissmen Barchille Bertradot and a M. Charlier. The latter apparently also assisted 
the prince, his brother Lutfullah, and his father Mahmut with their planned escape to 
Paris in 1899.
8
 
 
Initially, Sabahettin‘s father, Mahmut, had been a close confidant and aide to the 
Sultan. When, however, he started criticising some of the Sultan‘s policies and 
exhorted him to do more, especially in the realm of civil liberties,
9
 he fell out of the 
royal grace. As the policies of the Palace began to resemble those of a despot, and 
because of the family‘s conviction that liberal reform was the only method to 
modernise and revitalise the Ottoman Empire, Sabahettin, Lutfullah and Damat 
Mahmut decided to go into self-imposed exile in France. They hoped that, by 
joining forces with the exponents of the CUP abroad, a united, powerful and 
ethnically and religiously varied opposition could pressure Abdülhamit to either 
abandon his policies or step down and be substituted by a more enlightened ruler. As 
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7
 Hamit Bozarslan, Le Prince Sabahaddin (unpublished paper); Ege, Prens Sabahaddin. 
8
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9
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we saw in Chapter 2, the majority of the Young Turk movement believed this ruler 
to be the former Sultan, Murat V.
10
  
 
It seems that it was Sabahettin who convinced his father and brother to leave the 
Empire. Sabahettin announced to his father and brother: 
We must carry our fight into the open, my father. We must join those 
Ottomans who in France, in Switzerland, in Belgium are trying to help our 
people realize the possibility of rising and demanding a better government. 
My uncle maintains that these men abroad are adventurers, vilifying his 
beneficent rule in order to induce him to buy them off. When the people of 
Turkey hear that the Sultan‘s brother-in-law and the Sultan‘s sister‘s two 
sons are joining these men, they will give less credence to this calumny. 
Therefore, my father, since whatever usefulness you had in this country 
you have no longer, we must leave.
11
 
 
Once Sabahettin had convinced them, the next step was to organise their flight. The 
three had to sell their assets in order to afford traveling costs and life in Europe; sure 
enough, this needed to be done discreetly so as not to arouse the suspicion of the 
Sultan and his circle. They approached an English Jew – one of the family‘s 
business advisors – to act as their middle-man. As Sabahettin reminisced some 
twenty years later, he ―… advised us to make over our property to a friend of his 
who would sell it, deposit the money in a foreign bank in his own name and, when 
we reached Paris, transfer the money to us.‖12 At first, Sabahettin trusted this middle 
man until the latter started asking repeatedly for large sums of money, supposedly to 
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arrange their journey. These continuous requests aroused the prince‘s suspicion; he 
approached a Swiss of his own household, probably the Monsieur Charlier 
mentioned earlier, who was also Sabahettin and Lutfullah‘s tutor, asking him to 
discover and expose the motivations of this suspicious individual. The prince‘s fear 
was vindicated, as the English Jew was discovered to be a spy of Abdülhamit. In 
order not to raise suspicion of a change of plans, and also because the prince was 
―… enjoying the pitting of … [his] wits against those of the spy,‖13 Sabahettin did 
not cut off ties with the English Jew but, at the same time, entrusted his Swiss tutor 
to organise his departure for the day before the one organised by the spy. On the 
newly scheduled day, the three men boarded another steamer disguised as stokers 
and pretended to work on it until the boat passed the Dardanelles. The steamship 
was the French boat Géorgie, bound for Marseille; they boarded on it either the 14
th
 
or 16
th
 December 1899
14
 during the night, after having left a letter to Seniha 
Sultan.
15
 Having heard about Damat Mahmut‘s flight, and wrongly suspecting the 
three were on another boat, the Congo, Abdülhamit‘s forces stopped and searched 
the latter from 3 a.m. to 7 p.m. leaving the Géorgie to pass undisturbed.
16
 
Abdülhamit initiated a search for them all over the Empire: a regiment was sent to 
Adrianople to inspect the trains bound for Europe; a plea was sent to the prince of 
Bulgaria asking that everyone passing through his domains be searched; and all 
boats leaving for Europe were thoroughly combed. Moreover, all Ottoman 
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embassies in Europe were instructed to inform their host governments that the son-
in-law of the Sultan had left the Empire after having abducted his two sons and 
killed a servant of the harem. Both were fabricated accusations aimed at harming 
Mahmut‘s credentials and would make it easier for Istanbul to obtain his extradition 
back to the Empire. Demetra Vaka gives us a similar but more detailed account of 
how the news of the flight was received in Istanbul.
17
 Apart from the murder of the 
harem servant, described as a ―young and handsome slave girl,‖18 and the abduction 
of Sabahettin and Lutfullah, Damat Mahmut had, according to this false news, stolen 
his wife‘s jewellery. The dispatch sent from Istanbul to all the embassies and 
representatives of the Ottoman Empire abroad read as follows: 
Mahmud Pasha, who of late has shown signs of insanity, has left 
Turkey without authorisation, kidnapping the two minor sons of Her 
Highness Seniheh Sultan, his wife. Since, according to our laws, sons 
of the imperial household are under immediate and absolute direction 
of our august master and since, moreover, Her Highness, the Princess, 
[is] insisting upon regaining her minor sons, I beg you to take 
whatever measures you consider efficacious and to search for them 
minutely. In case Mahmud Pasha should be in the country to which 
you are accredited, immediately call upon the authorities and demand 
that the insane man, as well as the two children he has stolen, be 
extradited and returned to Constantinople under surveillance. By 
imperial order you are to telegraph the result of your efforts at once.
19
 
 
The propaganda against Mahmut did not stop there. The Porte issued a report 
probably to pit the French government against the three, according to which, 
Mahmut was planning to ―sell his services‖ to Great Britain. 20  Another rumour 
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aiming at delegitimising the three within the Empire was that they had converted to 
Christianity.
21
 Once their ship reached Marseilles, the Ottoman Consul General 
boarded it and found Damat Mahmut, Sabahettin and Lutfullah waiting for him. The 
Consul General pleaded with the French police officers not to let the three 
disembark. However, the French authorities questioned the fugitives and established 
that the father had no mental illness, that the two sons had left the Empire on their 
own will, and officially welcomed them on French soil. 
This must have happened between the 19
th
 and 20
th
 of December; their arrival was 
reported by Le Figaro of 20
th
 December as the following extract shows: 
Le paquebot Géorgie de la Compagnie Paquet … est arrivé ce soir  
[depending on whether the article was written the day the paper came 
out or the night before] à Marseille, .., ayant à son bord Mahmoud-
pacha,… et ses deux fils Sabaheddin, âge de vingt-trois ans, et Lout 
Falah [Lutfullah], âge de … [vingt22]-deux ans.23 
 
As soon as they landed on French soil, they moved to Paris; on the 22
nd
 of 
December, according to French police records, they occupied a room at the Grand 
Hotel on boulevard des Capucines.
24
 In Paris, they immediately met with Ahmet 
Rıza, who welcomed them and enlisted them in the organisation of the external CUP. 
On the 25
th
 of December, Mechveret published a letter by Mahmut Pasha addressed 
to Ahmet Rıza. The letter strongly praised the work carried out by the latter and 
anticipated the beginning of fruitful cooperation.
 25
 In the same issue of Mechveret, 
Rıza replied praising Mahmut‘s decision to move to France with his two sons. 
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Describing Mahmut Pasha, ―… un des plus éminent personnages de mon pays,‖26 
Rıza expressed the conviction that these new exiled activists would serve as symbols, 
both within and ouside the exile, of the passions that underpinned an opposition to 
the current regime: ―[d]es plus bas échelons de la société jusqu‘aux rangs les plus 
élevés, tout le monde le [Abdülhamit II] déteste et le flétrit.‖27 
 
A month later, Mechveret featured an open letter from Damat Mahmut to Sultan 
Abdülhamit II.
 28
 The same letter appeared in L’Aurore of the 25th of December 
1899, in L’Eclair on the 21st of January 1900, in Le Libre Parole (claiming the letter 
was sent by a Comité Révolutionnaire Turc) on the 3
rd
 of February.
29 
In the letter, 
Damat Mahmut explains their reasons for leaving the Empire: 
… certain que je ne saurais plus vous faire entendre la vérité tant que 
je serais à Constantinople, j‘ai pensé: puisque le Sultan est incapable 
et se refuse à écouter et à comprendre, il faut que j‘éclaire la nation, 
que je lui expose les dangers de régime actuel et la nécessité de le 
transformer. C‘est afin de remplir ce devoir et de dégager ma 
conscience de toute responsabilité que je suis venu en Europe. Je suis 
Musulman et Turc; je désire servir ma patrie sans distinction de race 
et de religion: mes deux fils ont les mêmes intentions; ils sont venus 
ici uniquement pour m‘aider à remplir ce devoir sacré.30 
 
The echoing of such a clear discourse of dissent in both the Ottoman and European 
press demonstrates how important their addition to the Young Turk movement in 
exile proved to be. Once in Paris, the three started engaging in anti-Abdülhamit and 
pro-Young Turk propaganda and recruited new members into the organisation. 
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Initially, Mahmut, Sabahettin and Lutfullah were active in raising funds in and 
outside France: they met with M. Kaiserlian, director of the French company 
L’Union, in order to receive a loan of 629,000 francs, they were turned down on a 
loan of 300,000 francs, and, between March 1900 and April 1901, went on 
numerous trips to Geneva and London with the same intent.
31
 London was, for 
example, the address of a letter in which Damat Mahmut promised to give back a 
substantial amount if granted a loan of 12,000 pounds.
32
 Funding expeditions were 
also conducted in Cairo, Corfu, and Brussels.  
 
Travelling and networking across Europe gave the three mean visibility and boosted 
their position both within the organisation and among influential European groups 
and governments. It also attracted the attention of the press, especially in France, 
England and Switzerland. Sabahettin was starting to emerge as the rising leader of 
the opposition, attracting substantial attention. Knowledge of governmental circles, 
coupled with their influential background, enabled Sabahettin and his father 
Mahmut to address several pleas for the reformists‘ cause to the French Prime 
Minister and President of the Republic, to the Russian and German Emperors and to 
the King of Belgium. As far as the press is concerned, we know that in Paris they 
were repeatedly visited by M. Guillard and M. Vaughan, editor and director of the 
newspaper L’Aurore respectively, M. Nadaud of La Paix, and a M. Verlez editor of 
a financial paper. They were close to Countess Mathilda Colonna de Cesari, director 
of La Revue d’Europe.33 At the same time, French newspapers constantly featured 
                                                          
31
 ―Rapports divers sur le sujets ottomans pendant la guerre de 1914, Mahmoud Pacha (beau-frère du 
sultan de Constantinople),‖ Préfecture de Police de Paris – BA1.169. 
32
 Hanioğlu, Young Turks in Opposition, 143. 
33
 ―Rapports divers sur le sujets ottomans pendant la guerre de 1914, Mahmoud Pacha (beau-frère du 
sultan de Constantinople),‖ Préfecture de Police de Paris – BA1.169. 
171 
 
articles on and interviews with Damat Mahmut Pasha, Sabahettin and Lutfullah. 
Pierre Quillard, the famous French poet, publicist and historian interviewed Mahmut 
for the newspaper L’Aurore;34 similar interviews were featured in Le Matin,35 and 
Le Libre Parole.
36
   
 
Because of their background as part of the Sultan‘s entourage, Sabahettin, his 
brother and Damat Mahmut were convinced that their move into exile was going to 
have a heavily symbolic impact. They thought that their arrival would considerably 
boost the morale of the Young Turk and other opposition organisations. They could 
not have been more right. In the words of Ahmet Rıza, 
Notre parti se sent déjà trop heureux de voir un membre, le plus en 
vue, de la famille impériale lui tender sa main puissante pour travailler 
avec lui à la délivrance de la patrie. Ce qui fait le plus de plaisir à mes 
compagnons de lutte et à moi, c‘est que ce témoignage de sympathie 
vient d‘une personne instruite, d‘un ancien ministre aux idées larges et 
libérales … Si un personnage aussi haut placé que le beau frère du 
monarque ne se trouve plus en sécurité dans son pays, quel est donc le 
sort réservé aux simple citoyens?
37
 
 
Their flight showed the European public opinion and governments that the 
opposition to the Sultan was not composed of individuals of inferior social status 
who simply vied for stronger economic and political gains. Their predicament 
reflected badly on the Sultan, who had lost part of his own family to the opposition; 
the particular danger of this ‗apostasy‘ was that these men possessed inside 
knowledge of the Sultan‘s weaknesses and fears. It was for this reason that the three 
men were constantly visited by the Ottoman Ambassador to France, Münir Bey. He 
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offered them, on behalf of the Sultan, every kind of pardon in order to bring them 
back to Istanbul; but the offer was rejected every single time. According to Hanioğlu, 
at some point they were even offered the sum of 50,000 Turkish lira had they agreed 
to move back.
38
 As Joseph Denais reports, offers were made, together with threats, 
almost everywhere the three went: 
Pour le faire fléchir, tout fut employé; tout échoua. Plus de vingt 
émissaires que je pourrais nommer – des officiers, des ministres, des 
ambassadeurs étrangers, le Khédive lui-même – lui [Damat Mahmut] 
furent envoyés à lui et à son fils, le prince Sabaheddine, la bouche 
pleine de promesses ou de menaces, en France, en Suisse, en Égypte, 
à Corfou, en Belgique …39 
 
Bribery was widespread among the Ottoman embassies and the three had been 
warned by Ahmet Rıza himself: 
Place entre un passé noble et honnête, et un nom illustre à se créer 
dans l‘avenir, Mahmoud pacha voudra certainement rester fidèle à la 
tâche qu‘il vient de s‘imposer; il ne se laissera pas tromper par les 
promesses fallacieuses d‘Abdul-Hamid, il ne rentrera pas en Turquie 
avant d‘avoir obtenu quelques réformes sérieuses et palpables au 
profit d‘un peuple qui a tant de respect et d‘estime pour lui.40 
 
At the same time, the three repeatedly complained to the French authorities that they 
were being followed. They were right, as there is ample evidence that they were 
being followed by the French police, presumably due to pressure placed on the 
police force by the Ottoman government. From the archives of the French police, it 
is possible to understand how the Ministère de L‘Intérieur et des Cultes (the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and Religion), the Direction de la Sûreté Générale 
(Directorate of General Security) and the Paris Préfet de Police (Police Prefect) were 
keeping each other updated on the movements of the three: documents from the 
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Préfecture‘s archives contain large numbers of small handwritten notes where every 
single movement was noted down by officers stationed outside the hotel and who 
followed them around. Sabahettin and Damat Mahmut also complained they were 
being followed by Ottoman spies.
41
 Sabahettin sent a letter to the Président du 
Conseil, the French Prime Minister – Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau, deploring the 
visible presence of Ottoman spies. An extract of the letter reads: 
Vous n‘ignorez pas Monsieur le Président du Conseil que par un abus 
inconcevable, qui a été justement dénoncé à la tribune de la Chambre 
des députés, par la droite come par la gauche, l‘espionnage du Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II aurait organisé à Paris, une police pour traquer 
comme des criminels des Ottomans coupables de vouloir, pour leur 
patrie, des réformes que l‘Europe entière a souvent projeté d‘imposer 
au gouvernement actuel. 
Si nous ne nous trompons, Monsieur le Président du Conseil, vous 
avez solennellement promis que le scandale dénoncé ne se 
reproduirait plus. Vous ignorez donc, certainement, que, sans tenir 
aucun compte de votre déclaration à la tribune et, au mépris des 
manifestations unanimes de l‘opinion, l‘espionnage du Sultan s‘est 
réorganisé en France, à Paris, comme naguère; son audace semblerait, 
si c‘était possible, avoir encore grandi. Et pas plus tard qu‘hier, deux 
agents de l‘ambassadeur du Sultan sont venus faire subir à notre 
concierge un interrogateur minutieux sur nos personnes, les visites 
que nous recevons, etc.
42
 
 
Soon, Sabahettin emerged as the central figure of this family. Damat Mahmut fell ill 
at various points and was thus unable to be as active as he had been when he first 
fled the Empire. He died on the 18
th
 of January 1903, aged 48. Lutfullah appeared 
not to have a true penchant for politics. Hanioğlu cites a document in which an 
observer wrote that ―Prince Lûtfullah, …, likes to make merry and is always short of 
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money… .‖43 According to a brochure written by one of the confidants and friends 
of Sabahettin, Joseph Denais, Lutfullah was back in Istanbul by 1906. Sabahettin, on 
the other hand, decided to carry on what his father had started and followed to the 
letter what his father had repeatedly stated when invited to return to his country: ―Je 
ne veux rien, ni pour mes fils, ni pour moi. Je veux que le Sultan gouverne 
honnêtement. ... Qu‘il change, qu‘il donne à son peuple les garanties que celui-ci est 
en droit d‘attendre et nous ne mettrons pas d‘autres conditions à notre retour.‖44 
Therefore, while studying physics at the medical faculty of the Sorbonne, Sabahettin 
became engaged in Western philosophical and political thought and established 
himself as a pivotal figure in the development of the Young Turk movement. His 
activism culminated with him representing one of the two major currents within the 
opposition at the Paris Conference of Ottoman Liberals in 1902.
 45
 At the time, he 
was regarded by many as the true leader of the movement; in fact, his group became 
the largest of the various factions and even more popular than the Mechveret one; so 
much so that it was referred to as the ‗majority‘ at the Congress of Ottoman Liberals 
of 1902.
46
 Due to his studies in a European Institution, Sabahettin became 
influenced by the École de science sociale, and the philosophy of Frédéric Le Play,
47
 
Henri De Tourville
48
 and, above all, Edmond Demolins.
49
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Sabahettin distanced himself theoretically from the currents of positivism and 
Darwinism that influenced so many Young Turk exponents, and came to consider 
the ‗individual‘ as the decisive component of social life. This stance was so peculiar 
for an ideologue of an activist group in exile that Bozarslan attributed to the prince 
the paradoxical label of a ―révolutionnaire de droite.‖50 The turning point in his life 
came with an unexpected event which would mark his future intellectual and 
political existence forever:
51
 his physical encounter with Edmond Demolins, an 
encounter that pushed him towards the École de science sociale. According to those 
who met Sabahettin personally,
52
 his first-hand contact with such French institutions 
was to be of paramount importance in directing him towards the ideas of Demolins.  
 
Demolins inspired him to think that it was social instead of political, and long- 
rather than short-term reform that was pivotal for the Ottoman Empire‘s future. In 
Sabahettin‘s view, all those political reforms that had been carried out in previous 
periods, from the Tanzimat to the promulgation of the Constitution, could not have 
changed the fate of the Empire as they were cosmetic and temporary. In brief, 
political change could only work if applied to a reformed societal organisation. It is 
at this juncture that a first appreciation of the dilemmas in Sabahettin‘s plan starts 
emerging clearly. His approach was too long-term and could not be translated into 
action, especially because it did not envisage a clear policy of how to rid the Empire 
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of Abdülhamit. In this, Sabahettin‘s formulations manifest themselves as the stance 
of an intellectual rather than those of a political activist.  
 
During the nine years he spent in voluntary exile, Sabahettin‘s efforts concentrated 
on creating a nucleus of resistance to the rule of Abdülhamit. He attempted to unite 
Muslims, Christians and Jews into a multi-ethnic and multi-religious elite that would 
represent and jointly guide the Empire; and gaining the ‗help‘ of what in his writings 
he refers to as the ―civilised world.‖53 This last point, as we shall see in Chapter 5, 
fuelled the debate that ultimately led to the rupture within the CUP and the failure of 
the 1902 Congress of Ottoman Liberals. 
 
Sabahettin’s philosophical and political ideological roots: Edmond Demolins 
In this section, I explain how Sabahettin constructed his theoretical plan by looking 
at which currents of thought he adhered to, and in particular, which specific 
individual he followed and why.  
 
In general, it was the whole field of social science, as it had recently emerged, that 
caught Sabahettin‘s interest. Especially stimulating was the evolutionary theory, 
which placed the history of the Ottoman Empire on a linear scale from decline to 
development. At the same time, evolutionary theory could not be fully embraced as 
it relegated the Turks to a lower place in the developmental scale. This last 
consideration explains, for instance, the interest and joy aroused among the Young 
Turks by Japan‘s victory over Russia and the subsequent peace treaty in 1905. 
Young Turks and other reformers alike saw in Japan an example of a late 
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moderniser that had managed to defeat not only a superpower, but also the 
superpower that had been the nightmare of the Ottomans. Japan had reformed, in the 
eyes of many Ottomans, precisely by synthesising Western technological 
advancement with traditional aspects, creating a hope for the Empire, to become the 
―Japan of the Near East.‖54 
 
In a similar vein, Sabahettin needed to find a source of inspiration that explained the 
reform in terms of inevitable transformation in the social sphere, rather than as a 
reductive hierarchical scale based on race. As mentioned before, among the various 
thinkers the prince admired was the French philosopher, sociologist, and director of 
the review La Science sociale, Edmond Demolins. The book that greatly inspired 
Sabahettin was Demolins‘ A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons. Sabahettin‘s 
almost magical encounter with the text and its repercussion on the prince‘s thought 
has been described by Bozarslan in the following manner: ―‗[u]n jour j'ai lu un livre, 
et ma vie a changé‘. Cette toute première phrase du roman La vie nouvelle d'Orhan 
Pamuk résume parfaitement la trajectoire du Prince Sabahaddin … A quoi tient la 
supériorité des Anglo-Saxons de Demolins changea en effet son itinéraire 
intellectuelle, ou mieux, lui en offrit un.‖55 From the words of Sabahettin himself, as 
quoted by Ege, the degree of interest and admiration that the figure of Demolins and 
his writings spurred in the prince was undeniable and his accidental encounter with 
the French writer was overwhelming: 
One day, both materially and mentally exhausted, sadly wandering 
through a famous street in Paris, Edmond Demolins‘ renowned work ... 
                                                          
54
 Renée Worringer, ―‗Sick Man of Europe‘ or ‗Japan of the Near East‘?: Constructing Ottoman 
Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras,‖ International Journal of Middle East Studies 36, 
no. 2 (May 2004), 213.  
55
 Bozarslan, Le Prince Sabahaddin, 3. 
178 
 
caught my eye in a shop window. I immediately went in and acquired 
the book. That night, I tackled the book and read it from beginning to 
end. Until that time, I had never come across answers in any other 
sociological publication like that of the author to what are the reasons 
for the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons. ... The next day I went to the 
same bookshop and purchased all of Edmond Demolins works. ... At 
this time, I was honoured with the great thinker‘s friendship [and had] 
adhered to the organisation of La Science Sociale and further became 
honoured by the opportunity to befriend other honourable members of 
the organisation and work with them. I read the works of the founders 
[of the school], Frédéric Le Play, Henri De Tourville and all works by 
the thinkers that became a part of that trend with such eternal passion 
and gratitude. I thought that with these methods an analysis of the 
social structure of the Ottoman Empire could be possible and that the 
opportunity to prepare a necessary reform program had made itself 
available.
56
 
 
The above quotation contains a number of interesting ideas. In a few lines, apart 
from an explanation that social science seemed to Sabahettin to be the most effective 
method of analysis, we are told how important it was for him, as much as for all 
other Young Turk émigrés, to be part of an intellectual elite that would overcome 
ethnic, religious, and political borders. In terms of content, what Sabahettin found in 
Science sociale was that, because of its particular method of analysis, it ―is the only 
[form of science] that has shown success in finding solutions for social issues.‖57 
Here, we start understanding that Science sociale had convinced Sabahettin that any 
type of political reform was dependent on drastic social change. 
 
Because Sabahettin‘s work was so heavily influenced by Demolins, it would not be 
possible to understand the prince‘s agenda without a brief survey of the ideas of 
Demolins as he expressed them in his book A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-
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Saxons.
58
 First appearing in 1897, the book was written after Demolins‘s trip 
throughout England. The writer was invited to visit various schools and assess the 
syllabi employed there. Throughout his journey, he was able to discuss with 
university professors and schoolteachers, sociologists, and people of various 
professions the various aspects of the Anglo-Saxon social system, and then to 
compare his findings to the French reality. Demolins studied the Anglo-Saxon socio-
cultural system through the qualitative method of observation in order to shed light 
on what he thought was the political and economic superiority of the Anglo-Saxon 
system over the French one. The emphasis on personal initiative that the Anglo-
Saxons developed since their first years of schooling accounted, in his view, for 
their eventual political and economic successes. Therefore, Demolins stressed both 
the importance of private initiative in already-formed individuals and, at the same 
time, highlighted the necessity to structure the education system around the principle 
of fostering this attitude within the forthcoming generations. Coming before the 
school, however, was another structure with a pivotal role in shaping the individual: 
the family. Similarly to that which he observed and admired of the Anglo-Saxon 
education system, Demolins appreciated the Anglo-Saxon family environment, 
where, contrary to the French habit, children were pushed to rely on their own 
capacity and impulse instead of relying on the family for the provision of sustenance 
and work opportunity.  
 
According to Demolins, societies and their different manifestations can be divided in 
three types. Every type depends on the role of the family in the rearing of children, 
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and of the role of the state as provider of employment and of the framework for 
more individualist development: 
1. Societies of a communistic
59
 family formation are characterised by 
the grouping of several couples into one household … the children do 
not rely on themselves for their establishment, but on the family 
community …  
2. In societies of a communistic state formation, the large public 
community takes the place of the dissolved family community; here, 
the young people rely principally on the State for their establishment 
in life, through the many appointments that the State distributes in the 
army or the different civil services … 
3. … [in] societies of an individualistic formation60 … the individual 
relies for his establishment neither on the family nor on the state, 
which disposes few appointments, because public powers are not 
much centralised and do not employ a very large number of officials. 
Here, the individual relies principally on his own energy and resources 
to succeed in an independent career.
61
  
 
Based on the above, the French and Anglo-Saxon social realities stood on two 
antipodes. Demolins viewed France as a society of communitarian formation, ―… 
characterized by a tendency to rely, not on the self, but on the community, on the 
group, family, tribe, clan, public powers, etc.‖62 Instead, according to him, ―societies 
of an individualistic formation [of which England was one of the best expressions] 
are characterised by a tendency to rely, not on the community, not on the group, but 
on the self. Amongst them, the private man (le ‗partuculier‘) triumphs over the 
public man …‖63 
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The nature of society is then mostly reflected in, or born out of, the education 
system, which prepares the new generations to lead their respective countries into 
the future. According to Demolins, the English education system continuously 
adapts to new realities and challenges, and, because it prepares individuals for 
practical work, it possesses ―… a really social character.‖64 Parallel to the more 
conventional didactical and theoretical teachings, schools in England emphasised 
practical and physical work that prepared pupils for life outside schools. This latter 
aspect would help them develop their interests in business according to an 
entrepreneurial mind-set and strengthen their capacity to adapt to the challenges of 
life. The end result would be a general sense of fulfilment for the individual, who, 
by producing for himself, would in turn contribute to the improvement and growth 
of his or her country. In this way, Demolins explained England‘s overwhelming 
commercial power. In France, on the contrary, Demolins thought that the system 
formed men for a society that was stagnant: ―… the actual necessity is that men 
should be adapted to the new conditions of the world – which call on individuals to 
take care of their own welfare. The old social framework, on which men formerly 
depended, is either broken or insufficient.‖ 65  Additionally, because the French 
system was still based on old requirements and necessities and did not adapt to the 
more modern challenges, it had fallen behind the Anglo-Saxon one. 
 
However, as mentioned, the school was not the only place where the new 
generations were moulded. The family constituted a pivotal training ground for adult 
life and had to be seen as the first foundational step before modern schooling. 
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According to Demolins, in this field too the difference between the two countries 
was striking. In individualist societies, the family is centred on parental bonds that 
are geared towards the development of an independent individual, as children‘s 
emancipation is the major task of parents. This way, children are made aware that 
their parents will not be responsible for their situation in life, and they will also have 
to develop their own entrepreneurial spirit and initiative. On the other hand, in 
societies of communitarian formation, the family tends to create the reality that the 
schools replicate and, more generally, of the education system. The new generations 
feel secure that the state will employ them as civil servants (a profession that 
occupies most of the working force in communitarian societies), suffocating, in this 
way, any prospect for the emergence of private initiative. The children are made to 
enjoy the fruits of their parents‘ achievements and are reassured that the family or 
tribe nucleus will be an asset for the future. Relying on these expectations, no appeal 
for private endeavours is likely to emerge. This tendency will lead towards 
decadence, according to Demolins, because it pushes the individual to abandon 
independent enterprise such as agriculture, industry, and commerce. This type of 
family attitude will also result in a passive generation, more geared towards 
accepting its status, especially at the national level, rather than actively seeking 
avenues to progress. 
 
After family and school, it is around the three sectors of agriculture, industry and 
commerce that the Anglo-Saxon, as an individualist society, has built its superiority 
vis-à-vis the communitarian counterpart. It is precisely around these three sectors 
that societies must focus on their attention in order to adapt and benefit from new 
realities.  
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Demolins provides, in a nutshell, his point of view on the nature of the two systems, 
communitarian and individualist, and their application on the ground: 
[a]nd if one single example can give an idea, … of the difference 
between men formed by the new methods and men formed by the 
old …, look at what they have made of Northern America, and then 
look at what the other race has made of Southern America … On the 
one side, a forward motion of Society, and the greatest known 
development of agriculture, commerce and industry; on the other, 
Society thrown backwards, and plunged to grovel in a morass of idle, 
unproductive town life, and given up to officialism and political 
revolutions. In the North, we have the rising of the future; in the South, 
the crumbling and decaying past.
66
 
 
All this must have sounded very familiar to Sabahettin, who was impressed by 
Demolins‘ explanation of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon system above the 
French, and found that a communitarian society fitted perfectly with the reality of 
the Ottoman Empire. As the pillars of Demolins ideal society were family, education 
and private initiative, these became not only the basis of Sabahettin‘s thought but, to 
some extent, also his obsession. What, Sabahettin found specifically instructive in 
explaining the state of the Empire as a society of communitarian formation can be 
summed up in two main aspects that characterised the last forty years of the Empire. 
One aspect was the exponential expansion of the bureaucracy that had hampered the 
entry of the younger generations into fields such as commerce, industry and 
agriculture, which needed development if the Empire wanted to prosper. The second 
factor was the promise of a state that would absorb the entire workforce that had 
rendered the population passive and reluctant to ask for changes, fearing they would 
upset a status-quo that safeguarded their economic well-being and that of their 
offspring. 
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How can Turkey be saved? 
Sabahettin decided to group together his ideas and plan of action by writing his own 
book, on the blueprint of Demolins‘ A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons. 
This work is significant, as it articulates Sabahettin‘s vision of reform during his 
more openly activist years along the side of Rıza and the other Young Turk émigrés. 
The positions formulated in this work seem in agreement with his views when he 
debated with other factions of the opposition about a course of action. In these later 
years, his intellectual aim remains what it was, namely, to provide an intellectual 
guide for saving the Empire from backwardness and dismemberment and project it 
into a flourishing future. Here, it is important to appreciate both the level of elitism 
typical of Young Turk émigrés and the almost messianic mission Sabahettin 
appeared to assume. The book was to serve as a set of guidelines for statesmen and 
the larger public who, by reading the text, would enjoy the same metaphysical 
inspiration that the prince had undergone in the streets of Paris. The work, entitled 
How can Turkey be saved?, was published in Istanbul in 1913.
67
 
 
Because the book appeared after the 1908 revolution, which brought about the rule 
of the CUP, the reader has to bear in mind that much of the criticism found 
throughout its pages refers to both the rule of Sultan Abdülhamit and that of the 
CUP. The book, in fact, covers the communitarian nature of Ottoman society, not 
the period of a specific rule. However, the book How can Turkey be saved? is an 
extremely valuable source in understanding what Sabahettin identified as the 
problems of the Empire under the rule of Abdülhamit for two reasons. First, it is 
clear when Sabahettin is referring to the despotism of Sultan Abdülhamit II and not 
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to the CUP. At the same time, the author specifies at various points that the nature of 
the state, the problems and dynamics involved and the intentions of those in power 
did not change substantially from the pre- to post-1908 environment. In Sabahettin‘s 
view, the social structure, the underlying philosophical ideals and the policies 
remained very much untouched between the two periods, as did the authoritarian 
rule of both the Sultan and the CUP. 
 
So, how did Sabahettin envisage reform in practical terms and how realistic was this 
project as part of a regime-changing initiative? As I explained earlier, the final aim 
of Mehmet Sabahettin was to switch from a communitarian to an individualist 
society in the Ottoman Empire. The prerequisites for such a switch, where the 
following: 
In the creation and regulation of this movement a few important 
principles [need] to [be] take[n] into consideration: 1. By being 
inspired by Science Sociale‘s investigation on individualist education, 
the English public schools and educational circumstances of new 
schools, set up separate educational institutions for girls and boys, and 
from those [new] schools bring educator families that are masters of 
their work; 2. In order to create an individualist character in our youth, 
[they] should benefit from an Anglo-Saxon education environment; 3. 
Young people brought up in this way need to be provided with 
conditions that allow them to settle in the land with rigour and to be 
made to obtain their independence through their own labour.
68
  
 
The last paragraph of the book is an exhortation to change drastically the Ottoman 
mindset and build the future through new pedagogical approaches:  
The issue of the continuity of our entity, for which we have not been 
able to achieve a solution through military and political roads for 
centuries, and that nowadays we face as a tragedy which it seems will 
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end with a definite collapse, will be solved [through Sabahettin‘s 
social plan] for the benefit of our people and humanity.
69
 
 
It is with the above considerations in mind that the book How can Turkey be saved? 
has to be analysed. Sabahettin‘s aim was to communicate his experiences and 
convictions, gathered after long months of retreat and study, both to the governing 
elite and the intellectuals of the Empire. This, however, seems to be simultaneously 
the strength of Sabahettin, as well as the greatest shortcoming of his political vision. 
It seems unlikely that a book on philosophy and sociology could have reached out to 
the members of the Young Turk organisation after 1908, bent on acquiring as much 
power as possible in their own hands, let alone to the masses. It appears that 
Sabahettin, probably due to his background, his exclusive education, and his role in 
the organisation of the Young Turks of Europe, could not understand how to bridge 
the intellectual and organisational gap that divided him from most of the realities of 
the Empire. Sabahettin was not able to provide a short-term plan but only a set of 
changes of a long-term character. However, the problem of representation extends to 
the whole Young Turk opposition especially during its intellectual phase (1895 to 
1902). As discussed at length in other sections of this dissertation, the elitist nature 
of the intellectuals who led the movement was undoubtedly a source of ideological 
eclecticism and richness, but equally one of the most fundamental reasons for the 
failure of the project. 
 
Mehmet Sabahettin shared not only the conclusions drawn by Demolins in his book, 
but also the method through which these considerations had been reached. What 
Sabahettin found both most fascinating and useful was the attempt to analyse a 
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specific society from a new perspective, that of comparative sociology. In fact, the 
book‘s early section emphasises the fact that economics, law and ethics alone cannot 
be used to understand the social realities of a given country, as it had been done until 
the emergence of the Science sociale, concieved by Frédéric Le Play, Henri de 
Tourville, and Edmond Demolins. These disciplinary fields, according to the prince, 
could not wholly explain society precisely because they were directly the results of a 
given social structure. Science sociale, instead, deals directly with social issues, 
upholds observation as its primary tool, and merges the features of what today 
would be called the fields of social science, with a positivistic approach: 
―[t]hrough the agent of this great and increasingly maturing social 
union, humanity, within private and public life, can only command 
itself and in this way shall completely collect other sciences into its 
central scientific environment, and will reach the most necessary and 
the most valuable support base.‖70 
 
As we have seen, the family and the creation of an entrepreneurial mind are 
extremely important for Demolins and for Sabahettin. For the latter, these need to be 
coupled with decentralisation, and private initiative, which become the prerequisite 
for any other consequent change. 
 
On the question of backwardness  
Sabahettin maintained that the Hamidian regime perpetrated all the aspects of a 
communitarian society in which despotism, nepotism, favouritism and a lack of 
dynamism were central features. The conviction that only social change, both in the 
public and private sphere, could ensure the regeneration of the Empire and its 
elevation to a status parallel to that of England, left Sabahettin deploring most 
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attempts at reform carried out in previous years, even those of the Tanzimat. 
According to him, these reforms at state level had failed to produce the desired 
outcomes, while they had tolerated stagnation in fundamental domains such as 
education and the government‘s tutelary role:  
It is true that the largest number of reformists since the Tanzimat 
period has nurtured a deep hope for change, but they have not 
discovered the form that this change should take. As conditions for 
change, they have only pushed forward freedom, the Constitution, 
education, morality and westernisation; [the reformists] are still 
pushing these ideas through. But none of these contentions has taken 
either the community, or the concepts that it tries to correct, an inch 
forward.
71
 
 
More specifically, the agent of change in the Tanzimat frame was an enlarged 
bureaucracy, which Sabahettin regarded as one of these state apparatus that had 
perpetrated the communitarian nature of society. Another sign of ineffectiveness of 
the Tanzimat period, or, to be more precise, one of its outcomes, was the reliance on 
the Constitution as one of the primary sources of reform. Recalling Demolins‘ 
discourse, Sabahettin explained that it is not the actual regime in place that 
contributes to the superiority of a country or the modernisation of a system and its 
people; what pushes change is the transition from communitarian to individualist 
cultures and societies: 
―... the constitutional government is present in Spain and England. 
North, Central and South America are all republics but the differences 
between these countries are so great that a comparison cannot be made. 
These differences are so demarcated that it is obvious that it is not due 
to the different forms of government but to the different types of 
social structures. The methods of governing in communitarian 
formations are ‗autocratic‘, ‗constitutionalist‘ and ‗republican‘. 
Whichever one of these is adopted, the results will always be the same: 
political bullying and social poverty. It is because of this [fact] that, 
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by changing the form of government and laws [only], we cannot reach 
true independence, [however,] this was obvious years before the 
constitution was declared.‖72 
 
Explaining his rationale further, Sabahettin wrote that, since the Constitution is the 
supervision of government by the masses, these masses have to be organised 
according to an individualist system, whereby the people are capable of caring for 
themselves and consequently supervise the workings of government.
73
 
 
―A real development of public life is born of neither ‗constitution‘, ‗parliamentary 
system‘ nor the ‗republic‘. Possibly, [it comes] from the private initiative which 
gives private life capability and order.‖74 Therefore, any reform undertaken without 
a deeply rooted shift to an individualist society would only remain a cosmetic 
change and have no impact on the people themselves. It is at this point that it 
becomes clear why, according to him, the period of the Tanzimat did not amount to 
the starting point of the wider reform movement that culminated with the 1908 
Revolution and of which the Young Turk opposition was part. Instead, Sabahettin 
saw the men of the Tanzimat as the perpetrators of a societal system that had harmed 
the Ottomans and had hampered any chance for authentic change in the two most 
important domains of Ottoman life that the men of the Tanzimat had intervened: the 
civil service and education. 
 
As far as the civil service is concerned, Sabahettin argued that bureaucratisation as a 
prerequisite to a better-controlled Empire had actually failed as it had not achieved 
any amelioration of the social dynamics. ―The core of the Tanzimat, as it will be 
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shown later, [was based] on collecting income into … [the] centre, a large public life 
congregation, that is to say it is nothing more than a community of civil servants 
framed within the central government organism.‖75  
 
In short, the Tanzimat had only managed to shift the locus of the problem without 
actually removing it or providing a reliable plan for reform: 
… among us, there is the belief that the undertakings since the 
Gülhane Hatt have improved our development as a nation. But when 
analysed, it can be seen that the principle set by the Tanzimat till that 
time was to remove the income that nourished the Monarch and 
collect it into a general treasury. Employers of the administration 
would receive their wages from this treasury and so would require 
[them] to bow down to the whims of those who control the treasury ... 
We know that public life in developed and steady individualist 
communities is not arranged in this way. Maybe it is the absolute 
opposite, the administrative faculty is never at the mercy of the civil 
servant class. That is to say that the Tanzimat could not bring about an 
evolution of public life towards an individualist direction. … because 
the formation that the Tanzimat wanted to give to public life was not a 
conclusion brought about by the developments of private life. Private 
life remains [as it were] in its old state. Thus, the characteristic of the 
Tanzimat is nothing more than tying the statesman to the centre.
76
 
 
Sabahettin was even more critical of the attempted reforms of the educational 
system: 
The formation of our gigantic school system started with the Tanzimat; 
meanwhile, there is [still] a need for people who can operate the 
newly set up institutions and at the same time repair these incomplete 
machines [structures] with their [own] thought. In institutions that 
come about under these conditions, education will necessarily 
resemble [life in the barracks] barrack‘s life and teaching will depend 
on books and concepts.
77
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To prove his point further, Sabahettin resorted to Demolins‘ study and stated that, 
even though England had a qualitatively lower educational system than France, 
English students possessed much greater practical knowledge. In his own words, the 
prince stated that: ―English youths, in comparison with the French, leave school with 
roughly half of the knowledge [of the French]. Whereas, when they enter the domain 
of practical life the former brings about a great display of strength compared to the 
latter.‖ 78  The comparison made is that the education system in communitarian 
societies is an aim in itself, while in individualist formations it is a means to further 
knowledge: 
It can be seen that, in Turkey, higher education, like primary 
education, takes an administrative and political form [character] … 
[This translates in the fact that], the administration provides teachers 
[seen as having] a higher status, one that places them [even] above the 
patriarch. The intention is to take up the great task of not just 
educating the children, but making the family head [as] a political and 
intellectual intermediary. [The result is that t]he children, who by and 
large stay amid their families, earn their living by depending on their 
family congregation and not their own enterprise. Thus, they are 
completely deprived of the contributing factor that forces individualist 
youths to widen their knowledge.
79
 
 
Closely linked to the evaluation made by Sabahettin in relation to the state of public 
education, he claimed that the situation in which the Empire found itself was, only 
on the surface, the making of Abdülhamit II. The Sultan represented only the tip of 
the iceberg as the political and economic state of the Empire mirrored its social 
decadence. I have already explored how the education system was to be modernised 
and changed in order to produce the men and women of the future, as Sabahettin had 
been inspired by reading Demolins. Tightly linked to this vision, according to 
Sabahettin, is a systematic change at the level of agriculture, commerce and industry. 
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These were all the domains of the lower class, which, in turn, completely lacked 
both the knowledge and the capital to benefit from and promote them. This had 
resulted in their stagnation. Sabahettin argued that while the three sectors should in 
reality be the domains of the middle class, this class was predominantly concerned 
with employment at the state level either as functionaries or in the military. The 
expectation of these civil positions has turned the middle class into both a victim and 
perpetrator of the despotic regime. It is only with a switch to an individualist society, 
in which private initiative becomes part of primary socialisation, that the Empire 
would fare better: more youth would be schooled, including those of the lower class; 
the development of private initiative would be at the centre of the new educational 
system; and the three sectors of agriculture, commerce and industry would grow 
stronger:  
It is work, especially agriculture [Sabahettin was still saying in 1924] 
that is going to save us. Asia Minor is as big as France and richer than 
France in natural resources. Work, instead of warfare, will put us on [a] 
par with the other progressive nations. My program is to send 
thousands of our young men and women to the different Anglo-Saxon 
countries, to those regions where the climate corresponds to ours, to 
receive practical agricultural education but also live in the homes of 
your [Anglo-Saxon] better middle class in order to bring back your 
spirit as well as your technical knowledge.
80
 
 
Sabahettin attached such paramount importance to a rise in employment in these 
three professions for their potential to enhance private initiative but equally out of 
his conviction that those employed in any one of the three areas would be more 
aware of the needs of his or her own country and would therefore be inclined to 
assume a more vigorous political role. Once again mirroring what Demolins had 
written after his tour of England and the publication of his study, Sabahettin was 
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convinced of the necessity to fill the parliament, once reopened, with delegates 
employed in these three professions. Comparing the composition of the French and 
English parliaments, the prince highlighted a striking aspect. He observed that the 
English parliament in 1895 had the following composition: out of 583 delegates, 
17% were merchants, 22% artisans, and 23% from agriculture, with a total of 62% 
from areas of employment where private initiative is obviously a prerequisite. Civil 
servants, instead, amounted to 47 delegates, a low 8% of the total. In the same year, 
the French parliament featured a marked difference in composition: with a total of 
633 members, only a 21,5% belongs to the category to which Sabahettin attaches 
great importance, with 11,5% agriculturalists, 6,5% artisans and industrialists and a 
low 3,5% for businessmen. On the other hand, the presence of civil servants in the 
French parliament was almost double that of the English one, amounting to 15%; to 
them, one has to add 7% of delegates without a profession.
81
 Unsuprisingly, the two 
tables used by Sabahettin feature three professions – artisans, farmers and merchants 
– as the pillars of the whole society, as expressed in the composition of parliament.  
What emerges from this is that in countries with an individualist formation the 
parliament reflects the value of society both in its layout and composition: the 
farmers, merchants and artisans who cover the three most vital sectors of society are 
well represented and occupy a place from where they can direct the actions and 
policies of the government. In France, example of a communitarian society, the 
situation is reversed, and the same applies to the Ottoman Empire. 
 
In conclusion, Sabahettin wanted to implement a plan of social reform emanating 
from the family unit and the school as the prerequisite for political change, while 
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none of the men of the Tanzimat had managed to understand the real need for such a 
change. This explained the backwardness of the Empire, which could not be blamed 
solely on Abdülhamit, but also on those who, having the power to change society, 
had not done so.  
 
Decentralisation and private initiative as political and social developments of 
the future 
It is clear that the flaws Sabahettin had identified in the social structure of the 
Ottoman Empire, when compared to the economic, political and social success of 
the Anglo-Saxon model, are similar to those found by Demolins in the case of 
France. According to Sabahettin, the Empire belonged to those countries with a 
communitarian state formation. His diagnosis adapted Demolins theory to the reality 
at hand and suggested a tangible yet long-term path to transformation. It is important, 
first of all, as Sabahettin had learned from Science sociale, to analyse any given 
society from the particular to the general. Thus, it was clear how the Empire had 
evolved from the communitarian family formation, resting heavily on kinship and 
clan affiliation, to a communitarian state formation. There, the government acts as a 
guardian-kin, while the administration provides secure jobs for life to the upper 
classes and, in doing so, hamperes any possible development, among the younger 
generations, of one of the pillars of a modern society, the private initiative of its 
citizens. 
 
In terms of this private initiative, Sabahettin had convinced himself that one of the 
most decisive aspects in explaining the success of Anglo-Saxon societies was the 
tendency to be constantly trying to move forward, without any sign of appeasement: 
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The individualists have reached social wellbeing and freedom through 
private initiative and pursuits suitable to changing necessities. This 
way of life and this education have been brought about by the 
vigorous organisations that have endorsed such training everywhere. 
Individualists learn the required skills of their profession through trial 
and observation and, therefore, at the start of their careers they are 
deprived in terms of broad knowledge[. H]owever, through close trial 
and observation they develop and reach the practical and true 
knowledge leading to success. Therefore, trial and observation and the 
scientific directive to understand universal truth are today a by-
product of individualism.
82
 
 
However, it is not enough for societies to spur a sense of private initiative in their 
citizens. In fact, the political environment needs to be one in which this private 
initiative can be put to work, and this, for Sabahettin, was synonymous with political 
and administrative decentralisation. In order to explain the benefits of following this 
specific trajectory, Sabahettin traced parallels between England and France as two 
manifestations of decetralisation and centralisation, respectively individualist and 
communitarian. Centralisation in France had given the individual great 
responsibility towards the centre, but the centre had taken away from the individual 
the authority over his life and his sense of responsibility. It is for this reason that 
monarchy in England had a much sounder basis than the French republic. And in 
this light, Sabahettin criticised the Ottoman Empire because of its choice, following 
the Tanzimat period, to uphold France as the model. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire 
would only manage to become an individualist society based on private initiative if 
it decentralised sources of power and decision-making bodies. This explains why, as 
far as the program of decentralisation goes, Sabahettin emphasised that social 
change has be adjusted to local needs. As Paul Fesch reported it, the plan was 
outlined as follows: 
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C‘est dans ce but que nous venons de former une Ligue de 
décentralisation  pour éclairer la masse turque sur le fond et la nature 
des réformes qui nous paraissent indispensable. Bien entendu, cette 
transformation politique doit être accompagnée immédiatement de 
l‘amélioration des conditions économiques de l‘Empire, afin qu‘on 
puisse mettre en valeur ses ressources inépuisables, qui restent 
aujourd‘hui encore inexploitées.83 
 
One of the features that need to be appreciated in Sabahettin‘s reform plan is the 
intense interdependence among its different aspects. As we have seen in the last 
section, the creation by the families of private initiative in their children, as well as a 
specific type of education at school would, by itself, improve the well-being of all 
the citizens of a given country in a domino effect. Similarly, it is only by shifting the 
emphasis from the importance of a centralised state towards the self administration 
of the various areas, that peace and growth were to be achieved. In other words, the 
introduction of a system of decentralisation, more understandable today as 
federalism, would work on different levels. It would enable a thorough 
understanding of the specific needs of each individual area of the Empire; empower 
local authorities, in coordination with the centre, to concentrate on these needs; as 
well as result in a better management of the resources. Simultaneously, a federally 
organised Empire would contribute to the pacification of ethnic, religious and 
therefore political tensions. Finally, the acquired internal peace would, automatically, 
spur economic prosperity, as foreign powers would not have any pretext to limit the 
rights of any of the minorities and halt the dual economic development that the 
Empire had witnessed until then. 
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Sabahettin supported decentralisation as the chance to build local governments and 
reform councils within the Empire.
84
 He thought that the Christians within the 
Empire had fared better than the Muslims because the latter had preferred 
centralisation, while the former had opted, willingly or not, for decentralisation. 
Greeks, Armenians, and Bulgarians were freer than their Muslim counterparts 
because they could choose their patriarchs. The Christians had developed private 
initiative whose absence had paralysed the Muslims. For example, the Muslim 
component would work towards the attainment of a stable pay as state functionary, 
while the Christian would foster his or her personal entrepreneurial interests. 
Sabahettin‘s stance did not translate into suggestions for the dismemberment of the 
Empire; on the contrary, he opposed any secessionist tendency on the part of the 
minorities. His model as a response to this tendency was Switzerland, where 
coexistence within a same country had been rendered possible. 
 
Local government, decentralisation and federalism: these were the themes of 
Sabahettin‘s thought, which anticipates a Swiss or North American federalism à la 
turca. Accordingly, the affairs of each and every area would need to be 
administratively dealt within the same area and not according to a general law 
applied to the whole Empire: ―local government organisations, in order to regulate 
according to the necessities arising from the capacity and operations of existing 
provinces, need to be divided into regions and regulated according to natural and 
social conditions. (In this wisdom, several provinces can be enclosed in one region). 
For each region, a regulatory committee should be brought forth.‖85 In the same 
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paragraph, Sabahettin also underlines how constructive an outside presence and 
source of assistance could actually be, marking one of the main differences between 
him and Ahmet Rıza: ―In places like India and Egypt, [this type of] good 
consideration has brought about a degree of utility; a few English individuals should 
[therefore] be employed in government functions and retain a place as chairman of 
these committees, so [that] we can benefit from their regulatory capability.‖86 
 
Throughout the pages of this work, Sabahettin is committed to the idea of federalism, 
translating into an emphasis on locality. To this end, he provides a sociological 
description of the actual changes needed at the level of local administration, which 
should be organised ―in a way to create a clearly identified [individual] responsible 
for each task and bound together in a chain … .‖87 
The habit of employing those whom he refers to as ―migratory civil servants‖88 had 
only proved counterproductive, since it meant entrusting with the management of an 
area people who know very little of local realities and needs. In line with the idea of 
a federal Empire, Sabahettin is convinced that all disciplinary affairs that involved 
the public administration should be dealt with locally. This would result in officials 
being more careful and acting justly. In fact, if the local population felt their officials 
to be accountable for their behaviour they would be inclined to trust the state and 
feel part of it.  
 
Connected to the above is judiciary reform, which Sabahettin considered to be 
especially strategic. The idea of an independent judiciary was directly related to the 
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right to a fair trial regardless of ethnic or religious background, a right on which the 
Hatt-ı Sherif of Gülhane had insisted. It is only in this domain that Sabahettin 
reserves some praise for the workings of the Tanzimat statesmen: 
Being a judge is a profession that requires the highest sense of 
responsibility. The sense of responsibility is a consequence of 
personal independence … in terms of the judiciary, we are faced with 
trend problems [of societal formation]: the judicial organisation that 
[should] uphold legal immunity in the most decisive manner, [should] 
rely on local people who in their private life possess the moral high 
ground through providing unbiased [judgment and] and inspiring trust 
and tranquility.
89
  
 
What surfaces here is the underlying need to ‗go local‘ and, in doing so, to reform 
other aspects of society and life accordingly. In the following quotation, Sabahettin 
refers to legal matters, but he gestures to the wider benefits of the localisation of the 
competence: 
Even today, in some districts of our nation, there are [those] who can 
draw on the respect and trust of individuals in their environment 
through the existent social capacity, and it is only natural that a certain 
number of individuals take up the role of referees for those locals. We 
can describe these individuals … as federal ‗justices of the peace‘. By 
doing this, justice can be easily and quickly distributed …‖90 Also, as 
locally known individuals, judges would find themselves closer to the 
population.
91
 
 
Sabahettin raises another issue within the broader aspect of decentralisation that has 
to do with the distribution of public and private property. This is one of the areas for 
which the prince clearly shows himself as a conservative liberal, as I have 
mentioned, and for this reason he has been labelled by Bozarslan ‗a revolutionary of 
the right‘. 
                                                          
89
 Sabahettin, Türkiye nasıl kurtarılabilir, 60. 
90
 Ibid. 
91
 Ibid., 62. 
200 
 
Because of the nature of ownership in the Ottoman Empire, Sabahettin claims that 
the revenues and ways to generate wealth are not used to their full potential: 
The social solution for the property problem lies with an efficient 
endeavour to switch from common ownership to private ownership. 
Under today‘s conditions, when it comes to providing for property 
through the administration: 1. The administration of the main 
registries (land registers) should increase in number and be dispersed 
so as to provide land and property owners with the most convenient 
means 2. A general census should be carried out, that will provide for 
the preparation of records and fitting documents that will be the basis 
for legal dispositions and land charges. 3. The administrative organs 
of the state should decide on the type of forms and organisations that 
are to execute these operations and to the drafting [of laws].
92
 
 
On religion and ethnicity 
In 1906, following a speech by Sir Edward Grey, then British Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, in which he spoke of the revival of Pan-Islamism, Sabahettin sent a written 
reply that gives us clues on how he positioned himself on the issue of religion. 
The first point, which highlights a common ground with the ideas of Ahmet Rıza, is 
that, for Sabahettin, Islam and fundamentalism are not synonymous. Actually, 
Sabahettin placed much of the blame around the misunderstanding of Islam on the 
public claims of people in influential positions in the West such as that of Edward 
Grey. Further on, Sabahettin explained that Pan-Islamism, as much as Islam, was not 
a fundamentalist manifestation and that its (re)emergence was a reaction to the 
aggressive and sometimes brutal policy of the West towards the East.
93
 Through this 
policy, he argues, people across boundaries, which are often imposed, enjoy 
elements of affiliation and mutual help; these common experiences contribute to the 
desire for conservation of one‘s own culture and political entity, all elements that are 
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thought to be in danger due to the actions of Europe and Russia. Therefore, what 
Sabahettin maintains is that religion could actually play a positive role in sustaining 
feelings of community and dignity. However, he also recognised that religion can 
become a political tool of oppression. What distances Rıza and Sabahettin, though, 
is the way this dynamic can be changed. As I argued in the previous chapter, Rıza 
blamed the decay of religion on the corruption of the Sultan and the religious 
dignitaries and, hence, their removal could lead to a more positive role of religion. 
Rıza also saw in Islam one of the vehicles through which changes at the top could be 
pursued. For Sabahettin, instead, the communitarian or individualist character of 
society is what changes the role of religion. Using the examples of Demolins, 
Sabahettin stated that Protestantism is as oppressive as Catholicism in a 
communitarian milieu while it would be more liberal in the individualist one.
94
 
Moreover, within a communitarian formation, religion usually decays, becoming an 
instrument of oppression.
95
 
 
Furthermore, Sabahettin was sensitive to the fact that some of the policies attached 
to what was claimed to be Pan-Islamism at that stage, were misleadingly inclusive. 
Abdülhamit II used a Pan-Islamic discourse as a political tool internally in order to 
rally support around his feeble position: ―Mais nous savons qu‘Abdul-Hamid II n‘a 
jamais envisagé son Khalifat à la manière des vrais adeptes du panislamisme.‖96 In 
reality, the Sultan deployed this discourse to counteract the section of Ottoman-
Muslim society that was demanding some type of Western-style secularism; this 
would threaten the Sultan‘s theocratic status. Sabahettin equally underlined how the 
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emerging intellectual Ottoman youth, because of its geographical proximity with 
Europe, had reached a level of synthesis between Ottoman and European thinking 
that turned them into products of modernity. If this class would, in the near future, 
lead the Empire, then a proper idea of Islam and Pan-Islamism would actually work 
towards reconciliation with the West. However, this will only work if the West itself 
changed its policy towards the Ottoman Empire. These assertions support my overall 
claim that the members of the Young Turk movement should not be considered to be 
non-believers but secularists. As in most communitarian societies, as Sabahettin 
would phrase it, religion has become the oppressive tool in the hands of the regime. 
This was, according to him, the case in the Ottoman Empire under Abdülhamit II 
first and the Unionist government after 1908. Suffice is to recall that Sabahettin 
wrote that ―people who believe that the religion of Islam is a hindrance to 
development are completely mistaken. It is not our religion that is a hindrance, but 
out social structure.‖97 
 
The perception of religion is intimately connected with the view of the ethnic 
minorities. Only by tailoring a new, more private role for religion, in fact, it would 
have been possible to include the religious and ethnic minorities in a reform plan 
that would appear feasible to them. The first step, similarly to what Rıza had 
formulated, was that any reform was to be applied to the whole population of the 
Empire regardless of religious affiliation. For instance, in the case of the Armenians, 
Sabahettin recognised the oppression that they had undergone since the late 1890s 
and, his father first and himself later, had publicly declared this.
98
 He denounced the 
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brutality and harshness that they had been submitted to. However, he directly 
blamed Abdülhamit for them, while at the same time discarded what others had 
called Turkish fanaticism. But Sabahettin also added that the situation did not 
constitute a separate issue but fell within the broader matter of the Eastern Question, 
involving other segments, such as the Kurds, the Albanians and the Arabs. 
According to Sabahettin, the Eastern Question could and should have only been 
solved by the efforts of the Ottoman Empire. In the quest for a solution, because the 
Armenians were numerically not sufficient to constitute a nation per se, they should 
set aside their weapons and use ideas and ideals in their place.
99
 In conclusion, the 
solution was to create a common federal homeland where Armenians would hold the 
same rights as the Turks. Even though, after 1908, the viability of a multi-ethnic 
Empire was becoming faint, Sabahettin insisted that it was the best option even for 
those few non-Muslim components left; in the case of the Armenians, Sabahettin 
repeatedly called on the Young Turk movement to discuss instead of oppose their 
demands. 
 
One of the major faults Sabahettin identifies in the organisations of the Young Turk 
was precisely that none of them could find a viable option to offer to the religious 
and ethnic minorities. In his view, the minorities were caught between two evils: on 
the one side, the absolutism and politically charged Islamism of the Sultan, on the 
other, the uncertainty and a lack of practical vision for their future on the part of the 
opposition. This explains, for example, how Sabahettin went from an ideology 
imbued with elitism and conservatism to one of revolution. However, revolution was 
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not, for him, a technique to acquire power, as he accused the CUP of doing. Rather, 
revolution was, in his view, part of progress understood here as a gradual evolution. 
―Le passage à l‘action révolutionnaire de Sabahaddin, synonyme de la mobilisation 
des populations urbaines, s‘expliquait par l‘urgence d‘agir pour mettre fin à l‘exile et 
à la passivité, marquer ‗l‘an zéro‘ de ‗la réforme des hommes et des femmes‘, mais 
pas pour un changement d‘ordre eschatologique.‖100 
 
Sabahettin and the West 
Sabahettin‘s stance on foreign intervention and the extent to which the Empire was 
supposed to accept European help oscillated greatly over time. In order to 
understand Sabahettin‘s general approach to the subject, it is interesting to refer to 
an article he authored in the French journal La Revue, on December 15
th
 1906. In the 
article, Sabahettin claims that the Turks, as race, have undergone three stages. It is 
their third phase, which started around the 1850s, that concerns us here and informs 
us of Sabahettin‘s stance towards Western Europe:  
[b]efore this period [the 1850s], they [the Turks] had preserved an 
Asiatic character; in the present day, they look to Europe for 
inspiration. Today they have established an army after European 
fashion and have endeavoured to improve their civil and political 
institutions. The Liberal movement under Murad V, however, was 
suffocated by the hostility of Russia, and the destruction of 
Constitutional Turkey has greatly facilitated the advance of the 
absolutism of Abdul Hamid II. The monarch who bears this name is 
not, strictly speaking, a national product; he is the product of Russian 
absolutist reaction … and that is the explanation of Turkey‘s apparent 
slowness in adopting the European civilisation.
101
 
 
It is, therefore, the absolutism of the Sultan that, according to Sabahettin, is 
hampering the possibility of a transition from a communitarian system to an 
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individualist one. However, as I have highlighted before, this transition could not be 
achieved only by adopting Western institutions, but had to be implemented through 
a drastic process of change in the nature of society. This explains why calling for the 
westernisation of society and politics in the Ottoman Empire would amount to yet 
another cosmetic change that, in the long run, would not benefit the Empire and its 
population. In fact, Sabahettin is clear about what he thinks a process of 
westernisation would lead to: 
… by attempts to impersonate a nation, we cannot become that 
nation … By embracing nationalism, we cannot possess more than 
what we already know. … in our intellectual circles, the mentality of 
westernisation takes the meaning that we equip our country with the 
western ‗material‘ and ‗spiritual‘ tools and we believe that, as in the 
most developed countries, if we manage to bring about structures such 
as paved roads, railway lines, ports, sewers, battleships, schools, 
libraries, banks and so on, we can elevate Turkey to the same civilised 
standards as the West.
102
  
 
The passages above reveal a similar approach to that of Ahmet Rıza in terms of the 
importance that the West has in the realm of intellectual and political influence in 
the Ottoman Empire. However, Sabahettin‘s stance was more complicated than that 
of Rıza in that the former differentiated between different actors, while by 1897 Rıza 
considered any external assistance to be negative, whatever its source. For 
Sabahettin, instead, England and France represented two viable and actually 
foreseeable partners in a military intervention within the domains of the Empire. A 
more detailed description and analysis of Sabahettin‘s stance, as it surfaced during 
the Congress of Ottoman Liberals of 1902, can be found in the next chapter. 
However, what is clear is that Sabahettin thought of Russia as aggressive and an 
unlikely partner in the implementation of reform. Instead, as far as England and 
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France were concerned, Sabahettin hoped to convince these governments that the 
movement of the Young Turk represented a progressive force, capable of bringing 
down the despotic regime of Abdülhamit and reforming the Empire in a framework 
of respect for the representativeness of the minorities. His personal admiration for 
French intellectuals and Anglo-Saxon social organisation made Sabahettin positively 
predisposed towards these two countries. It is also a fact that both Sabahettin and his 
brother Lutfullah had, at different intervals, travelled to England; aspiring to 
establish funding and political backing for possible concerted actions.
103
 There are 
two other considerations that need to be discussed at this juncture. Immediately 
following the Congress of Ottoman Liberals held in Paris, Sabahettin and Ismail 
Kemal Bey – who was to became, at a later stage, a central figure in Albanian 
nationalism – became allied and took over the publication of the journal Osmanlı.104  
A constant feature of Osmanlı was its unconditional support for English intervention; 
even in earlier years, the journal had repeatedly featured opinion pieces and even a 
pamphlet with the aim of ―… reviving the traditional friendship between the two 
conntries [sic] [England and the Ottoman Empire] …‖105 and attempting to convince 
both government and public opinion that a vibrant section of Turks were fighting 
against despotism and needed the support of England. Lastly, not long after landing 
in Paris, Sabahettin, his father and brother sent a letter to the British, which was 
intercepted by the Ottoman Ambassador to Paris; they were promising, in exchange 
for material help for the constitution of a united opposition front, special favourable 
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economic terms for England over all other countries should the reform movement be 
victorious.
106
 
 
Sabahettin, activism and the Unionists 
As I argue in this section, Mehmet Sabahettin was a highly controversial figure, in 
both historical and political terms. He was either admired as an unparalleled 
ideologue and innovator, or regarded as an idealist who had lost touch with reality 
and who could not grasp the materialist needs of a state. Equally, he would be 
accused of not being able to adjust theories to the practice of government policies. 
This, however, represented the limit of the ideological phase of Young Turk history 
as a whole, not only of Sabahettin. Yet, the prince was, possibly, more detached 
from the practical needs of the population than the rest of the Young Turks, yet he 
continuously thought he had a public role to play.
107
 In fact, even after the 1908 
revolution when the CUP managed to get to power, he became a critical participant 
in public debates and for this clashed repeatedly with the Unionists in power.  
 
As I have shown through the pages of this chapter, Sabahettin‘s sociological 
analysis was complex and could not be fully translated into a feasible political 
programme. It needed to be rendered intelligible for his contemporaries, which was 
problematic since he had been away from the Empire and thus unable to observe the 
nationalist social realities as they had unravelled within. But, in some ways, this was 
not so different from other Young Turk members. What did distinguish him was his 
grand plan for creating a decentralised Empire, where provinces and their 
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administration would have had more or less an almost autonomous status from 
Istanbul. This policy was in stark contrast with the nationalistic and autocratic 
tendencies of the CUP as they developed in the post-1908 environment and, for this 
reason, such a plan would have been relatively short lived. This is because 
representatives and followers of the CUP saw in the decentralisation the beginning 
of a political regionalisation that would lead to the total collapse and disintegration 
of the Empire. It is true that, once back in the Empire and through the newspaper 
Terakki, the prince was allowed to initiate an exchange of views with CUP leaders 
and sympathisers, but his criticism of the system installed by the CUP was never 
officially taken into consideration.
108
 Sabahettin tried to become an active 
participant in shaping Unionists policies, only to be marginalised under the 
suspicion that his ideas could be harmful to the Empire: ―Il entreprit alors un vaste 
travail pédagogique pour expliquer ses idées et se defender contre les accusations 
dont il était la cible (anglophile, collaboration avec les anarchistes, encouragement 
au séparatisme arménien, ascendance géorgienne …).‖109 Overall, the inapplicability 
of Sabahettin‘s ideas lay in the fact that their prerequisite was to shake the 
foundations of the community and apply a drastic and all-encompassing plan of 
private initiative and individualisation. This was supposed to be done through a 
radical revolution in the conceptualisation of what the Empire had to be territorially, 
culturally and socially; this was an idea that many were not ready to see materialise. 
Moreover, the book, How can Turkey be saved? is extremely complicated, not only 
in that it treats a difficult topic but also in its articulation of the subject. As much as 
the ideas of Ahmet Rıza were going through different stages as he proceeded, so also 
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was the approach of Sabahettin towards the reforming path of the Ottoman Empire, 
substantially a work-in-progress. But the difference seems to be that, while Rıza was 
ready to share the burden of creating an ideology, using Mechveret as a forum, 
Sabahettin saw himself as the sole repository of a truth. He formulated this truth, 
which he had inherited from another written absolute truth, that of Edmond 
Demolins, in a book. Moreover, the striking difference between the writings of the 
two intellectuals is one of focus: whereas Rıza is more populist in his formulations, 
directly exhorting people, his thought lacks the structure of a pragmatic and 
applicable plan. Instead, Sabahettin does provide a structure, yet amid a much more 
complicated framework, as well as an extremely detailed plan. So detailed and, in a 
way innovative, was this plan, that it was grossly misunderstood by the same people 
he had attempted to inspire, the Unionists. To the latter, in fact, Sabahettin‘s plan 
would necessarily lead to the fragmentation and subsequent break-up of their Empire. 
 
Another setback for Sabahettin‘s ideology was that it represented a long-term and 
idealistic vision of socio-cultural engineering that did not agree with the urgency to 
overturn the Sultan. Not much is debated on the short-term needs of the Empire. 
How was Sabahettin to convince minorities and the majority that the various 
components could work together and trust each other? An answer lies in the 
outcome of the Congress of Ottoman Liberals held in Paris, in 1902, which is 
surveyed and analysed in the next chapter. Something to consider, which explains to 
a certain extent why Sabahettin became the leader of the majority within the 
organisation, is the fact that he represented an impressive and weighty figure, also 
due to his access to influential government officials, especially in France. Testimony 
to this is the letter addressed to the French Prime Minister as well as the tight 
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surveillance, both French and Ottoman, under which he and his family were under 
while in France. A further issue that needs consideration, which he shared with Rıza 
in this case, was that his membership in the intellectual milieu allowed him to 
overcome, in many instances, shortages of funds, needed in this case to organise the 
congress, by receiving the practical help of French intellectuals and activists, such as 
the use of the house in which the Congress was held at first.
110
 
 
Surely worth considering among the various ideas put forth by Sabahettin is his 
view of the history of reform of the Empire, which gives the reader a clear image of 
the differences with Ahmet Rıza. As I have explained before, in his book How can 
Turkey be saved?, Sabahettin claims that the Tanzimat reforms have achieved close 
to nothing, and that reform would only work following a change in the social 
structure. This change should be carried out through the development of private 
initiative on the part of the government as well as the people and on the plan of a 
federal Empire. The Tanzimat, in his view, had changed very little of the societal 
dynamics and, together with the adoption of the Constitution amounted to cosmetic 
changes easily reversible. However, aside from the readings of Demolins, the idea of 
decentralisation and private initiative that Sabahettin learned and developed from 
texts and exchanges with the French intelligentsia, there are sources of inspiration 
that came directly from his own Ottoman past. Surely, in fact, even though we know 
that Sabahettin thought that the Constitution as well as any other political framework 
was not enough to reform without deep social change, the memory of the 1876 
parliament must have impressed him and must have fostered in him the idea that his 
grand plan was, after all, feasible. The outcome of the opening of parliament was, 
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among other things, the emergence of an elite made up of Albanians, Greeks, 
Armenians, Arabs and Macedonians: ―[f]or the first time in its history, the Empire 
appeared to be genuinely multiethnic.‖111  
 
After all, Sabahettin‘s efforts did not meet with much success and Sabahettin was 
sentenced to death in absentia, without any actual proofs, for the assassination of 
Mahmut Şevket Pasha.112 Simultaneously, the party that almost fully upheld his 
views, Hürriyet ve Itilaf Partisi, was excluded from politics the same year his book 
came out. Contributing to the misunderstanding of his program and ideals was also 
the prince‘s character. Undoubtedly moved by love for his motherland, Sabahettin 
was, however, uncompromising and substantially polemical in his dealings with 
whoever opposed his views.
113
 Such attitude was very ill received by the 
establishment, by now totally Unionist, that made total compliance a prerogative for 
active political life. On the side of the public, Sabahettin was difficult to understand 
and, because of his hermit-like lifestyle, his figure easily portrayed in very negative 
light.  
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Concluding remarks  
Writing the concluding remarks to the previous chapter, I emphasised that the 
importance of Ahmet Rıza rested upon his attempt to find for himself and, hopefully, 
for his followers a secular philosophical platform that did not oppose the belief in 
Islam. This came to be his version of positivism. The other major achievement of 
Rıza was to create a forum, through the establishment of the journal Mechveret, 
where Ottomans and non-Ottomans could discuss the political situation of the 
Empire and debate its future political shape. Sabahettin, on the other hand, did not 
need to discuss a future plan, he had it well in mind. This took the shape of a federal 
Empire, within which society would have to be drastically altered to resemble the 
organisation of the impressive and successful Anglo-Saxon society. This was the 
outcome of his encounter and adherence to the school of Science sociale, which 
gave Sabahettin an altogether different character from all the other Young Turks. As 
argued by Bozarslan: ―La tradition de Le Play (1806-1822) et de Demolins (1852-
1907) permit en effet au Prince de se situer en dehors du positivisme en vogue et du 
darwinisme social qui influençait la majorité des opposants Jeunes Turcs, pour 
considérer l‘individu comme l‘élément décisif de la vie sociale.‖114 
 
A very crucial aspect of Rıza‘s plan was his approach to religion within a positivist 
framework; for Sabahettin‘s writings, this aspect was at best marginal. His position 
vis-à-vis religion does not feature prominently in the writings analysed here. We do, 
however, have a telling and somewhat poetic encounter with religion in Sabahettin‘s 
memoirs. The way Sabahettin recalls his encounter with the ideas of Demolins is 
very similar to a religious enlightenment. It is precisely the complex relationship of 
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these two words that gives us a clue to Sabahettin in particular but also to the Young 
Turk Weltanschauung in general: religion and the Enlightenment as it had taken root 
in Western Europe. It is in fact the merging, or synthesis, of the two that all those 
working abroad under the umbrella organisation of the Young Turk movement were 
attempting to work out. In the passage referred to above,
115
 Sabahettin‘s encounter 
with Demolins‘ ideas resembles closely the experience of religious revelation. 
Moreover, the choice of finding all the answers in a book can be connected to the 
textual importance in Islam. We can only speculate about this choice of narrative: it 
could be an attempt to portray his own ideology as very close to Islam, or 
approximate a familiar discourse that would make his work more intelligible and 
acceptable to others. This seems to me to be the more plausible explanation, as the 
majority of the exponents of the opposition were confronted precisely with this task: 
their main obstacle was popularisation, the enlargement of their ideology. However, 
other possibilities need to be considered. Another equally probable explanation is 
tightly linked with the elitism and self-projection that most of the Young Turks had. 
In some ways, Sabahettin finds himself so enlightened that he has a direct 
connection with knowledge (the pages of the book) and compares himself to the 
Prophet: once the truth had been revealed to him the world would have drastically 
changed.  
 
The way in which the prince‘s memories are told116 gives us an additional idea of 
the background and self-image that many among the Young Turk organisation 
shared but which was, undoubtedly, a central feature of Sabahettin‘s character: the 
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idea of a mission. After all, the narrated encounter that changed his life hints at some 
sort of predestination: as if another Jibril had come down to illuminate the masses 
through a modern, progressive and universalistic prophet. Many of the opponents of 
the rule of Abdülhamit II were convinced elitists, the products of a specific 
educational background which highlighted their intellectual and educational 
superiority in comparison to the rest of the population. Moreover, they also saw 
themselves as possessing the tools and thus being assigned the mission to reform 
and save the Empire. However, in Sabahettin, the level of elitism borders some sort 
of predestination, which, for example in the case of Rıza, does not surfaces in the 
same manner. 
 
In the end, what emerges most from the ideas of the prince is a very eccentric 
relationship with culture and religion. Although difficult to explain, it seems that the 
most plausible explanation for this relationship remains the one I have put forth for 
Ahmet Rıza‘s dilemmas: the natural outcome of an ideology in the making. 
However, it is also fair to note that Sabahettin defended Islam by stating that its 
fanatic aspects, to which the West repeatedly referred, should be seen as an outcome 
of what he refers to as the brutal policies of the West on the East.
117
 What can be 
inferred from the material analysed throughout this chapter is that religion was to 
have a very individual role, as Sabahettin‘s plan evolved around the idea of 
multiculturalism and secularism, in an Empire where localities were to be 
maintained but not allowed to interfere in other localities. To sum up in a few lines 
the ideology of Sabahettin, I argue that he was a thinker ahead of his time and, due 
to the sense of mission and intellectualism, both difficult to grasp and unable to turn 
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ideas into actions. He was also out of touch with life in the Ottoman Empire, not 
understanding that those who opposed the rule of Abdülhamit II wanted tangible 
results and that, once the revolution had been carried out, ideas of constitutional rule 
were soon to be submitted to the decisions of the Unionists who had taken up the 
tutelary role the intellectual Young Turks, such as Sabahettin, had thought should 
have been theirs. 
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CHAPTER 5 – THE END OF AN IDEA: THE 1902 CONGRESS OF 
OTTOMAN LIBERALS IN PARIS 
In the two previous chapters, I surveyed the main traits of the ideologies of Ahmet 
Rıza and Mehmet Sabahettin with a view to address 4 issues. The first deals with 
what I have referred to in Chapter 2 as the ‗necessity for exile‘. It is at the Congress 
of 1902 that this necessity, or opportunity, is highlighted once more and actually 
reaches its potential: inside the Ottoman borders such a congress could have never 
been convened. Moreover, if the Congress had somehow been convened inside the 
Empire, its character would be different: it would have meant that the internal 
branch of the organisation had not been silenced and, therefore, the Congress would 
have had to negotiate this branch‘s more military outlook with the émigrés‘ 
intellectualism. As I highlight in Chapter 2, from 1896 onwards, an ideological split 
had taken place between the internal and external branches of the organisation – 
before the latter was actually disbanded in 1897 – whereby the internal organisation 
became dominated by bureaucrats and army personnel who were bent on a more 
violent course of action. On the contrary, the external branch was made up of 
students and intellectuals less inclined to abrupt changes and more committed to 
dialogue. The organisation of the Congress inside the Empire would have resulted, 
as I shall argue further on, in two possible scenarios: one possible outcome could 
have been the development of concerted action rather than the end of the intellectual 
phase, as, instead, happened in Paris. The other possible outcome could have been 
that, with the help of spies and the police, Sultan Abdülhamit would have discovered 
and persecuted the members of the movement. Whichever of the two outcomes we 
consider as more likely, it would have had a major impact on the conceptualisation 
of social and political policies in the near and long term future. In sum, exile, once 
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again, provided a specific course for the development not only of the immediate 
history of the Young Turk organisation but also its ideological future development. 
A second issues that I treat in the following pages is how the members of the Young 
Turk organisations, and in particular Rıza and Sabahettin, perceived the question of 
reform in collaboration with each other. Connected to this is the question of the 
shape that reform was supposed to take and the desired course of action to achieve 
this. The last two critical aspects that I address in the next pages concern foreign 
intervention and the role religious and ethnic affiliation would play in the new 
envisaged Empire. I will argue that at the core of these issues are the meaning, 
nature and feasibility of the affiliative, proto-nationalist idea embodied in 
Ottomanism. The scope of my analysis goes as far as 1902, the year of the Paris 
Congress whose failure marked the end of the period 1895 – 1902, which I have 
labelled the ‗intellectual phase‘ of the Young Turk era. An assessment of failure 
does not imply any teleology, but I do contend that the irreconcilability between 
intellectual endeavour and practical necessities, that became flagrant during the 
Congress, was in fact inherent in the trajectory and ideas of both figures and leaders 
of the opposition, Rıza and Sabahettin.  
 
The end of this intellectual phase, marked by the loss of belief in Ottomanism and 
essentially in the belief that the Empire could still be held together peacefully 
regardless of religious and ethnic divisions, coincided with the end of an idea. This 
idea was possibly outdated and idealistic at the turn of the century but it was 
nonetheless appealing and convincing for a large group of Ottomans who had 
embarked on a journey abroad and had devoted a substantial part of their life to 
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intellectual activism marked by hardship and constant confrontations with Ottoman 
diplomatic pressure and ambivalent European governments. 
 
In the following pages, I will draw the curtain on what I have repeatedly called the 
intellectual phase of the Young Turk history and will describe how the two most 
important factions, those of Rıza and the Mechveret group – referred to as the 
minority group during and after the Congress – and of Sabahettin – referred to as the 
majority – diverged over the way to approach the four critical issues mentioned 
above. 
 
This chapter will highlight the diversity of ideas among the various factions that 
made up the opposition, and give the reader an insight into the drastic change that 
the opposition would undergo after the split of 1902. At the same time, I will 
emphasise the fact that the failure to create a united, homogeneous front is 
instructive for an understanding of how the same dynamics of negotiation are still 
very much the topic of inquiry today.
1
 In this light, therefore, the solutions put forth 
by Rıza and Sabahettin could not provide answers to the questions and challenges of 
the time as they were too idealistic, as I maintain throughout this thesis, and 
provided little in terms of actions.  However, the formulations that emerged from the 
experiences of the two intellectuals become extremely important, not only for the 
short-term, but also for the long-term ideological developments of the Ottoman 
Empire first, and the Turkish Republic later, as it will be discussed further on. 
However, hopes among the opposition were very high. As reported by a close friend 
of Sabahettin who was active in helping the organisation of the Congress, the events 
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of 1902 featured a high level of excitement and expectation that imbued those who 
took part in it: ―Et c‘est de ce jour-là surtout, on peut le dire, que la Turquie put 
entrevoir, prochaine, l‘aurore de la liberté.‖2 The analysis carried out in this chapter 
reveals such level of commitment that each member of the opposition was prepared 
to demonstrate, which is paradoxical given the Congress‘ eventual condemnation of 
the Ottomanist plan.  
 
I examine the Congress using primary sources such as the books of Paul Fesch
3
 and 
Joseph Denais,
4
 and the memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey.
5
 Throughout this chapter, 
the figure of Ismail Kemal becomes extremely important, hence it is important to 
introduce him briefly. Ismail Kemal had worked as a civil servant in the first years 
of Abdülhamit‘s reign and acted as Governor General of Tripoli in the late 1890s. 
From 1892 on, Ismail Kemal embraced the reformist plans of Midhat Pasha and 
joined the Young Turk movement in exile. While in Europe, Ismail Kemal was 
charged with the fabricated accusation of having offered the throne of Albania to 
Mehmet Ali, and for this he was tried for high treason and condemned to death in 
absentia, with loss of civil rights, rank, dignities, decorations and property. After the 
Revolution of 1908, Ismail Kemal went briefly back to Istanbul but had to leave 
soon and ended up joining the Albanian nationalist project. Apart from playing an 
active role during the Congress as one of the closest associates of Sabahettin, Ismail 
Kemal‘s trajectory exemplifies well that of Ottomans from a non-Turkish 
background: a believer in Ottomanism with a strong background in state service, 
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who, at the end of the intellectual phase and the consequent crystallisation of 
internal differences, abandons the Ottomanist project for a nationalist one. The 
above sources enhance the somewhat limited secondary sources on the Congress, 
such as the article of Şükrü Hanioğlu, ―Der Jungtürkenkongress von Paris (1902) 
und seine Ergebnisse,‖6 and Ramsaur‘s book, The Young Turks.7 The above sources 
are corroborated with primary material I gathered by reading material produced by 
the two factions or surveillance reports on their actions, i.e., the articles that featured 
in Mechveret and Osmanlı, as well as the documents kept at the Paris Police 
Prefecture.  
 
Organisation and attendance 
The convening of a congress of all the opposition parties who viewed themselves as 
Ottoman Liberals had been in the minds of the Young Turks for some time. Prior to 
1902, the group under Tunalı Hilmi Bey, the Osmanlı İhtilâl Fırkası,8 had attempted 
the organisation of such congress – under the aegis of the Khedive of Egypt – in an 
effort to unite all Ottoman opposition groups, including the Armenian and Greek 
ones. However, plans for this congress to be held either in Brindisi, southern Italy, 
or on the island of Corfu, ran into difficulties: Ahmet Rıza and the Mechveret group 
refused to participate and the Ottoman diplomatic service admitted that it had co-
opted the Italian government into blocking all possible contacts between Young 
Turk members on Italian soil. There were two further problems: as we know from a 
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variety of sources, Freemasonry had expanded in Egypt
9
 and the group around the 
Khedive was heavily influenced by Masonic ideas.
10
 This might have been risky for 
the coalition that would find itself too close to Freemasons had the organisation been 
in the hands of Masons. The other consideration is that the Khedive was very close 
to the British; therefore a congress organised under his influence would have forced 
the Ottoman Liberals to identify themselves mainly with Britain. Rıza and other 
Young Turk activists were reluctant to pursue such close association with Britain as 
they either leaned towards an alliance with France, or the maintenance of a balance 
of power among Western European countries that would benefit the opposition to 
the Sultan. 
 
Eventually, Damat Mahmut, Sabahettin and Lutfullah took on the organisation of 
the Congress. However, the Ottoman government had managed to convince the 
Swiss, German, English and Italian governments to expel the three if caught on their 
soil. Finally, it was decided that Paris represented the best venue for a congress, both 
for its large concentration of Young Turk members and for the tolerance of the 
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French government, which was sensitive to public opinion and which, in turn, had 
sided with the Young Turks.
11
  
 
As plans for the organisation of the Congress went ahead, the Ottoman government 
reached the conclusion that it was going to ―… be held between the 17th and 20th of 
January 1902, with the participation of 30 Turkish and Armenian revolutionaries, 
whereby plans for assassination of the Sultan would be discussed.‖12 The level of 
alertness by the Ottoman police to the movements of Sabahettin and the organisation 
of the Congress is testimony to the fact that the Sultan not only feared the opposition, 
but also believed that unity between the various factions was, at that point, a real 
possibility. The records of the French police
13
 show that the Ottoman authorities had 
labelled those attempting to unite as ‗revolutionaries‘ and ‗anarchists,‘ and that the 
French authorities intended to prevent the meeting scheduled for the night of the 17
th
 
or 20
th
 of January from taking place in the house of Sabahettin.
14
 The French police 
kept the house of the two brothers Lutfullah and Sabahettin, located on Boulevard 
Malesherbes, under surveillance but confirmed that no congress had been held on 
the 17
th,
 though a man had visited them and stayed at their place for about ten 
hours.
15
 I suspect this man to be either Paul Fesch or Joseph Denais, who were both 
very close to Sabahettin and Lutfullah and were involved in the organisation of the 
Congress. After having ensured that no congress had already taken place, the 
General Prefect of the Paris police, M. Lepine, summoned Sabahettin and Lutfullah 
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on the 24
th
 of January,
16
 informing them that the French police would not grant 
authorisation for such a congress. 
 
Nevertheless, appeals to public opinion on the ground of freedom of expression and 
continuous protests and complaints to the police about the two brothers being 
constantly watched over by individuals, who were discovered to be from the French 
political police, turned them from conspirators to victims. This public rhetoric 
forced the police to change their stance. Another important factor in the decision to 
allow the Congress to take place must have been the French desire to prevent 
English sponsorship.
17
 The French authorities secretly hoped that holding the 
Congress in France would draw the Young Turk movement closer to them and away 
from Britain; they believed that once the factions meeting in Paris had taken power 
in Istanbul, they would reward the French government and businesses with 
preferential political and economic treatments.
18
  
 
Mechveret, gives a different account of how the members of the opposition were 
finally allowed to get together. Apparently, five French deputies, close to the 
Mechveret group and belonging to different political factions in parliament, 
approached the French authorities defending the aims of the Congress as peaceful.
19
 
Not long afterwards, the cabinet director of the President of the Council summoned 
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Rıza and some other members of the Mechveret group and informed them that the 
French government had lifted its ban on the meeting provided the attendees would 
neither discuss any revolutionary option nor use phrases that would harm the public 
image of the Sultan. The French government was reassured: 
Nous avons expliqué au distingué chef du cabinet que nous sommes ni 
anarchistes ni révolutionnaires, et cela non pas par crainte d‘aucune 
sorte, mais par conviction ferme que les changements brusques, 
obtenus par des moyens violents, nous paraissent dangereux pour le 
salut de la Partie. Nous remercions ici le Gouvernement français 
d‘avoir tenu compte de notre déclaration et d‘avoir dissipé ainsi le 
nuage d‘incriminations et de calomnies.20 
 
Hence, the organisation of the Congress became a matter of public knowledge even 
before the actual Congress had taken place. The French independent journal 
L’Eclair wrote on the 26th January that around fifty Ottomans, from Turkey, Egypt, 
Mesopotamia, Romania, Rumelia, Albania as well as from London, Rome, Geneva 
and Athens were to arrive in Paris for the Congress organised by Sabahettin and 
Lutfullah. The newspaper even featured the preliminary programme, which included: 
1. Dévouement et loyalisme envers la dynastie; 
2. Honorer le religion musulmane ainsi que la civilisation moderne. 
Protéger toutes les autres religions ou cultes; 
3. Faire de la Constitution ottomane promulguée en 1876 la base du 
gouvernement et le pivot de l‘entente et de l‘union entre tous les 
Ottomans sans distinction de religion ni de race; 
4. Proclamer l‘égalité politique entre musulmans et non musulmans et 
les faire bénéficier également des avantages matériels et moraux du 
gouvernement du pays.
21
 
 
The following day, the French journal Le Temps spoke of a proposition to hold the 
meeting in London, only if Paris was to be officially ruled out at the last minute, 
which meant that the two brothers did not regard the prohibition of Monsieur Lepine 
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as the definite stance of the French government. The same article featured an 
interview with Sabahettin and Lutfullah, in which they claimed to be working 
towards the unity of all ethnicities under an enlightened Ottoman sultanic banner 
and mentioned that the aim of the Congress was: ―étudier un projet de constitution 
nouvelle à donner à leur pays.‖22 
 
In the end, the Congress took place in Paris between the 4
th
 and the 9
th
 of February 
1902. Because no official permit had yet been issued, holding the gathering at 
Sabahettin‘s residence was deemed risky. Therefore, the first day the Congress was 
held at the house of a Frenchman, a member of the Institut de France, Monsieur 
Lefèvre-Pontalis, on avenue du Trocadéro. The house of Lefèvre-Pontalis had been 
made available after Joseph Denais had convinced the latter to offer his premises for 
the opening day.
23
 After the first day of meetings, the French authorities finally 
issued a permit and for the following three days the delegates met at Sabahettin‘s 
house on Boulevard Malesherbes. The Congress was presided over by prince 
Sabahettin, then 26 years old, with the honorary presidency awarded to his father 
Mahmut Pasha. At the Congress gathered 47 delegates from all the various ethno-
religious components of the Empire: Arabs, Greeks, Kurds, Albanians, Circassians, 
Jews, Armenians, and Turks, all of them political refugees coming from Egypt, 
Bulgaria, Switzerland, England, and France, made up the ethnic composition of the 
meeting.  
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The Congress was convened through a letter that contained a written appeal signed 
by Sabahettin and Lutfullah; Paul Fesch provides us with a summary.
24
 The appeal 
stated that the only way to save the country was to gather the moral and material 
forces of all Ottomans, regardless of their race, religion and sex. To accomplish this, 
it would be necessary to uphold freedom and justice, to establish a solid and modern 
system of education for the future generations, and to reinstate the constitutional 
regime. However, because all classes of Ottomans inside the Empire suffered the 
despotic and oppressive rule of Abdülhamit, it fell upon those Ottomans, 
representative of all the various ethno-religious components outside the Empire, to 
spearhead the changes. The primary purpose of the Congress, the two brothers 
explained, was to create a shared political and ideological platform upon which to 
build a tight alliance between all Ottoman opposition forces. This joint opposition 
would work to identify those culpable for the backward and dire economic, social 
and political situation of the Empire and would decide on the best course of action 
for the eradication of those culprits before setting up a viable plan for the future.
25
 
 
The first day: great expectations 
The opening evening of the Congress started full of positive expectations, as 
Osmanlı, the journal close to the group of Sabahettin, reported: 
… this evening‘s meeting is a valuable and colourful chapter of our 
nation‘s history. That night, close to fifty invited attendees on a 
mission, with the insignia of the proud crown of Ottomanism on their 
heads [fez] and on their faces manifesting sincere cheerfulness, were 
received one by one in the hall[.] From the wall was hanging, together 
with the French flag – worthy to mention the three colours of 
humanity – the Ottoman flag, consisting of a star taking shelter in the 
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crescent [symbol] of justice of the nation, [which] was filling with the 
light of joy the eyes of the Ottomans present there, who were longing 
to embrace independence [from Hamidian despotism].
26
 
 
The Congress was inaugurated by Lutfullah, who, at 9 o‘clock, gave a short speech 
thanking all the attendees. Sabahettin opened the proceedings with a speech along 
the lines of the appeal circulated to convene the Congress.
27
 The speech focussed on 
fostering a sense of unity among the various factions and highlighted the pursuit of 
the common goal of defending the value of life, the equality of law, and the freedom 
of religious opinion.
28
 He insisted that the idea of Ottomanism was alive, feasible 
and actually the only viable course to pursue. As reported by Osmanlı, the speech 
featured the following passage: ―…the reforms that we shall try to apply and 
implement today in our fatherland are not in the name of something related to 
religion or a party, but in the name of the common [idea of] Ottomanism.‖29 
Sabahettin‘s speech ended with the hope that all the aims could be achieved: 
Until yesterday, the different elements that make up the noble 
Ottoman nation [were] working separately and have not been able to 
unite at [any] one place[.] While all these things are a sign of regret 
and reflect a painful image to friends and foes alike, today these 
divided communities of people, with mutual brotherhood and 
respecting and honouring their law which they had acquired, [are] 
coming together as members of the same family gathering ready for 
united action, in order to strive for an immediate cure against these 
unbearable injustices that since 25 years have been plundering the 
Ottoman nation through whirlwind[. This] fact is a source of 
gratitude … 30 
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After the positive inauguration, the Congress was paused to be re-convened on the 
following day. The resolutions taken after this first day were the following: 
 
1) forcefully reject any kind of affiliation between the Ottoman nation and the 
current despotic administration, which is opposed by the entire world, is 
corrupt and evil, and under whose lowest authority the nation has lived for 
twenty-five years; 
2) establish between the various peoples and races of the Empire an 
understanding which would ensure to all, without distinction, the full 
upholding of their rights – as mentioned in the Imperial edicts (Gülhane and 
Hümayun) – and confirmed by the international treaties; 
3) provide the means to fully satisfy the legitimate aspirations of all to be part 
of the municipal and provincial administration; 
4) ensure the equality of all citizens in terms of rights and duties and instil in 
them a feeling of faithfulness and loyalty towards the throne and the 
Ottoman dynasty, which is the only agent that can unite all; 
5) strive in all possible ways to direct all the different Ottomans and their 
voices towards the accomplishment of a threefold aim: maintain the integrity 
and indissolubility of the Ottoman Empire; re-establish internal order and 
peace, which is a prerequisite for progress; and respect the fundamental laws 
of the Empire, in particular the upholding of the 1876 Constitution, which 
was undeniably the most important, the most precious, and the most 
protective instrument of reforms in general as well as of the rights and 
political liberties of the Ottoman peoples against arbitrary rule; 
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6) respect the international treaties and in particular the Treaty of Berlin, whose 
regulation concerning the internal order of Turkey needs to be extended to all 
the provinces.
31
 
How did it happen that, after such a promising start, the delegates disagreed so 
profoundly and were to split into two distinct opposing groups? As illustrated by 
Osmanlı, it is at this point that things started to fall apart and unity of intent became 
a utopian vision: 
The resolution consisting of the above mentioned four articles only, 
which were put down in the discussion, ultimately occupied the 
present people for three-four nights in agitation. The arguments, 
debates, rejections, answers and defences started coming from all 
sides. Sometimes over the etymology of a word, or composition … the 
time was spent, for hours, exactly like negotiating an agreement with 
the great powers … Within this powerful agitation and tidal conflicts, 
two parties were organised, which had one sacred intention but 
different methods to reach their aim.
32
 
 
The first incident took place at the conclusion to the general resolutions, when the 
delegates of Droshak and Henchak,
33
 as well as two independent Armenian 
delegates, decided not to take part in the vote that would confirm the four points of 
the resolution. According to Ismail Kemal, a rift appeared between the Mechveret 
group and the Armenian delegates on the issue of power and its distribution among 
the various factions of the organisation. The Mechveret group pursued a centralising 
policy, with the role of Istanbul revived and reaffirmed, while the Armenians pushed 
for the establishment of local councils and local administration. In his memoirs, 
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Ismail Kemal claims that the majority of those present, including Sabahettin, sided 
with the Armenian delegates. Ismail Kemal argues that the minority group around 
Mechveret opposed to the idea of federalism was the same group that would later 
carry out the Revolution and the group whose policies were reflected in the actions 
of the Committee of Union and Progress after 1908. However, Ismail Kemal‘s 
interpretation presents some factual mistakes and contradicts himself in his memoirs, 
which were written, of course, retrospectively. First, it is strange that the Mechveret 
group, which is the group that advocated non-violent measures and opposed 
revolutionary options, would soon completely change its stance and accept, plan, 
and carry out the Revolution. We shall see further on in this chapter how Rıza 
jumped on the winners‘ bandwagon, though only after the reinstatement of the 
Constitution and his realisation that Ottomanism as idea had lost its credibility. 
Moreover, the groups that carried out the 1908 Revolution had little to do, from an 
ideological as well as a social point of view, with the groups present in Paris in 1902. 
A few lines after linking the Mechveret group with the actions of 1908 and the 
Unionist rule, Ismail Kemal acknowledges that: 
I myself was in favour of actions that would have the effect of giving 
the alarm and attracting the attention of Europe, by which means the 
Sultan would be forced to come to terms without the country being too 
much upset. For this it was only necessary to take possession of a 
dominant position, like Salonica, for example, or Bolayir, which is the 
key to the Dardanelles, with an armed force, and from there impose 
conditions on the Sultan.
34
 
 
Possibly hoping to convince the Armenians to join in the vote and sign the 
resolutions, Sabahettin came out with the proposition of an additional paragraph that 
would establish a permanent committee of the opposition groups and demand the 
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intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs of those foreign powers that had been 
signatories of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and that of Berlin in 1878.
35
 As reported in 
Mechveret, part of the proposed addition was as follows: 
… le Comité permanent qui sera constitué aura pour mission de se 
livrer aux démarches nécessaires auprès des Puissances signataires du 
traité de Paris, de l‘année 1856, et du traite de Berlin, de l‘année 1878, 
afin d‘obtenir leur action bienveillante pour faire prévaloir les susdits 
principes et pour mettre en exécution les traités internationaux 
concernant l‘ordre intérieur de la Turquie, ainsi que tous les actes 
internationaux découlant des susdits traités, et pour les faire appliquer 
à tous les vilayets de l‘Empire … 36 
 
This proposition turned out to be the most contradictory aspect of the Congress: its 
controversy divided the opposition and marked the point of no return in Sabahettin‘s 
relationship with Rıza. What is to be noted is that Sabahettin must have been well 
aware of the consequences of his stance. After all, Ahmet Rıza was convinced that 
disinterested help on the part of Europe was but a fiction and had repeatedly 
expressed this through the pages of Mechveret. In addition, in 1922, he published the 
monograph La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient
 37
 on the issue 
of European political intervention, criticising, as I mention elsewhere in this thesis, 
the imperialist approach and vested interests of the West in modern times. For Rıza, 
the signatory powers of the Treaty of Berlin were the same powers that had agreed 
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to the cutting off of Balkan areas from the Empire and had carved out spheres of 
control for themselves. One therefore wonders whether Sabahettin genuinely wanted 
to try and convince Rıza or was merely attempting to overshadow him and take over 
the leadership of a united opposition movement.  
 
It is likely that Sabahettin genuinely thought this to be a fair point to yield to the 
Armenians but he must have been convinced to do this by Ismail Kemal and by his 
own personal admiration for the British.
38
 The relationship between Sabahettin and 
Ismail Kemal must have been a very close one. Apart from their view on the 
Tanzimat in general, which, according to Ismail Kemal ―inaugurated the era of 
equality and justice for all the people in the Empire, [and which he described as] of 
great and far reaching importance[,]‖39 but was not shared by Sabahettin, the two 
converged on a number of issues. One of the reasons for their common stance at the 
Congress on the issue of foreign intervention and their antagonism with the 
Mechveret group could be the common conviction that basing the inspiration for 
reform from the West solely on France had been a mistake. The other reason could 
be that they both agreed that political and administrative centralisation had been 
counterproductive as it had encouraged tensions between ethnic and religious 
minorities and had contributed to more Ottomans from these minorities falling for 
the nationalist and separatist discourse opposed to Ottomanism.
40
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Sabahettin, according to Ismail Kemal‘s memoirs, thought the latter‘s attendance to 
the Congress so instrumental that he went to Brussels to convince him to come. 
Ismail Kemal accepted on two conditions:
41
 the first condition was that all ethnic 
groups should be represented at the Congress as, he wrote in his memoirs himself: 
―[i]t was essential, in my opinion, to show that those who were against Abd-ul-
Hamid were acting simply and solely with a view to creating a national Government 
that should be equally impartial and beneficent to all the peoples of the Empire.‖42 
The second condition was that, since the countries signatory to the Paris and Berlin 
Congresses of 1856 and 1878 had stated that they were actively involved in 
pressuring the Ottoman government to adopt far-reaching reforms, one of the aims 
of the Congress was to discuss the active participation of Europe. According to 
Kemal‘s own memoirs, Sabahettin and Lutfullah both agreed with him. Beyond 
Kemal‘s views, it is also important to consider that Sisyan Efendi,43 an Ottoman 
Armenian delegate, was equally convinced that unity between the Young Turk and 
the Armenian groups could only have taken place following a prior agreement on 
foreign intervention.
44
 This was the fateful end of the first day of work.
45
 The 
promise of the delegates was to sleep on this proposition and hold a constructive 
debate on the following day. Yet, the conclusion of the first day seems to have 
marked the collapse of unity among the opposition factions. 
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As is to be expected, during subsequent discussion on this issue, the Armenian and 
Albanian factions, represented there by Sisyan Efendi and Ismail Kemal Bey,
46
 
accepted the new proposition warmly and were backed up by Sabahettin, Lutfullah 
and a large number of the Greeks and Albanians present at the Congress. On the 
opposite side, stood the group that emerged as the minority group. According to 
Mechveret – the only source providing delegates‘ names – the minority group was 
composed of ―Halil Ganem, Hodja Kadri,47 Férid Nazim, Hamdi, capitaine d‘état-
major et Ahmet Riza, … .‖48 The group condemned the idea of foreign intervention 
and issued the following statement:  
The Constitution is the guarantor of the felicity and salvation of all the 
different Ottoman subjects, we have no need for the acts of assistance 
of the great powers and asking for such assistance is impossible. Even 
if it could be envisaged, it could act not in favour, but rather against us. 
Such help would damage our national feeling. Let us work on our own, 
let us trust and rely on our powers...
49
 
 
So fundamental was the disagreement between the two factions, that Rıza, as late as 
1906, accused Sabahettin and those in his camp of betraying the Ottoman cause for 
the benefit of the minorities and Europe: ―… ils cherchent à se conformer 
servilement aux desiderata des Européens.‖ 50  The stance of Mechveret was not 
limited to a theoretical premise or the commemoration of past European intervention. 
What especially enraged Rıza and his associates was the current European 
involvement in the Armenian cause, which represented yet another intrusion 
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disguised under the appeal to the rights of peoples. As I have explained in Chapter 3, 
such intervention was totally against the course of action envisaged by the 
Mechveret group. Two years after the Congress, in 1904, Mechveret translated an 
article published by the journal Şura-yı Ümmet, in which England and France were 
accused of being hypocritical in their request of reform for specific sections of 
Ottoman society only. Both Mechveret and Şura-yı Ümmet upheld not only the 
rights, but also the duties of peoples, in this case the Armenians of the Empire, to 
ask for equality, justice, and freedom. Therefore, according to Rıza, the Young Turk 
movement as a whole recognised the importance of these claims and considered 
them a given. What could not be overlooked, though, were the pressures exercised 
upon the Empire by the two European countries: ―... ce droit et ce devoir que nous 
reconnaissons aux Arméniens, l‘Angleterre ne les admet pas en totalité dans les 
Indes et en Irlande, non plus que la France en Tunisie et en l‘Algérie.‖51 
Back in the Congress, in response to the Mechveret group, the majority issued a 
fairly long declaration in defence of foreign intervention, of which the most salient 
aspects were: 
The European intervention will happen sooner or later. … We will 
request help from Europe together with all the Ottoman peoples in 
harmony; this way, the intervention would not be against us, we want 
to turn it to our favour. Yesterday, the interventions were made for 
Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia and Crete;
52
 [if we do 
not act], tomorrow they will be carried out in the heart of Anatolia, in 
front of our capital‘s door.53 
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The minority group maintained that foreign intervention was always motivated by 
the interest of the intervening countries and that the Ottomans themselves were 
supposed to deal with their own problems. They argued that finding a solution to 
this fundamental issue would constitute a first step towards reform and 
modernisation and would signal the initial stage of a process of maturation of the 
Empire, its emancipation from foreign tutelage, and its rightful appeal to belonging 
to the club of modern countries. On the other side, the stance of Sabahettin and those 
around him was based on the premise that an intervention was forthcoming, whether 
invited or not and, therefore, it would have been in the interest of all Ottomans of the 
opposition spectrum to actively negotiate its form and direction. In an attempt to 
bring the minority within the understanding of a shared decision, Sabahettin added 
that ―[w]e will request help from Europe together with all the Ottoman peoples in 
harmony, in this way the intervention is not against us, we want to turn it to our 
favour.‖54 
 
As much as the Mechveret group remained adamant in its refusal of European 
involvement, so did Sabahettin and those around him, who maintained their stance. 
In 1905, three years later, on the pages of the Courier Européen, Sabahettin 
reiterated his point of view on the matter. This time, he added that if specific steps 
were to be taken by the Ottoman population, then intervention could possibly be 
avoided. As reported by Paul Fesch, Sabahettin stated: 
L‘intervention étrangère, incompatible, il est vrai, avec la souveraineté 
nationale et peu désirable quand on peut l‘éviter, n‘a rien de bien 
alarmant quand elle se produit dans un but restreint, déterminé et utile 
au pays. Assurément, s‘il y a entente préalable sincèrement, 
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solidement établie entre les principaux éléments de l‘empire, 
l‘ingérence politique limitée de l‘Europe, telle qu‘elle se trouve 
spécifiée dans l‘article 61 du traite de Berlin, par exemple, ne pourrait 
rien avoir d‘alarmant, par cette raison très suffisante que les habitats 
de l‘Empire, appliquant eux-mêmes les réformes, rendraient cette 
intervention absolument inutile. Au contraire, une intervention 
militaire provoquée par une situation tout à fait chaotique pourrait 
produire des effets désastreux pour tous. Qu‘il me soit permis 
d‘ajouter que, si nos compatriotes Arméniens avaient fait seulement 
une partie des efforts qu‘ils ont déployés à l‘étranger, en vue de 
s‘associer au mouvement libéral turc, le régime actuel aurait disparu 
depuis longtemps.
55
 
 
However, by the time Sabahettin expressed these thoughts, it was too late; the break 
within the movement had reached such proportions that efforts at reviving it could 
not bear fruit. But what can be inferred from the above extract is that Sabahettin 
displayed some flexibility in comparison to Rıza on their respective plans for the 
future. Whereas Rıza hardly changed his take on European intervention as well as on 
the issue of the Armenian contribution to a united plan, Sabahettin seems to have 
been, on this issue, more in tune with the reality of the Empire and its needs at 
different points in time. Therefore, the issue of foreign intervention was a crucial 
one in making or breaking the unity within the Young Turk movement. It started as 
a preliminary discussion, or at least so it was hoped, and instead ended up being the 
issue on which this much sought-after entente foundered. 
 
The second day and after: things fall apart 
Both Mechveret and Osmanlı reported that the second day of the Congress started 
with the two sides already distant in their aims and prepared to raise more issues 
rather than work together. Immediately, the group around Rıza asked Sabahettin, in 
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his capacity as president, to clarify on what grounds certain people within the 
majority were representative of a current; by this, they questioned the choice of 
candidates that had been made by the two princes when they sent out the invitations. 
The accusatory stance towards the Armenian delegates, who constituted partly those 
groups whose representativeness was being doubted, is mirrored in the pages of 
Mechveret.
56
 The Armenian delegation‘s refusal to sign the agreement on the 
programmatic four points gave the Mechveret group the conviction that, by this 
stage, the Armenians were working solely for their own benefit and boycotting all 
that had been done in the way of unity.
57
 
Les patriotes ottomans [wrote Mechveret] ne manqueront pas de juger 
sévèrement l‘acte qui consiste à ne point adhérer à un programme qui 
proclame si largement l‘égalité politique entre musulmans et 
chrétiens. … Ils [Armenians] ne veulent s‘entendre, y disent-ils, avec 
les Jeunes-Turcs que pour renverser le régime actuel. C‘est donc un 
mouvement révolutionnaire seul auquel ils sont prêts à concourir, et 
rien de plus.
58
 
 
After the initial rupture on the issue of foreign intervention, the Congress did not 
move forward. Instead, each position became even more crystallised, with personal 
antipathies and the groups‘ individualistic aims becoming as important as political 
and ideological debates. The Armenians were labelled revolutionaries by the 
Mechveret group, an aggressive gesture given that Mechveret had always placed 
substantial emphasis on the non-violent, non revolutionary intentions of its members. 
The majority group, upon the suggestion of Halil Ganem, made an attempt to 
reconcile the parties by altering the initial document, characterising possible foreign 
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involvement as ―action bienveillante‖ and adding to it the specific type of 
involvement, by qualifying it as ―concours moral.‖59 It was hoped that this would 
ease the differences between the two groups and move forth with the Congress. 
Instead, the minority group did not feel satisfied with the addition and thought it 
would not modify the general sense of the phrase. Therefore, the impasse remained 
and the rest of the Congress was to be substantially unfruitful, with statements and 
resolutions either not agreed upon by the whole opposition or extremely general in 
their aims. The ultimate blow to the Congress was actually provided by the minority 
group, which issued a harsh and uncompromising statement: 
En adhérent au Congrès, nous avions espéré la fusion entre tous les 
éléments ottomans et nous comptions profiter de cette force créée par 
notre union. Nous exprimons ici notre vif regret d‘être déçus dans 
légitimes espérances. … nous ne sommes pas, comme on le prétend, 
hostiles à l‘Europe; au contraire, un de nos principaux désirs consiste 
à voir la civilisation européenne répandue dans notre pays, notamment 
ses progrès scientifique et ses institutions utiles.
60
 
 
Yet, the worst was yet to come. The divisions within the opposition started to 
highlight religious and ethnic differences; and Ottomanism began to slowly lose its 
feasibility as a meaningful movement. Before dwelling on the issue of Armenians‘ 
participation in the opposition, it is instrumental to clarify that no group, however 
antagonistic, had turned against the Armenian component but, as I will mention 
further on, the minority group‘s stance against their actions stemmed from an 
ideological position. It is clear that the Mechveret group was in no way opposed to 
the Armenians from a passage contained in Joseph Denais‘ book; his evaluation can 
be considered reliable since he was close to Sabahettin and therefore in no way 
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predisposed to defend the Mechveret group. Following the clashes between the 
forces of the Sultan and the Armenians in 1894 and 1896, groups of Muslims came 
out to defend them. A wave of arrests followed with, according to Denais, ninety 
people arrested, including a Mufti. As a response to these events, the Ottoman 
émigrés issued a letter. The following passage is taken from La Turquie Nouvelle, 
which features part of this letter and revealing of the spirit of the whole of the 
opposition towards minorities in general and the Armenians in particular: 
… les deux Comités libéraux ottomans, à Paris, le Comité d‘initiative 
privée, ‗Constitution et décentralisation‘ (fonde par le prince 
Sabaheddine) et le comité ‗Union et Progrès‘ communiquèrent 
ensemble à la presse la note suivante: ‗les partis Turcs d‘opposition 
protestant avec indignation contre les atrocités commises dans les 
diverses provinces de l‘empire ottoman, notamment à Van, et contre 
les tortures infligées dans les prisons d‘Erzeroum aux Turcs et aux 
Arméniens qui réclament le régime représentatif‘61 
 
However, the post-scriptum of the issue of Mechveret following the Congress 
heavily accused both the permanent committee and the Armenian delegates. The 
former was blamed for having allied with the latter, with the author of the article 
wondering whether secret concessions had been agreed between the two parties. The 
article, ―Congrès,‖ reminded the readers that the Armenians had left the Congress 
persisting in their unwillingness to vote for any of the clauses put forward. 
Mechveret accused the Armenians of following the pan-Slavic project and of having 
allied with the Macedonian-Bulgarian Committees. The articles closes with the 
following statement: 
Les Arméniens, qui se déclarent hautement eux-mêmes être un comité 
révolutionnaire et réclament l‘intervention active des Puissances 
étrangères, tendront la main droite au Comité révolutionnaire bulgare, 
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et la main gauche au nouveau Comité ottoman que nous attendons a 
l‘ouvre et que nous jugerons d‘après ses actes.62 
 
The delegates of the Armenian organisations Droshak and Henchak responded that 
although the Armenian Committees intended to work with all other organisations in 
the pursuit of the aims set out in the resolution, they would also continue pursuing 
their own particular goals. 
63
 These goals were against the regime and not against the 
existence of the Ottoman Empire, yet they clashed with the ideology of the minority 
group. What provoked reaction was the secondary outcome of the particularistic aim 
of the Armenian section: as mentioned, they held a foreign physical presence to be 
an important factor in the overall reform of the Empire. Following the resolutions 
that opened the Congress, a document containing the common declarations of all the 
participants was drawn up. In this, all the delegates stated that they agreed to engage 
in a common struggle to: 
 
1) transform the present regime into one of freedom and justice, reinstating the 
1876 Constitution; 
2) remind the European powers that it is both their duty and in the general 
interest of humanity to ensure the respect of the international treaties signed 
between them and the Ottoman Empire, so that all parties in the Empire can 
benefit from it.
64
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3) work to reform the Empire, having in mind the needs outlined by the 
Armenian delegates, which included the tight observance of the workings of 
the local administration in those areas inhabited by Armenians; 
4) work for the active inclusion of the European powers, even though a 
minority of the delegates refused any interference in the internal affairs of 
the Empire.
65
 
 
As one can gather from the above, the resolutions which came out of the Congress 
were vague and generic. This was the outcome of a conscious policy, so that 
something even so general could actually be agreed upon. But it was also something 
that would hopefully serve as a starting point, as well as a natural reflection of the 
profound differences among participants. The only tangible result of the Congress 
was that, once the minority group had basically ruled itself out, the majority group 
was able to form the Central Committee of the Ottoman Community of Freedom 
Loving Peoples, Osmanlı Hürriyetperveran Fırkasının Merkez Komitesi. This 
political group led by Sabahettin was to remain in Ottoman political life for a long 
time and would serve as one of the few voices of dissent during the Unionist regime 
after 1908. So, the last session of the Congress ended with the establishment of the 
opposition‘s permanent committee and the elections of its members. The committee 
was composed of seven members, who were chosen almost entirely from among 
those who had backed the idea of foreign intervention. It included three Muslim 
members: Ismail Kemal Bey, Ismail Hakkı Bey66 and Ali Haydar Midhat.67 The 
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three Christian members were: Vasileos Musurus Ghikis Bey,
68
 Fardi Effendi,
69
 and 
a third whose name has been purposely omitted by Mechveret
70
 for security reasons 
and who instead has been named by Osmanlı, as a certain Sinet Bey.71  Prince 
Sabahettin was nominated president and immediately promised to donate a large 
sum, apparently 25,000 francs,
72
 to the newly formed committee. The minority 
group decided to unite and fund a new publication – with the organisational 
guidance of Mechveret – that would primarily address the Turkish section of the 
Ottoman population. 
 
The members of the Committee also worked out and established the articles and 
regulations for the newly formed organisation. The most important parts of the 
regulations were those stating that unity of intent and common goals were shared by 
all those who became members, that the headquarters of the Committee were to be 
in Paris, and that other branches in France were to be soon opened. The aims were, 
once again, so broad and the membership so loose that the Committee could not 
have become, and did not become, a pivotal player in the fight against Abdülhamit II 
and in the promotion of reform throughout the Empire. As we know, after 1902, and 
                                                                                                                                                                   
67
 Ali Haydar Midhat, the son of Midhat Pasha.  
68
 An Ottoman Greek, Ghikis Bey, was ―the son-in-law of Musurus Paşa, former Ottoman 
ambassador to London, [Ghikis] had once been a members of the State Council and had fled to 
Europe on the heels of Damat Mahmut Pasha and his sons.‖ Hanioğlu, Young Turks in Opposition, 
183. He was to become, together with Ismail Kemal, one of the closest associates of Sabahettin. 
Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution. 
69
 Georges Fardis, an Ottoman Greek. 
70
 It is interesting to note that Mechveret, omitting the name of this third member, also specifies that 
this person, who himself asked Mechveret not to be named, had received a strong majoritarian vote. 
This indicates that he was the most favoured of all those elected. According to the journal, this 
member was also a staunch opponent of foreign intervention and probably the only one with these 
ideas within the newly formed committee. ―Le Congrès des libéraux ottomans,‖ Mechveret 
Supplément Français 8, no. 126 (15 February 1902), 4. 
71
 ―Congress of the Ottoman Freedom Loving Peoples in Paris,‖ Osmanlı 5, no. 104 (16 April 1902), 
7. I have not been able to establish who Sinet Bey was. None of the primary and secondary sources I 
have consulted give any more in-depth information. 
72
 ―Le Congrès des libéraux ottomans,‖ Mechveret Supplément Français 8, no. 126 (15 February 
1902), 4. 
244 
 
even more so after 1907, the power of the opposition groups rested with the military 
and activist groups present in the Balkan provinces, and in particular in Monastir, 
Salonika, and Üsküb. 
 
Consequences of the Congress 
In his memoirs, İsmail Kemal summed up the outcome of the 1902 Paris Congress 
of Ottoman Liberals: ―the lack of agreement among the Turkish reformers which 
became manifest during the Paris Congress prevented any possibility of united 
political action likely to give reason to hope for a change in Turkish affairs.‖73 
Similarly, the Congress of Ottoman Liberals was branded as a failure by all the three: 
Paul Fesch, Ernest Ramsaur and Şükrü Hanioğlu.74 The only real immediate and 
tangible success of the Congress was that the organisers managed, for the first and 
last time, to achieve a gathering of all the opposition movements mirroring the 
ethno-religious components of the Empire. In fact, as it will be explained further, the 
other Congress, held in 1907, was much more limited in its ethnic representation,
75
 
so that the failure of the 1902 Congress seems to have hampered a dynamic of 
inclusion. This fact led to another indirect but decisive outcome: positions within the 
opposition groups crystallised so much that the surge of power soon to take place 
from the intellectuals into the hands of the military constituted a turning point. 
Without the rupture within the movement, both the actual organisation of such 
drastic measures as those of 1908, by which I mean the military confrontation 
against the forces of Abdülhamit, and the passing of power to the military wing, the 
Unionists, may have never materialised. Because of the rupture, the different wings 
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became more extreme in their respective views and less willing to collaborate with 
others who, from allies, turned into enemies.  
 
An articulation of the argument that the failure of 1902 marked the end of a peaceful 
course of action – the intellectual phase of the Young Turk movement – and the end 
of Ottomanism as a valid answer to European ideological intrusion can be found in 
Ismail Kemal‘s memoirs:  
… the troubles in Macedonia increased, and the directors of Turkish 
policy at Constantinople, instead of arriving at an understanding with 
the Powers which would have been interested in maintaining Turkish 
integrity, adopted a mischievous policy which drove the people to acts 
of desperation. Having lost all hope of doing anything salutary for 
Turkey, all my efforts, as well as those of Redjeb Pasha and other 
Albanian patriots, were devoted to the task of trying to save Albania 
from the disaster which we now realised was inevitable.
76
 
 
Overall, the failure of 1902 and the political developments after that year and before 
1908 appeared to reiterate the unfeasibility of a peaceful Ottomanist plan. As a 
consequence of the fact that the two currents had fundamentally disagreed, whether 
for ideological or practical reasons, the various groups started leaning towards a 
more activist and less ideological agendas in order to actually bring about the 
changes that each group deemed necessary.  
 
Evaluating the outcomes of the second Congress of Ottoman Liberals, held in Paris 
in December 1907, it is clear how activism was becoming the central feature of the 
discussion. As I have mentioned earlier, the attendance at the 1907 Congress was 
drastically limited compared to what it had been in 1902 – only Sabahettin‘s and 
Rıza‘s groups and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation took part. The aim of the 
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gathering was limited to reaching a theoretical compromise between perspectives, 
without a discussion of political action and legislative projects. This explains the 
marked difference between the two congresses, and, according to Mechveret, this 
was because ―… l‘expérience ayant montré que toute entente a été jusqu‘ici rendue 
impossible par ce fait que chaque groupement s‘acharnait à soutenir son programme 
politique …‖77 
 
It can be noticed that the above is the beginning of a plan of action proving that, by 
1907, and surely by the following year, the intellectual phase had given in to a more 
pragmatist, belligerent one. The same issue of Mechveret contains more details of 
the new approaches to opposition. The new programme envisaged a revolutionary 
option, which in 1902 had been clearly refused by all parties, as much as the 
organisation of an armed resistance. Especially interesting is one of the measures 
that the three organisations set as part of their action: ―La propagande dans l‘armée: 
c‘est-à-dire, prendre les mesures nécessaires pour gagner l‘armée à notre cause 
d‘opposition antigouvernementale … .‖78 
 
A passage from the same article is particularly telling: 
Nous nous unissons pour une lutte commune, tout en respectant 
l‘autonomie de chaque organisation; nous nous unissons sincèrement, 
fraternellement, et avant de commencer la bataille, nous nous 
engageons à ne pas faiblir et nous déclarons au Sultan que nous ne 
déposerons pas les armes avant d‘avoir amené pour la Turquie 
l‘avènement d‘une ère nouvelle. … Le Congres est donc unanime pour 
reconnaitre que tous le groupes d‘opposition doivent désormais 
recourir aux moyens révolutionnaires qui ont donné des résultats 
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encourageants, ainsi que le prouve l‘action révolutionnaire en général 
et l‘action récente des groupes mixtes, turcs et arméniens. Dans 
plusieurs villes des provinces asiatiques, les moyens révolutionnaires 
sont d‘ailleurs imposés et justifiés par les violences mêmes du pouvoir; 
c‘est le régime actuel qui, pas ses crimes, nous a poussés à la 
révolution.
79
 
 
What is surprising about the paragraph above is that it is reported in the journal that 
represented, up until and including the 1902 Congress, the group that opposed 
violence and revolutionary means more than all the others, therefore indicating more 
dramatically the end of an intellectually driven phase and the opening of a 
drastically activist one in which real unity among the factions is not even sought 
after. It is only the removal by force of Sultan Abdülhamit II that interests all the 
parties involved. The fact that every group within the broader movement worked, 
ultimately, for its own gain was considered to be one of the main problems of the 
movement by Rıza, through the pages of Mechveret:  
Les groups politiques qui se trouvent hors de la Turquie pouvaient 
seuls prêcher librement la solidarité, et c‘était, à vrai dire, leur premier 
devoir. Ont-ils bien rempli ce devoir? Hélas! pas tout à fait. On trouve 
sans doute, dans les journaux appartenant aux divers groupes, des 
appels à la solidarité plus ou moins pompeusement présentés. Oui, 
chacun de ces groupes invite les différentes nationalités à s‘unir, mais 
à s‘unir sous son propre drapeau! Il ne faut pas oublier que les divers 
partis d‘opposition ont dans leur poche un remède spécial à l‘aide 
duquel ils prétendent guérir les maux. La malheur est que chaque parti, 
croyant son remède le meilleur et supérieur à ceux des autres, n‘avait 
pas pensé à soigner le mal après une commune consultation. Une 
dissidence régnait donc également entre eux.
80
 
 
To sum up, the Congress that had been convened to establish a unified front against 
the rule of the Sultan ended in rupture between Armenians and the rest, and in a split 
between the two major factions of Sabahettin and Rıza. On the one extreme stood 
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the Armenians and other Christians who pushed for substantial European 
involvement and envisaged an Ottoman Empire divided very much on the national 
lines of the various components. In the middle stood Sabahettin, with the plan of ―an 
Ottoman Confederation in which the various nationalities of the Empire would have 
a great measure of autonomy and in which the main bond would be the dynasty.‖81 
On the other extreme was the Ahmet Rıza–Halil Ganem axis, which represented a 
milder approach to reforming the political entity and, possibly, a bloodless transition 
to another Sultan. However, the Mechveret group represented the section of the 
Ottoman opposition, grouped under the loose umbrella of the Young Turk 
movement, which was quicker to abandon plans and hopes for a multi-confessional 
Ottomanist project. We know that Rıza, after the Congress of 1902, slowly moved 
towards the idea of Turkism. Proof of this is a document dated 1908 in which an 
official of the French government reports that the day after setting foot back into the 
Empire, Ahmet Rıza allegedly proclaimed: ―‘[l]a Turquie aux Turcs‘ et à manifester 
sa mefiance et son aversion envers tous les partis, notamment envers le parti de 
décentralisation du Prince SABAHEDDINE.‖82  
 
Further proof of the fact that the Rıza group was moving towards the Unionist ethos 
of the post 1908 Revolution political scene is given by another French intelligence 
report. Written on the 16
th
 of July 1908, shortly after the Young Turk Revolution, 
the intelligence report claims that the group around Rıza was active in what is 
described as Eastern Rumelia, placing it geographically close to the section of the 
                                                          
81
 Ramsaur, The Young Turks, 73. 
82
 ―Sabaheddine – Loutfoulah / Comité Liberal Ottoman,‖ Préfecture de Police de Paris – BA1653-
17154. 
249 
 
army and the organisation that was to become the backbone of the Unionist Turkist 
policy.
83
 
 
Shortcomings of the Congress 
The Congress was a debacle for different reasons that are not limited to the time of 
the Congress itself but instead have long term repercussions for the history of the 
Empire and the Republic of Turkey  
 
The first setback does not concern issues discussed at the Congress and that 
highlighted a marked difference between the two groups, the majority of Sabahettin 
and the minority of Rıza. Rather, it has to do with an aspect which was wholly left 
out of the discussions, namely religion. Both Sabahettin and Rıza dwelled 
extensively on the future of religion in their writings, yet did not manage to broach 
the issue at the Congress. However, Rıza and Sabahettin, while disagreeing on the 
issue of foreign intervention and on the possibility of a peaceful course of action, 
had demonstrated until that moment a common ground on religion through their 
writings. Being secularists, they both considered religion to be a private issue and 
explained that, what in Europe had been denounced as religious fanaticism, was in 
fact a natural development and the answer to an aggressive policy of Europe that 
was attempting to break Ottoman society along religious lines.
84
 But they had not 
reached any more common formulation on the issue of religion than an 
argumentative defence against yet another European accusation.  
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Indirectly, however, the Congress itself did somehow clarify further the stance of the 
two groups on this issue and, mainly, highlights even more that, with the failure of 
the 1902 attempt, the possibility of an inclusive Ottoman proto-nationalism was no 
longer an option. In fact, I suggest that only through a highly intellectual and 
ideological approach could a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire have stood the 
challenges of nationalism in the nineteenth century. The moment that unity among 
these groups failed to materialise, the religious issue, as embodied in the idea of 
Ottomanism, collapsed. It is fair to wonder, therefore, that had they discussed this as 
the first and most important issue, the Congress could have produced a consolidated 
group, aware of some differences, but set on preserving secularism and religious 
plurality and, as a consequence, the recognition of equal rights of all citizens, 
regardless of creed. However, the fate of the Congress, in respect to issues related to 
religion, could have been either one that confirmed the intellectual nature of the 
opposition group, and in doing so tailored a role for religion but remained in the face 
of practical action very vague; or one that would lose the intellectuality, as it started 
to do, together with a constructive discussion on religion, for the benefit of political 
pragmatism and action.  
 
Practical limitations affected the Congress‘s composition. Many of those coming 
from abroad had difficulties reaching Paris, since police forces in many countries 
worked in conjunction with the Ottoman embassies to prevent delegates from 
travelling. Ethnically and religiously, only the Armenians were invited as 
representatives of their own community, while the Greeks, Jews and other Balkan 
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nationalities were invited on account of their occupational positions.
85
 This excluded 
the Albanians as their opinions were obviously represented, in terms of group, by 
İsmail Kemal himself, who, as mentioned earlier, was close to Sabahettin and could 
exercise substantial leverage over the decisions taken. 
 
This representational inequality is reflected in the final establishment and 
composition of the Committee of Freedom Loving Peoples. As I mentioned earlier, 
the president of the Committee sanctioned by the Congress was Sabahettin, with 
Sathas and Sisyan Effendis, who were both from the ethnic minorities, acting as 
joint vice-presidents. Ali Fahri Bey
86
 and Adossidis Efendi,
87
 also from the 
minorities, were the recording secretaries.
88
 Since the staunchest supporters of 
foreign intervention, apart from Sabahettin, were among the exponents of the 
minorities, the very composition of the committee was biased in favour of this issue 
as part of the final decisions of the Congress – and this, as I argued earlier, was 
central to the failure of the Congress itself. 
 
What became clear during the Congress was that the only point all the delegates 
agreed upon was their hatred for the regime of Sultan Abdülhamit II. This affinity 
proved to be too abstract to consolidate action. In this light, I suggest that the 
Congress was an intellectual effort, which crumbled in the face of pragmatic 
demands for activism and political organisation. 
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The conclusion of the Congress, the composition of the committee, and the way the 
minority group was treated, must have been a serious blow for Rıza and his group. 
The closing of the preface to the minutes of the Congress, as it appeared on 
Mechveret, presented a picture of total separation with the Armenians, Macedonians, 
Albanians and with Sabahettin himself: 
C‘est avec le plus vif regret, nous le répétons, que nous nous séparons 
momentanément de nos compatriotes. Ils ne tarderont pas à nous 
revenir dès qu‘ils auront goûté à l‘herbe amère des pâturages 
diplomatiques, mais ils verront alors qu‘ils auront fait le jeu des 
comités révolutionnaires arménien, macédonien et albanais. La 
tactique de ces comités, qui est percée à jour, est, à vrai dire, des plus 
habiles; elle consiste à se présenter devant l‘Europe avec un comité 
ottoman ayant à sa tête un membre apparenté à la dynastie et 
sollicitant l‘intervention de l‘Europe pour le même objet. Toutefois les 
Puissances ne se laisseront pas éblouir, croyons-nous, par cette 
coalition éphémère qui aura contre elle l‘opinion publique en 
Turquie.
89
 
 
The Mechveret group underlined the fact that the meeting, convened through 
personal invitations by Sabahettin and Lutfullah, was not adequately prepared in 
advance. Through the pages of its journal, the Mechveret group claimed that the 
organisers had not fixed a programme in advance with only a few delegates (those 
around Mechveret) having organised a preparatory meeting to discuss the resolutions 
they would work during the Congress. The passage in question, although relatively 
short, is quite revelatory. First, it communicates that Rıza and his group thought the 
remaining delegates came without any preparation, either due to bad organisation, or 
because they were not expecting the Congress actually to bear fruits. Secondly, the 
points adopted by those present at the preparatory meeting, which was organised by 
Mechveret and held at the home of Halil Ganem, were vague: loyalty to the dynasty 
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of Osman, the importance of Islam as reconcilable with the progress of modern 
civilisation, the safeguarding of all the other religious beliefs, the establishment of 
harmony between all the Ottomans entitled to the same rights and, above all, 
adopting the Constitution of 1876 as instrument of unification among  peoples.
90
 
This obviously raises the possibility that it was the Mechveret group itself that did 
not have any positive expectations from the Congress. 
 
Thus, the Congress resulted mainly in ―the accentuation of the difference of views of 
Sabahettin and Ahmet Rıza into a rift …‖91 This divergence seems to have produced 
an ideological impasse for the exponents of the Young Turk movement: it impeded 
on the vision of unity among the opposition groups, it frustrated the ambitions that 
Ottomans alone could remodel their country upon modern lines and, most 
significantly, it challenged the belief that, somehow, Osmanlılık – Ottomanism – 
was still a viable option for the coexistence of the various ethno-religious realities of 
the Ottoman Empire. This multi-layered breakdown led the various exponents of the 
different currents, and especially the ethnic and religious minorities, to realise that 
nationalism, as it had been intended in Western Europe, constituted a direct threat to 
the survival of the Ottoman Empire and, at the same time, the almost inevitable 
future of its political development. 
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Transition from intellectualism to activism 
Soon after the Congress, Ahmet Rıza was drawn towards the idea of the 
Turkification of the Empire while Sabahettin remained attached to the religious 
minorities and, for this, acquired more followers outside the Empire than inside it. It 
can be argued that if the delegates had had the time to get into more nuanced 
discussions during the days spent at the Congress, they would have dwelled more on 
the issue of religion within the Empire. Instead, as a result of the failed attempt to 
unite the opposition in 1902 and of the marked differences among the groups that 
the Congress made manifest, both Turkish and non-Turkish Ottomans opted for an 
ethnically, religiously or linguistically founded nationalism – I will discuss this 
further in the next chapter. This, in turn, inaugurated the period culminating with the 
1908 revolution that was, in the eyes of many, doomed to fail precisely because of 
these factors. In the end, the loss of feasibility of a project based on Ottomanism and 
the crystallisation of nationalist tendencies made the chances for the existence of a 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire extremely slim. By the time of the Second 
Congress of Ottoman Liberals, held, as I mentioned earlier, from 27 to 29 of 
December 1907, participation was extremely limited, hinting clearly at a dimished 
chance of feasibility of the idea of Ottomanism.  
 
The conclusion of this second Congress signalled the dismemberment of an already 
disjointed opposition. The second attempt should in fact be seen as the formal 
acknowledgement of divisions that had ended the intellectual phase of the Young 
Turk movement five years earlier. Moreover, some of the most emblematic figures 
within the organisation decided to withdraw their membership from the Young Turk 
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organisation even prior to this second Congress.
92
 At the same time, the composition 
of the 1907 Congress depicted accurately the composition of those who still believed 
in the idea of an Empire but not in the ideology of Ottomanism. Of the ten men who 
made up the core group that led the Revolution, seven had not been prominent in the 
‗intellectual‘ phase.93 The remaining members formed a society, in Salonika in 1906, 
with the name of Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti. The society had strong military 
affiliations and clearly diverged from the intellectualism of earlier years. The 
Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti sought, right from the start, a new type of membership 
and alliance, with military elements and a provincial base in the Monastir and Edirne 
area. Furthermore, as Erik Zürcher has pointed out, ―[a]t the time of the revolution, 
the CUP had about 2,000 members, of whom about two thirds or more seem to have 
been military men.‖94 The fact that the environment in the post-1902 Young Turk 
organisation was drastically different from before and that the activist current was 
about to have the upper hand is clearly shown by the emergence of a Revolutionary 
Committee.
95
 This was not the first occurrence of the revolutionary option during 
the existence of the Young Turk movement, but the timing, the influence that its 
members had and the group‘s agenda did show some unusual traits. As argued by 
Fesch, these members had spent more time outside the Empire than inside, ―... ces 
Jeunes Turcs révolutionnaires, ... me semblent avoir poussé plutôt sur les hauteurs 
de Belleville que sur les bords du Bosphore ... .‖96 Until then, the activist wings of 
the organisation had emerged inside Ottoman lands (the internal Young Turk 
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branch), rather than in exile (the external Young Turk branch). Similarly, Fesch 
considers them close to French Freemasonry in Paris, which had usually served as a 
place of peaceful exchanges rather than drastic actions.  
 
I suggest that the development of such committees as the Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti, 
is yet another sign of a transition from the intellectual phase of the opposition to the 
activism of the revolutionary option. The names of some of these organisations, in 
fact, were themselves distinct from those of the earlier phase, when references were 
made to science, philosophy and intellectual movements. The Revolutionary Society 
(Cemiyet-i Inkılâbiye),97 to which both Fesch and Hanioğlu refer, chose to establish 
a ‗watchdog‘ under the name of Comité de Salut publique in Istanbul;98 this gesture 
links this phase of the Ottoman struggle to the drastic one of the Reign of Terror in 
the French experience.  
 
Another noteworthy as well as striking difference between the two phases was the 
type and the source of help envisaged to bring about political transformation. Up 
until 1902, The Young Turk organisation had debated the extent of Western moral, 
physical and financial help desired or needed. But when the organisation transited 
onto a new phase, potential links to Britain were abandoned in favour of Germany – 
especially during the preparation for World War One. This shift coincided with an 
internal move towards Turkism within the Empire, and the drastic change in the 
environment was clearly felt by contemporaries. In the Introduction to the Vetluga 
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Memoirs, for example, Ali Necat Ölçen claims that ―[t]hat day [17th of December 
1908, the day parliament reopened] marked the beginning of a period that 
dramatically affected the fate of the Ottoman Empire and, in fact, was the beginning 
of the end. There was no doubt the Empire would one day collapse, but perhaps it 
would not have collapsed so soon.‖99 
 
After intellectualism: the trajectory of Ahmet Rıza and Mehmet Sabahettin 
after the congress 
The Congress of 1902 was a turning point, not only in the history of the Ottoman 
Empire and modern Turkey, but also more directly in the lives of Sabahettin and 
Rıza. After the Congress – and the brief attempt at reaching some agreement 
between the various groups in 1907 – Sabahettin retired from active politics for 
three years, which he spent in solitary confinement. During this time, he convinced 
himself even more so that the Ottoman Empire needed social reform as opposed to 
political solutions.
100
 It seemed for a while that he would not be willing to go back 
to politics and that he had abandoned any plan to constitute or influence an 
intellectual elite that would lay out a path to modernity. This has also been argued 
by Şükrü Hanioğlu, who writes that: 
[a]s we have seen, Edhem Ruhi and Abdullah Cevdet [two influential 
members of the umbrella organisations, and the second, incidentally, 
one of the four founders of the Ottoman Union Society] could not 
induce Sabahaddin Bey to work with them. Apparently the prince had 
no desire to work with members of the old CUP organisation and thus 
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adopted a wait-and-see policy before launching a new campaign 
against both the Ottoman government and the coalition.
101
 
 
Ahmet Rıza, on the other hand, embittered as much as the prince, was drawn away 
from active involvement in Ottoman politics and dedicated himself, at least for some 
time, to reading and contributing to positivist philosophy as well as being part of this 
circle.
102
  
 
Neither of the two, however, would remain outside of politics for long. On the one 
hand, the path taken by Sabahettin is not so surprising: he remained in the 
opposition to the CUP, maintaining a resistant attitude. This was due to his political 
stance as well as his desire to represent an enlightened elite, who could understand 
better what the population at large actually needed. The most surprising move was 
that of Rıza. In 1904 Halil Ganem died, severing the link that tied Rıza with non-
Turkish groups in the Empire. From then on, the Mechveret group, or what was left 
of it, gradually moved closer and closer to the idea of centralisation of power within 
a Turkish-oriented Empire. In relying on the Turkish component, Rıza saw an 
opportunity to promote secularism among the whole population and push forth the 
positivist plan that he had in mind once the revolution had taken place. This agenda 
had been entrusted to him by the Positivist Society in Europe.
103
 After the 
Revolution, he went back to the Ottoman Empire and became the Unionist President 
of the Chamber of Deputies. Once in Istanbul, he was seen as fiercely opposed to 
religion and one of the most radical elements within the CUP, to the extent that the 
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counter-revolutionaries of the 1909 coup demanded his removal from office among 
that of various others.  
 
It seems that after 1902 Sabahettin distanced himself from organised politics of that 
scale, except for a few instances. For example, he remained close to the Balkan 
minorities and, together with Ismail Kemal, travelled to Britain to follow up on 
institutional help that had been promised by some within the British government in 
order to push his own plan ahead. However, as Ismail Kemal himself recalls, 
[a]fter the Congress, without interrupting my residence at Brussels, I 
kept a pied-à-terre in Paris, where, in association with the two Princes 
and other political friends, I continued to push plans for reforms, 
which I must say were based on and supported by nothing but our own 
hopes.
104
 
 
It is after the failure of the Congress that Sabahettin‘s idea of forming a proper 
committee really picked up some momentum. In 1905, in fact, Sabahettin‘s group, 
which until then had no ‗official‘ name, took the name of Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve 
Ademi-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti, the Committee/League for Decentralisation and 
Private Initiative. The organisation had a central branch in Paris and carried out 
some activities in Eastern Anatolia and the Black Sea coast. The main aim of the 
League inside Ottoman lands was to use the Turkish component of the population as 
the vehicle through which ethnic and religious differences would be overcome.
105
 
Even though some links have been highlighted between the events leading up to the 
Revolution of 1908 and the activities of the League, as Hanioğlu reports, its 
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members prepared a report in which they underscored the role of their organisation 
in these events.
106
 
 
The following extract informs us of how programmatically Sabahettin was to 
envisage the future after the Congress; this later extract recalls aspects that made up 
his earlier ideological approach to reform treated in Chapter 4. Sabahettin claimed 
that most of the problems of the Empire resided in the fact that the Sultan could act 
freely and impose anything upon a population that would not be ready to oppose him 
due to acute social paralysis. This paralysis was attributed to lack of education and 
private initiative, which undermined the emergence of an entrepreneurial class, 
engaged in agriculture, commerce, and industry. This situation was also fostered by 
the unwillingness of most people within the Turco-Muslim component to change a 
status-quo in which the larger part of their productive population was absorbed by 
the state through employment in the public sector. In the words of Sabahettin: 
[p]our conjurer le péril que menace la nation, notre jeunesse 
intellectuelle doit se tourner vers les carrières indépendantes et 
productives. Nous devons unir nos forces pour remplacer l‘autocratie 
absolue par une monarchie constitutionnelle et viser à la 
décentralisation qui satisfaira [sic] à la fois les éléments chrétiens et 
musulmans de l‘Empire.107 
 
According to Eric Anduze, Sabahettin quit his exile and went back to the Empire in 
July 1908, after the Revolution. What he would not abandon was his devoted 
opposition to the constituted powers, which were now represented by the Unionist 
government. It is in this government that Sabahettin saw, in many instances, a 
repetition of the repressive regime that the government‘s memebers themselves had 
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supposedly combated for years. It was for this reason, in fact, that he was constantly 
harassed with accusations of plotting to overthrow the Second Constitutional regime. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Sabahettin was, in fact, even accused of having taken 
part in the 1909 counter-coup. Through the pages of Terakki, he constantly debated 
with newspaper editors such as Tanin, and Unionist members
108
 and challenged the 
regime through the foreign press.
109
  
An emblematic passage, from Terakki, is the following: 
Although a long time has passed since the deposition of Sultan 
Abdülhamid and the ruler of the former era, the new government finds 
itself needing to apply a very harsh rule. This shows that Turkey has 
not walked on a very sound and developing path.
 110
 
 
This obviously set him against the CUP and in very good light with liberals both in 
the Empire and in the rest of Europe, which explains his hermit-like lifestyle back in 
Istanbul.
111
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The two aspects, which have been discussed throughout, relating to the outcomes of 
the Congress are the reasons for failing to unite the various groups under one banner, 
and the feasibility of the project, i.e., the Young Turk version of Ottomanism. While 
the concluding chapter will deal with the feasibility of such project, the following 
paragraphs sum up the direct reasons for the relative failure of the Congress.  
 
The major impediment to the success of the Congress was the very nature of the 
opposition groups before and after 1902. It is precisely the existence of what I refer 
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to as the intellectual phase and the lack of intellectualism after this time that tells 
much about the immediate outcome of the Congress. In this, it is instrumental to 
recall the earlier discussion on religion as an example of the predicament in which 
the Ottoman opposition groups found themselves. Both Sabahettin and Rıza had 
broadly similar approaches on the issue of religion and this in some respect united 
the two intellectuals. However, as the aims of the Congress were more pragmatic 
than ideological – the quest for unity, the reaching of a shared plan of action, and the 
establishment of a practical plan for the future in order to change the social and 
political make-up of the Empire – this intellectual approach to programming became 
irrelevant precisely in the urgency of political action. 
This last consideration also points to the fact that the failure of the intellectual phase 
is testament to a discrepancy between the content of the intellectual work of the 
Young Turk émigrés and the actual process of political and social transition. As I 
have argued before, the intellectual exercise carried out was instrumental for the 
emergence of later dilemmas and discussion but was equally ill-equipped to respond 
to the specific demands of the moment. The spirit of the time, unfortunately for the 
likes of Sabahettin and Rıza, was one in which positions were crystallising so much 
that the various components of the Empire needed an active practical approach, not a 
forum for intellectual debates. 
 
However, I argue that even if the Congress failed to meet the aims for which it had 
been organised, it nevertheless resulted in a more long-term success, namely, the 
benefits resulting from having, within the broader organisation of the Young Turks, 
an external branch that relied heavily for success and conceptualisation on being in 
exile. 
263 
 
It is clear that exile gave the chance to gather, for the first and last time in the history 
of the Young Turk organisation, the most representative pool of Ottomans of 
different ethnic and religious backgrounds. As I have shown in this chapter, the 
Congress did not manage to create a united front of opposition. However, the 
repercussions on an ideological plane shaped the legacy and success of this period. 
As much as the short-lived First Constitutional Period (1876-1878) served as a 
source of inspiration for many Young Turks, so did the intellectual and ideological 
work of the organisation carried out abroad between 1895 and 1902, impacted on the 
future statesmen of the Empire and early Republic.
112
 The dilemmas that are still 
being discussed nowadays in Turkey on issues such as the role of religion in the 
public sphere, the appreciation of the Ottoman past, and the place of Turkey in the 
geopolitical space, are frequently connected to this period, which was a vital part of 
both the ‗longest century‘ of the Ottoman Empire and, I contend, the most formative 
era of the Turkish Republic. In conclusion, what this chapter has highlighted is that 
the story of the intellectual phase of the Young Turk organisation is somewhat ironic 
and decisively poignant: it was doomed to fail in order to allow for tangible 
outcomes but was crucial to the formation of the future ideological, practical and 
social developments of the Empire and the Republic. 
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION  
This dissertation explored the writings of Ahmet Rıza and Mehmet Sabahettin, 
leaders of the Young Turk movement abroad, with a view to examine a strand of 
ideology and a specific type of activism that have been so far overlooked in the 
historical literature. It argued that, by providing the opportunity to publish journals 
more or less uninhibited by censorship, exile became central to the development of 
this strand of the movement. Escaping the censorship regime put in place by the 
Sultan inside the Empire‘s borders, Young Turk activists published the journals they 
wanted, using the political language they thought was most effective to garner 
support within the Empire and the international community. Apart from one legal 
suit initiated by the French government, which ended well for Mechveret, the 
opposition abroad managed to express their political and social grievances and 
create a forum around their journals and activist groups. 
 
Yet, I maintained that exile was not solely an escape; figures such as Rıza and 
Sabahettin aspired to penetrate and gain the recognition of a European and, to an 
extent, global intellectual elite. This affiliation gave them more than visibility; it 
offered them a feeling of spiritual and social belonging and the opportunity to reach 
a level of theoretical synthesis that matched the dynamism and richness of the 
Parisian intellectual life. As discussed, Rıza enjoyed the company of many 
philosophers, and specifically of Gustave Le Bon, during les déjeuners du mercredi, 
while Sabahettin met with Edmond Demolins, among many others. As I have 
presented earlier, the meeting with the group of La Science sociale and the reading 
of Demolins‘s book, changed his life forever. Beyond their personal encounters, the 
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two figures had the opportunity to contribute to transnational intellectual projects by 
writing for journals such as La Revue Occidentale and The Positivist Review.  
 
The combination of exile and their participation in the philosophical circles of the 
time influenced Rıza and Sabahettin into thinking that their mission was to save the 
Empire from collapse through daring, ambitious, and somewhat unrealistic, 
approaches to social and political reform. As we saw, Sabahettin recalls his initiation 
into social science as a mystical experience in a bookshop, whereby he felt to be the 
‗chosen one‘, a quasi-messianic figure. 1  Ahmet Rıza‘s adoption of Le Bon‘s 
approach as his inspiration is equally revelatory of a romantic elitist approach. Le 
Bon‘s elitist awareness, clearly evident in the work of Rıza is summarised below: 
Civilisations as yet have only been created and directed by a small 
intellectual aristocracy, never by crowds. Crowds are only powerful 
for destruction. Their rule is always tantamount to a barbarian phase. 
A civilisation involves fixed rules, discipline, a passing from the 
instinctive to the rational state, forethought for the future, an elevated 
degree of culture — all of them conditions that crowds, left to 
themselves, have invariably shown themselves incapable of realising.
2
 
 
However, this top-down approach and their affinity with elite circles was a double-
edged sword for both Rıza and Sabahettin; on the one hand, they reached a level of 
consistency and abstractness that lay the foundations for future ideological 
developments both in the short term and the long run.
3
 On the other hand, their 
project lacked a method of mass-distribution, a fact that hindered the translation of 
their ideas into action. 
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Regardless of their inability to turn this exiled opposition into a united front, these 
two activists were key figures during a specific formative period of Ottoman history; 
what has clearly emerged from this study is that the period surveyed, 1895 to 1902, 
constitutes a specific phase in the history of the Young Turk movement, which I 
labelled the ‗intellectual phase‘. Before the total defeat of the organisation inside the 
Empire in 1896, the Young Turk émigrés constituted only a branch of the 
organisation, the external one. Because the internal branch was supposed to be the 
central one, and because it was mainly composed of military officers and 
bureaucrats who leaned towards pragmatism, the external members were not free to 
pursue their own intellectual venture as they pleased but were tied to the decisions of 
the internal organisation. However, with the dismemberment of the latter in 1896, 
the Young Turks in Europe were empowered to pursue their own visions; since no 
longer accountable to the political planning of the internal branch, these figures were 
able to develop their intellectualism.  
 
Their independence from the internal branch made Rıza and Sabahettin‘s powerful 
enough to formulate their own ideological approach towards reform, which, as we 
have seen in Chapter 5, stopped short of organised action at the Congress of 
Ottoman Liberals in Paris in 1902. In fact, the Congress held in February 1902 was 
the first and last instance in which Ottomans representatives of the various ethnic 
and religious communities gathered together with the aim of cooperation. It was 
there that the intellectualism of Rıza and Sabahettin crumbled before the pressing 
concerns of organisation and action. Sabahettin‘s idea of a total restructuring of 
society, from a communitarian to an individualistic (British liberal) one, and Rıza‘s 
rather unrealistic conceptualisation of Ottomanism as a frame of belonging that 
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would supersede any ethnic and religious division sanctioned only by the upholding 
of existing laws, were difficult approaches to materialise. The two ideologues did 
not take into consideration the pressing needs and realities of the moment, such as 
the physical removal of Sultan Abdülhamit II. Likewise, some of the tensions within 
their respective ideological visions were not addressed sufficiently: their version of 
political secularism was not clearly articulated in relation to a religious experience 
(Muslim and non-Muslim) within the Empire and, as a result of this ambiguity, their 
appeal to a supra-national discourse such as Ottomanism became problematic both 
to minorities and to elites wishing to preserve their cultural prestige.  
 
The idea of Ottomanism, as I argued in the thesis, needs to be scrutinised in order to 
adjudicate whether the different plans put forth by Rıza and Sabahettin were viable 
at that stage. I established that both ideologues based their plans on the idea of 
Ottomanism, albeit with noticeable differences (Sabahettin‘s federalism was not 
identical to Riza‘s proto-national ideology). I also narrated that the ethnic and 
religious components of the Empire were well represented at the 1902 Congress 
where the concept was debated most seriously. It is worth, therefore, assessing how 
the various communities that made up the Empire looked at Ottomanism as their 
possible political and social future. In sum, was Ottomanism an entirely utopian 
vision born and bred in exile, or did it encapsulate the hopes and agendas of some of 
the Empire‘s components?  
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Renzo Falaschi presents an account of the events of this period through two 
documents he collected.
4
 Even though the author shows the actions of the Albanian 
committees as ultimately geared towards the formation of an Albanian state, the 
situation at the beginning of 1900 is one in which the different ethnicities still seem 
to operate under the banner of Ottoman unity. When Ismail Kemal toured the whole 
of Europe looking for allies both within the Young Turk movement and among 
European circles, his intention was to promote the cause of the minorities and, 
possibly, work towards a federal re-organisation of the administration in Istanbul. 
This was surely the case until 1912:
5
  
[t]he deep rooted habit of respect towards the Empire, the persuasion 
that none of the national communities – which like a mosaic 
constituted the Empire itself – would not yet be ready to acquire by 
itself economic independence, the understanding that the time was not 
yet ripe for the division of the Empire – whose survival, for similar or 
different reasons, was at the heart of all the European powers – all 
these considerations induced people [Albanians and other minorities] 
not to rush events and limit aspirations to what was realistic and 
actually achievable.
6
 
 
This quote reveals an apprehension that cultural and religious pluralism, central to 
the activism of the minorities, would not be a central part of the Young Turk agenda. 
Nonetheless, the minorities (Albanians and others) still considered themselves part 
of the Young Turk opposition, eve if only due to practical considerations. 
 
As for the Arab provinces, Kayalı7 and Zeine Zeine8 demonstrate that certain secret 
societies that emerged from the 1980s onwards were in fact opposed to the Istanbul-
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based Young Turk movement, though, ―these initiatives remained restricted to a 
small group and did not constitute the basis of an Arab movement.‖9 During the 
period surveyed throughout this thesis, Arab participation inside the Young Turks as 
in the case of Halil Ganem – was strong; and this is a testimony that Ottomanism 
was considered a possibility by both the Turkish component and by the Ottoman 
Arab community. To add to this, Kayalı provides clear evidence of a substantially 
large number of Ottoman Arabs within the Young Turk movement: 
One of the principal envoys Abdülhamid sent to Europe to contact the 
Young Turks and win them over was Najib Malhama, his Lebanese 
Christian security chief. The choice of Malhama undoubtedly had to 
do with the large number of Arabs, mostly Christian, among the 
Young Turks in Europe.
10
 
 
Another instance of Arab support is the case of al-Antaki, who had supposedly 
accepted the Sultan‘s offers to come back to the Empire and leave the opposition. 
Instead of siding with the Sultan, al-Antaki started gathering information on behalf 
of the Young Turks of Paris.
11
 A certain Ahmed Wardani became the spokesperson 
of the internal branch in contact with Ahmet Rıza in order to negotiate and organise 
the unification of the two branches.
12
 The picture that Kayalı gives us of the 
relationship between the Young Turks and Arabs is an intimate one, in which the 
Arab provinces constituted not only the birthplace of some of the activists in Paris, 
but they also served as hiding place for some others. These provinces were also the 
debating grounds for the ideas of the key exponents, like Rıza and Sabahettin. In 
sum, Kayalı does not suggest any real antagonism towards the concept of 
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Ottomanism. However, from the time of the 1908 Revolution, and immediately 
afterwards, Kayalı states that the Ottomanist project would have been extremely 
difficult to implement: ―[w]hile it would take longer for Arabism and Turkism to 
find political expression, a meaningful synthesis of the two under a redefined 
Ottomanism (such as the Young Turks would attempt) was prejudiced by the modes 
of expression of the two trends [Arabism and Turkism].‖13 Hence, while Kayalı 
reports a degree of cohesiveness between the two components, Arab and Turkish, he 
alludes to signs of ethnic, linguistic and cultural affiliation that were starting to 
become more evident in this discussion.
14
 
 
The appeal that Ottomanism had is equally evident in the life of Shlomo Yellin 
investigated by Campos. A convinced Ottomanist, whose brother, David, was a 
staunch supporter of Zionism, Shlomo, also known as Süleyman, spent a substantial 
part of his life after the 1908 Revolution alerting people to the dangers of Zionism 
that would undermine the idea of Ottomanism in the eyes of the Jewish 
community.
15
 A similar instance from the side of the Greek minority was that of 
Pavlos Carolidis, explored by Kechriotis. Carolidis was born in a village near 
Kayseri in 1848, studied history at the universities of Athens and Tübingen and was 
elected deputy of Izmir to the Ottoman Parliament in 1908. He took this 
appointment seriously and invested in the possibility of working within an 
Ottomanist framework. He had a ―strong belief that the new regime would open the 
ground for a sincere understanding between the Greek and the Turkish 
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element … .‖16 Whether Carolidis was mistaken in his hopes or not is not our 
concern here. What I want to highlight, rather, is that if in 1908 there were still 
adherents to an Ottomanist vision, we can assume that support was even stronger 
during the period 1895 to 1902 when this ideological discourse was at the forefront 
of the opposition movement. 
 
Of Ottomanism‘s various sides, the one that concerned political organisation on a 
federalist scale emerged as the most viable path thanks to its appeal to minorities. 
Çağlar Keyder claims that ―a constitution providing universal and equal citizenship 
combined with ethnic and territorial autonomy might just have saved the Empire and 
avoided the excesses of nationalism and of the nation-state.‖17 In this, he gives much 
credit to Mehmet Sabahettin‘s propositions, which, in hindsight, appear as more 
applicable than those of Rıza.  This federalism would maintain the much-sought 
unity without requiring an unrealistic degree of affiliation among the various 
components, who would enjoy self-government. If pushed by a united front, such 
plan could have satisfied the majority and ensured the survival of the house of 
Osman.  
 
Despite the fact that no such plan was put forward after the failure of the 1902 
Congress, the idea of Ottomanism did not completely disappear after 1908; its 
survival reinforces my claim that Ottomanism, as developed by Rıza and Sabahettin, 
would continue to be an influence on political discourse for many years to come. In 
1908, a French observer reported on the matter as follows: 
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Les Arméniens ne le revendiquaient pas au lendemain des massacres 
d‘Anatolie. Les Grecs seront loyalistes, si les Turcs les traitent avec 
justice et leur attribuent la –part à laquelle ils ont droit. Le patriotisme 
de chacun dépendra de la manière dont la nouvelle patrie ottomane se 
comportera avec tous les enfants.
18
 
 
After the Revolution, more and more CUP members, who had at different times and 
to varying degrees been members of the Young Turk movement, turned from 
Ottomanism to Turkish nationalism, leaving those who did not very little room for 
manoeuvre. As this shift to Turkish nationalism became more pervasive, not only 
the ideology but also the political and social environment around the Turkish and 
Arab components made a federal option more unlikely.
19
 However, sources also 
point to the fact that, in spite of the rigged elections in 1912, the federal plan was 
still popular: 
In the Arab provinces of Syria, Beirut, and Aleppo, and the sanjak of 
Jerusalem, twenty-four of the thirty deputies had already switched to 
the Entente [Sabahettin‘s party], and, before the CUP began to use 
state resources to manipulate the campaign, the urban vote seemed 
poised to bring in the Liberals as the majority party.
20
 
 
It is worth signalling that the idea of decentralisation within a framework of 
Ottomanism was coherently formulated by Sabahettin but was not limited to him. 
Ismail Kemal
21
 was a proponent of the same vision; according to Falaschi:  
[u]pon his experience as careful and devoted administrator and from 
his liberal and modern background, Ismail Kemal became convinced 
that it would have been necessary to abolish the absolute 
centralisation as a sole administration could not have satisfied the 
needs of peoples so different among each other in culture, religion, 
customs and climatic and geographical realities. In brief, the concept 
that Ismail Kemal would have accepted as a first step would have 
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been that of the transformation of the Empire in a federation, maybe 
vaguely resembling the Swiss system, in which each different 
community would administer itself autonomously within the same 
economic and political community.
22
 
 
Having established that Ottomanism represented an option for socio-political 
engineering well into 1908 – and therefore surely in 1902 – it is important to address 
the failure of the intellectual phase of the Young Turk component. Among the 
multitude of explanations that could address this question, the one most closely 
related to this thesis is that intellectualism was the movement‘s motivating force and 
equally its ultimate flaw. Such emphasis on intellectualism prevented the Young 
Turk figures in question from conceptualising a mechanism of implementation of 
their ideology on a bigger scale and in the short run. Instead, the pragmatism and 
authoritarianism of the Unionists first and of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk later created a 
momentum for drastic changes that could actually take place. However, it was the 
robust intellectualism of Rıza and Sabahettin that allowed Young Turk ideology to 
leave an important legacy and inaugurate pivotal discussions that have been debated 
in the post-1908 imperial environment, in the Republican era, and in the present. 
Such discussions revolve around: the meaning of modernity; the idea of cultural 
belonging in relation to an ‗East‘ or a ‗West‘; and the role and status of religion in 
society. Such issues were debated by Ziya Gökalp in 1923
23
 and, equally, by the 
wider population in modern Turkey during the 1990s, as Yael Navaro-Yashin 
illustrates.
24
 In fact, she argues
25
 that contemporary Turkey is defined through these 
on-going debates about culture, religion and the state; these debates prove that the 
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dilemmas tackled by Rıza and Sabahettin are relevant to our understanding of 
present day dynamics in citizenship and in governance.  
 
Specifically, these debates have found increased resonance in the 1980s and onward, 
with the emergence of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis, which responded to the 
specific type of nationalism promoted by Kemalism during its fifty years in power. 
The ideologues of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis, the members of the Aydinlar Ocaği, 
and the upholders of Republicanism, lately grouped as Ulusalcılar and attempting to 
distance themselves from both the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and from the 
Turkish Islamic Synthesis, dispute issues that must have sounded very familiar to 
the intellectual Young Turks: the degree of foreign cultural influences considered 
beneficial, the choice between adoption or adaptation vis-à-vis the West, and the 
role of the state ―as an active agent in engineering cultural and intellectual life.‖26 
Equally, they negotiate the role of religion in the public sphere and in governance, 
the meaning of national culture, and the role of the family in society.
27
 To some 
extent, it is ironic to see that the social class that promoted the Turkish Islamic 
Synthesis were the entrepreneurs, precisely the section of society that Sabahettin 
thought pivotal for the development of his liberal-secular ideas. He would have 
repudiated the patronising relationship between state and citizen as well as the 
family metaphor altogether, but he would certainly agree with the idea of Turkey as 
composed of multiple realities and affinities that have been its territorial and cultural 
legacy since the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in 1299. What we witness 
therefore today, is a continuation of debates set up in the previous century and 
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consolidated during the particular phase of the Young Turk movement I examined in 
this thesis 
 
To conclude, the intellectualism of Rıza and Sabahettin may have impeded on the 
actualisation of plan for a reformed Ottoman Empire by the end of the nineteenth 
century, but their debates and conversations are still pertinent. Their relevance today 
proves my central claim that these two figures, influential ideologues and passionate 
though less effective activists, have been critical agents of Ottoman modernisation 
and, by consequence, that their trajectories should be part of the study of modern 
Turkish history. 
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